Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

740.5/4–2354

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor (MacArthur)¹

top secret

[Paris,] April 23, 1954.

Participants:

• Prime Minister Laniel
• M. Vidal
• M. Bougenot²
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mme. Laniel (also present but did not enter into conversation)

I had lunch privately with Mr. Laniel today at the Matignon. Messrs. Vidal and Bougenot were present for most of our conversation, as was Madame Laniel, who did not enter into the conversation.

[Here follows discussion regarding the question of French ratification of the European Defense Community.]

Reverting to Indochina, Laniel then said that if Dien-Bien-Phu fell the entire French picture would be changed. With all Bidault’s qualities he did not think that he, or any other French Foreign Minister, could avoid reaching an agreement with the Communists at Geneva—even if unfavorable—if Dien-Bien-Phu fell.

He said that he had seen General Ely yesterday and asked him the following two questions:

1. Could Dien-Bien-Phu be saved? General Ely replied that if the US would intervene with about 200 to 300 carrier aircraft, he was convinced Dien-Bien-Phu could be saved, but hours were of the utmost importance and in 3 or 4 days such intervention would be meaningless.

2. Could the garrison of Dien-Bien-Phu fight its way out? Ely replied that under existing circumstances it could not make a fighting withdrawal. However, if US aircraft intervened massively, there was the possibility of a French relief column of a few battalions moving up from Laos. This was not a good prospect but might be feasible with US air intervention. Otherwise, it was not possible. Laniel summed up as follows: If Dien-Bien-Phu falls, France will have no choice but to accept a cease-fire. Also, this defeat will have a profound effect on EDC, probably destroying the possibilities of favorable French action.

I said to Laniel that the picture he had painted seemed to me catastrophic in terms of France’s future. In essence, what he was saying was that the fall of a small outpost—important though it might be psychologically—would result in a capitulation by France and other decisions which would nullify all progress made in the past few years in our collective endeavors. It seemed to me that France would be left in a position of weak and defeated isolation. I could not conceive how any Frenchman could reason that the fall of an outpost in Indochina must result in the abandonment of that area and the destruction of the collective defense system which we had together developed for the defense of Western Europe. Laniel replied that he agreed it was not logical but that Dien-Bien-Phu had become a symbol in the minds of the French people and Parliament. It had become a tremendously emotional thing and Frenchmen were no longer capable of reasoning about it. I said that in essence the picture he painted would seem to leave the US no choice but to rethink, not only its strategic policy, but its entire political relationship with respect to France. Laniel said this would be a tragedy and one which he would do his utmost to avert, but he did not think that he could control the ground swell which would follow the loss of Dien-Bien-Phu and doubted that he would be long in office after its fall.

I said that while Laniel had made no direct requests to me for US air intervention, he had certainly implied such a request. On a personal basis I could only tell him that I saw little possibility of any US intervention if it were not part of an effective collective arrangement for united action in that area. In confidence, I could tell him that we had had consultations on a bipartisan basis with members of the US Congress. We felt that if there were effective collective arrangements we would probably be in a position to participate more actively but to ask us to intervene with aircraft to save Dien-Bien-Phu was in effect asking us to commit US prestige to save not only that fortress but the rest of Indochina without any political basis for such action. To me this did not seem possible. Bougenot said that US prestige need not be committed. The carrier based aircraft could be under nominal French command for the strikes and it need not be more than an isolated action lasting two or three days. If necessary, the aircraft could be painted with French insignia. They could, for example, be construed as part of the Foreign Legion for this limited action.

I replied that it just was not possible to commit US forces to battle in the way envisaged. There would certainly have to be Congressional support for such action. We could not commit US forces on a temporary basis as part of either the Foreign Legion or the French military establishment without the support of the US Congress.

Laniel said that if we could do nothing to save Dien-Bien-Phu, he thought the future was very dark. He repeated his conviction based on General Ely’s estimate, that massive US carrier based aircraft would permit the holding of Dien-Bien-Phu.

I said that I was not a military man and, therefore, not capable of any military judgment. Personally I doubted seriously that intervention by aircraft would save the garrison. With respect to the future I thought that one had to always envisage the worst happening and if Dien-Bien-Phu fell in the coming days, I wondered what position his government would take, quite aside from the question of French Parliamentary and public opinion. Laniel said that he could not tell me what would happen. He personally was opposed to any agreement which would lead to the turnover of Indochina to the Communists, whether it be by a territorial division or the fusion of the Viet Nam and Viet Minh governments. However, he thought there would be an irresistible ground swell in France calling for a cease-fire on almost any terms and he did not think any government could remain in power, which did not take this into consideration. He said that no one who did not live in France could understand the depth of French feeling against continuation of the Indochinese war. One might call this psychological, but it was nonetheless a deep and burning reality. Furthermore, if the fortress fell he thought all the Viet Nam fence sitters, including members of the present Viet Nam administration, would scramble toward Ho Chi-Minh’s bandwagon. He did not exclude defections by Viet Nam military units.

I said that I could only repeat what I had said previously, to the effect that it would be a tragedy for France and the free world if everything we had achieved together over the past few years were cast aside because of the loss of a relatively minor outpost in Indochina. I recognized the psychological implications but it seemed to me that the French must think how to limit the damage if Dien-Bien-Phu falls, rather than to throw up their hands in abandonment. Laniel said that he agreed but thought there was no possible way he could see to limit the damage.

In conclusion, he said that he would be glad to have General Ely give the Secretary a first hand estimate of the situation in Indochina from the French military view if the Secretary so desired. I said I believed the Secretary had seen General Ely yesterday³ but would pass on this message. Laniel also said that he understood Admiral Radford was arriving tomorrow. He would like to see Admiral Radford if this were possible. He understood that Radford was sympathetic to the idea of supporting Dien-Bien-Phu with US aircraft and he would appreciate the latter’s estimate on what was possible. I made no comment.

1. This conversation took place at the Hotel Matignon from 1 to 4 p.m. For the portions of this memorandum concerning the European Defense Community, see volume V. The meeting as a whole was summarized in telegram Dulte 9 from Paris, Apr. 23. (740.5/4–2354)
2. Andre Bougenot, Under Secretary of State to Prime Minister Laniel.
3. Reference is presumably to the meeting between Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Bidault on the morning of Apr. 22, reported in telegram Dulte 2, p. 1361. General Ely was present during the portion of that meeting devoted to Indochina.