State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417
Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting at the Pentagon Building, April 23, 1954, 11:30 a.m.1
[Here follow a list of those present (22) and the record of brief discussion of a subject other than Indochina.]
Admiral Radford then reviewed briefly his plans. He was scheduled to leave for Paris that afternoon. He intended to talk to both the French and the British Chiefs, and he had an appointment with Mr. Dulles prior to the Secretary’s departure for Geneva. The subject of these discussions would be the proposal that on a military level representatives of Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Thailand and the U.S. look into the question of building up the military capabilities of Thailand against likely possibility of a debacle in Indochina. The Admiral added that he planned to leave Paris on Tuesday, April 27 in [Page 1368] plenty of time for the NSC meeting in Washington on the Thursday following.2
Mr. Murphy then gave a brief review of our position on Geneva. He emphasized that we were adamant on our position that there was to be no semblance of a five power conference. Mr. Murphy also referred to the present state of EDC, with particular attention to the machinations of the French Socialists which would probably delay ratification of EDC even further.
The discussion then turned to a consideration of the serious situation in Indochina. Admiral Radford referred to the practical factors which a commander-in-chief in Indochina had to take into account. He pointed out that a cease fire, or any other kind of a settlement, did not lessen the possibility of a wide-spread popular uprising, particularly in Hanoi, Haiphong and Saigon. On the contrary, any settlement might be a signal for a general bloody insurrection which would move very fast. The French no doubt have not forgotten the incident which occurred in Hanoi in December 1946, and were without question concerned about the evacuation of dependents from the Tonkin delta.
With respect to Dien Bien Phu, Admiral Radford noted that the picture was extremely dark. He said that there was only enough food and water in the garrison to last for two days. And what would happen when Dien Bien Phu falls, he asked. General Giap, in the opinion of General Cogny, would probably next turn his attentions to the Red River delta, and (again according to General Cogny) would probably be able to overrun it in a matter of some ten days. The Viet Minh could no doubt count on mass defections among Vietnamese troops as a result of the fall of Dien Bien Phu, and this would certainly be of assistance to the Viet Minh.
Admiral Radford recalled a conversation he had had with General de Lattre de Tassigny some two years ago in which the General had stated that there was no need to worry about evacuation because if the situation got so bad that evacuation became necessary, there would be no possibility of evacuation. This was at a time, Admiral Radford said, when preparations were being made by the U.S. (Manila Liaison Group—MLG) and the French to evacuate Americans under our overall evacuation plan. The French would probably try to evacuate to Haiphong, the Admiral continued, but in order to make the operation a success how many civilians would they have to sacrifice? They were numbered in the thousands in the delta. What was much more likely was a situation where the French, and those Vietnamese who had been loyal to them (and thus marked men from the point of view of the Viet Minh), [Page 1369] would have to fight their way out without any chance of orderly withdrawal.
Referring briefly to U.S. policy on the Indochinese question, Mr. Murphy pointed out that we were tied to a difficult political situation in the U.S.
General Ridgway then referred to the experience in Korea, where the situation was a great deal better because it was possible to conduct fairly orderly evacuation operations because of our naval and air superiority.
Continuing on the Indochinese situation, Admiral Radford pointed out that the French were always dealing with intangibles; they could never really catch the temper of the people.
Mr. Murphy then referred to a conversation which he had had in Tokyo in June 1953 with King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia,3 when the King stated that most Cambodians did not regard the Communists as their enemies as much as the French; that the majority of his people would no doubt fold their arms and let the Communists move in if worse came to the worst.
Finally, Admiral Radford referred to the strange attitude of the French, who apparently take the view that they have it in their power to make some kind of a settlement in Indochina without consulting with the Associated States. Such a concept was unrealistic, and the Admiral had noted with approval that Secretary Dulles had spoken a few plain truths on this subject to the French.