751G.00/4–2354: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

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Dulte 10.” Eyes only Acting Secretary. At Quai d’Orsay dinner tonight following developed through bilateral talks:

1.
Pleven informed me that “cease-fire” referred to in Navarre’s message1 would in his opinion not be local, but general throughout Indochina.
2.
Eden expressed to me grave doubts that Britain would cooperate in any active fighting to save Indochina. He expressed fear that United States intervention might initiate World War Three and urged we should take no such action without prior consultation. He expressed view that there should be prompt military consultations in Washington, including representatives of Thailand to make plans to endeavor hold situation if Indochina lost. He said he did not believe that Churchill cable to President2 was primarily related to Indochina situation.
3.
Bidault expressed to Dillon his belief that if United States participated to help save Dien Bien Phu and if this help proved inadequate for that purpose, under these circumstances, French would as matter of honor go on fighting. However, he expressed to me the view that assuming Dien Bien Phu fell without United States intervention, he saw no hope of any French reaction, other than acceptance of defeat and probably leftwing government which would hold office on sufferance of Communists, although probably without open Communist participation.
4.
Gruenther expressed view he had never seen French morale so low.
5.
There seems to be some possibility that a new formula can be found to satisfy Mollet3 regarding EDC. However, this calculation on basis of present political situation and does not take account of repercussions which could come from Indochina.

Dulles
  1. Regarding the message from General Navarre, see telegram Dulte 7, Apr. 23, p. 1374.
  2. Regarding the message from Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower, see footnote 3, p. 1367.
  3. Guy Mollet, Secretary-General of the French Socialist Party.