751G.00/6–1052: Telegram
The Consul at Hanoi (Sturm) to the Department of State
823. Dept pass Paris, Saigon; rptd info Paris 302, Saigon 525. While Tam govt has not yet been sworn in and one week affords inadequate perspective to judge in detail its reception and prospects of success, imminence Letourneau visit makes it appear desirable transmit best judgment on initial impact in Tonkin.
It has been obvious since my arrival here early April that major pol shift was in store. Persons of widely varying pol views have sought me out repeatedly to complain against unpopular and do-nothing Hun Govt, to express their conviction that change must be made promptly and to voice their hope, even expectation, that genuine govt of natl unity might soon emerge. This hope was high and carried with it the possibility if realized, of reaching down into Tonkinese villages and rice paddies to inspire confidence and lend some courage to peasants subjected daily to blandishments of VM and in many cases visited by unspeakable miseries occasioned by war but unlisted in official communiqués. That is not to say delta peasants are pol conscious or even know names of Saigon and Hanoi politicos, but in govt so tightly centralized what happens at the top immediately affects governor and through his subordinates ultimately comes home to least inhabitant of obscurest district. At this hour the let-down in Tonkin among those persons of all stripes who are pol conscious is impressive and disheartening. Even Fr concerned with pol matters, beginning with ComRep cabinet dir himself, are “nauseated” to use expression of ComRep pol chief, who told me he had never before been so tempted to clear out, even though this turn of events was “logical conclusion to long series of disappointments.”
Name of Tam is anathema in Tonkin. Not only is he considered Fr puppet, “cop” and sadist, but also indifferent administrator. His northern cabinet colleagues stem from outer reaches of reaction and include even so equivocal and shady a character as Vu Hong Khanh,1 whom Fr hold responsible for murder by garrotting of not less than ten [Page 178] Fr in Hanoi during Chi occupation. (Khanh at the time was leading “band of pirates”; his victim’s bodies were later found in pit in center Hanoi.) As this tel is being written, Dai Viets still hold out, with result that Tam‘s cabinet as composed so far bears local reputation of being made up of persons qualifiable by one or more of fol epithets: pro-Fr, opportunists, non-entities, extreme reactionaries, assassins, hirelings and, finally, men of faded mental powers. Whether Cabinet members named, who incl six Fr citizens, shld indeed be judged so harshly, I am unable say, but that they are so judged is pol fact of prime importance. If Dai Viets continue hold out and Binh shld at last leave post, any doubt now lingering in north will be resolved against Tam and his crew.
It has been reported this pol development is “major victory for VM.” Some persons go so far as predict uprisings or, at least, defections from Viet Armed Forces. While such dramatic eventualities not impossible, I believe them unlikely assume serious proportions. What does concern me is that fresh impetus may be given in Red River Delta to recruitment by VM, who have been handed propaganda tool which they may be expected exploit to fullest. Highest VM truth is concept of independence (at best an ambiguous term as currently used in Vietnam), any card Franco-Viets can play against it has been vitiated by being dealt to Tam.
Mil balance is now delicate. There have been indications recently Delta populations collaborating more actively with Franco-Viets. If VM recruitment and provisioning cld be held in check and peasant collaboration with Franco-Viets carefully nurtured through effective and sympathetic admin by local reps of natl govt, it shld be possible get over the hump of this crucial [garble] phase of war. Without active participation of a population convinced its best hope lies on this side, war can never be satisfactorily terminated by purely mil forces now available or in prospect. On basis of info available to me, I do not believe Tam govt can rally popular support, or provide leadership, which alone can supplement to the desired end an inadequate mil estab. On the contrary, I feel Tam‘s group will alienate not only many who might have been won over but also many now active this side. Reaction of these people need not be dramatic: abstention alone can rob nation of whatever contribution they might have made.
At the very best it is felt here that under Tam Vietnam will mark time and that govt will not survive more than two or three months.
Pessimists believe retrogression may be rapid. All agree, however, that time is not unlimited and that by force of present events not to go forward is to slip backward. It seems clear that nowhere in south does there exist that sense of urgency which pervades the north, affecting persons as far apart in many essentials as Tri and Linares. [Page 179] A general feeling here is that while little men play politics in Saigon, in this Delta, other men are dying and populations are chivvied endlessly by opposing mil forces.
Under the circumstances politicking seems a tasteless, even sinister, luxury.
There are various candidates for the role of villain in this piece, the Fr, Nguyen De, Tam, possibly even Bao Dai himself. That is a detail to concern local historians at later date. What does concern us now is direct effect of event itself on war in Red River Delta. At best, this effect is negative and it may even be actively deleterious. Whereas under another regime it might have been possible rally considerable numbers of people and so deny to VM by pol means what Fr never cld deny them by force of arms alone, best we can hope for from Tam govt is that it not too seriously harm war effort. That, I submit, is a poor return for Fr blood and American money.
Fortunately two and two do not always make four in FE and things are seldom as good or bad as they seem.
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- Minister of Youth and Sports in the Nguyen Van Tam government.↩