751G.00/4–2554: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
niact
[Received 10:51 a.m.]
4060. Repeated information niact Geneva 123. For Secretary. For Acting Secretary. Pass to Secretary of Defense Wilson and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Following is personal message from Admiral Radford:
“I was met upon my arrival Paris1 by General Ely who requested a meeting with me Sunday morning. At about 1830 Saturday evening Ely called and requested an immediate meeting preferably before Secretary Dulles departed Paris for Geneva. Ely came to see me at my hotel about 2030 Saturday.
General Ely stated that he came as a representative of the French Government following the Cabinet meeting Saturday afternoon and at the specific request of Bidault and Pleven. He had been asked to talk more as ‘a soldier to a sailor’. He specifically requested urgent air intervention by US Forces at Dien Bien Phu. This request was made with the full realization that such intervention might not be decisive in relation to the outcome of Dien Bien Phu itself which could probably only hold out for a few days anyway. Nevertheless US intervention before the fall of Dien Bien Phu was of utmost importance both from the standpoint of public opinion in France and morale in Indochina. He indicated that US intervention was required to prevent his Vietnamese forces from disintegration as a result of the loss of Dien Bien Phu. Ely added his personal view that the French Cabinet included a few strong men, Laniel, Bidault and Pleven, but that the remainder were quite weak. He anticipates a very serious situation if the US had not responded to the request for assistance prior to the loss of Dien Bien Phu.
I made no commitment to Ely and explained that the US position had been made quite clear by Secretary Dulles to Bidault and Laniel.
Following the conversation between Secretary Dulles and Eden I am endeavoring to meet the British Chiefs of Staff in London Monday afternoon en route to Washington. I expect to arrive back in Washington Tuesday morning.”
Following is comment by Dillon which has been shown to Radford.
In view developments last three weeks I am convinced that leaders of French Government have never informed full Cabinet of requests for US armed intervention. The Cabinet meeting referred to by Radford was actually a restricted meeting attended only by Laniel, Pleven, Maurice Schumann (for Bidault who was busy with Secretary and Eden), Armed Service Secretaries and General Ely. This group has been and remains willing to take entire responsibility for request for US armed aid on the basis that everything possible must be done to [Page 1403] save or assist the garrison at Dien Bien Phu. If such aid is given it is my opinion, fully supported by Bidault, that French Forces will continue to fight in Indochina regardless of result of Dien Bien Phu. If such US armed aid is not given, the fact of US refusal or inability to help will inevitably become public knowledge. I feel that reaction in France where knowledge of US constitutional processes is almost nil will be that US desires that French personnel should contrive to bear the full burden of the fighting against the Communists.
I feel the inevitable result will be the prompt overthrow of the Laniel government which has done its best to carry on in Indochina and its replacement by a government pledged to negotiate with Ho Chi-Minh and to withdraw French Forces from Indochina. I do not think that such a government would accept US armed aid in Indochina even if it were freely offered.
In short we must in making our decision realize that military intervention by US Forces in next few days prior to fall of Dien Bien Phu appears to be the only way to keep the French Union Forces fighting in Indochina and so to save Indochina from Communist control.
- Admiral Radford arrived in Paris on Saturday, Apr. 24, 1954.↩