751G.00/4–2154: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
2072. Repeated information Paris 685. Paris for Secretary. General O’Daniel has read me excerpts of long Top Secret telegram1 he intends to send to Admiral Radford describing his latest (and frustrating) interview with General Navarre. O’Daniel likewise proposes as an American course of action that Vietnamese National Army in effect be turned over to selected corps of American training experts to be remolded into effective fighting force. This army, apparently under American command, after its period of training would then commence operations from south to north, which would give troops increasing combat experience and thus in O’Daniel’s judgment would place them in juxtaposition with French Forces holding Tonkin Delta at time when real offensive could be mounted next November.
[Page 1359]I suggested to General O’Daniel that, if his concept met with approval in our government, there were two arguments which could be used in convincing French Government that it should agree to this form of joint Franco-American-Vietnamese warfare in Indochina. First argument was General Navarre’s own admission to O’Daniel that it was impossible to train Vietnamese troops to combat fitness and that Vietnamese Army in effect was incorrigible so far as military potential was concerned. If this was so, we could offer to take over job of making real Vietnamese Army. Second argument, which would appeal to French pride and which, of course, was vital if French were to remain and hold Tonkin gap, would be to portray essential role which France would play in maintaining Tonkin Delta, which is historical sally port from China to Southeast Asia. This type of combined operation might lessen dangers of Franco-American friction, since in effect French would control military operations in north and American-Vietnamese command in South.
Foregoing is sent without any judgment on our part as to military feasibility of O’Daniel’s proposal. It is clear, however, that if French assent were to be gained, it could only be after conversations at the highest governmental level, and it is also certain that Navarre would have to be relieved as Commander-in-Chief as he would under no circumstances consent to such a concept.
I suggested to O’Daniel that he request that copy of his message to Radford be passed Paris for the Secretary.2
- Reference is presumably to telegram MG 1122A, from General O’Daniel to Admiral Radford, Apr. 22, not printed. This message was devoted largely to the specifics of MAAG relations with French military authorities and to support for the position that the United States should assume larger training responsibilities. It also reported that General Navarre had stated that due to enemy action, he had had to abandon plans for a fall offensive. In addition, O’Daniel expressed the view that Navarre’s attitude was not conducive to victory, that he did not grasp the importance of the Vietnamese Army, that he lacked the grasp of important tactical matters, and generally “failed to measure up in ability to wage war here on a scale that is necessary to win.” (751G.00/4–2254)↩
- The State Department relayed telegram MG 1122A to Paris in telegram 3818 of Apr. 23. (751G.00/4–2254) On Apr. 24 in Paris, Secretary Dulles asked Ambassador Heath, who was to accompany him to Geneva as a member of the U.S. Delegation, for his opinion regarding the recommendations of General O’Daniel. Heath’s memorandum on the subject which expressed considerable skepticism with respect to the O’Daniel proposals, was submitted to the Secretary on Apr. 26. For text, see vol. xvi, p. 571.↩