751G.5/4–1654: Telegram
The Consul at Hanoi (Sturm) to the Department of State
591. Repeated information Saigon 495, Paris 267. Limit distribution. In farewell call1 I paid him yesterday, General Cogny reviewed once more, but with unwonted bluntness, his differences with General Navarre, particularly regarding conduct of Battle of Dien-Bien-Phu.
Cogny said Viet Minh had planned, and were executing their operation at Dien-Bien-Phu with shrewd attention to all its strategic aspects. He remarked that earlier Viet Minh incursion into north Laos and feint toward Luang Prabang were designed to clear out any French Union units which might threaten their rear when they chose to attack Dien-Bien-Phu. Present “battle of the Hanoi-Haiphong road and railway” is an integral part of the battle of Dien-Bien-Phu, as is generalized upsurge of guerrilla activity throughout delta. Every present enemy action is designed to impede French Union resistance at Dien-Bien-Phu, or else to divert or pin down troops whose efforts otherwise might be brought to bear, directly or indirectly, on Viet Minh Corps de Bataille now engaged at Dien-Bien-Phu.
French Union Forces, on the contrary, are limited to reacting to military situations created by the enemy initiative, Cogny continued. French response to Dien-Bien-Phu is purely tactical, and High Command [Page 1341] has made no effort to call into play those strategic factors, admittedly few in number but still capable of paying dividends, which to some degree it still controls. The two groupes mobiles now engaged in operation “Atlante” should be sent here and employed in lightning raids on Viet Minh bases at, for example, Tuyen-Quang and Yen-Bay. These points are now stripped of defenses and vulnerable to attack and lie across still important Viet Minh supply route from China. Without going into details, Cogny indicated his conviction that attacks such as these and others, could be expected to relieve enemy pressure at Dien-Bien-Phu.
While ground forces at Dien-Bien-Phu have been “magnificent”, fact remains that battle is being fought by Air Force. French have been negligent in providing air support in this area.
When they beseech US to make more planes available, and receive satisfaction, they find themselves short of pilots and hampered by an inadequate infrastructure. A satisfactory air force establishment could radically change present relative positions at Dien-Bien-Phu in favor French Union Forces.
Cogny said he is not certain that a third major assault will be made by Viet Minh before Geneva conference. While a victory over French Forces would enormously enhance their prestige, crushing defeat would be so embarrassing that enemy may not choose to take the risk, and may content himself for time being with attempting to “asphyxiate” French garrison.
General Cogny is confident of the high quality of his men at Dien-Bien-Phu, and feels that they will be able to hold out against a third (and possibly a fourth) major enemy attack, but the long range prospect troubles him.
Cogny remains convinced that French High Command should never have accepted battle in remote jungle of Thai country, for at Dien-Bien-Phu the seven year battle for the Red River delta might very well be lost.
- Sturm was succeeded at Hanoi by Turner Cameron.↩