Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/4–1154

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor (MacArthur)

top secret

[London,] April 11, 1954.

Subject:

• Indochina

Participants:

• Secretary Dulles,
• Ambassador Aldrich,
• Mr. MacArthur,
• Mr. Eden,
• Mr. Denis Allen¹

[The following memorandum was dictated by Mr. MacArthur following the dinner at Ambassador Aldrich’s house on April 11 when the conversation reported below took place.² This memorandum has not been seen by the Secretary and represents Mr. MacArthur’s report based on certain notes he took at the meeting.]³

Secretary Dulles outlined the US views on Indochina, indicating that if some new element were not injected into the situation, he feared French might be disposed at Geneva to reach an agreement which would have the effect of turning Indochina over to the Communists. The new element which might be injected was the concept of united action. He described in detail our views on united action. He also briefed Mr. Eden in detail on the present situation at Dien Bien. Phu according to our most recent reports, indicating that it seemed probable that it might fall and that while from a military point of view the loss of Dien Bien Phu would not be disastrous, the political and psychological effects there could lead to a situation where the will of France and the Associated States to continue the struggle no longer existed.

Mr. Eden said that as the British saw it there were two problems connected with the Indochina affair:

1. The local problem of defending Indochina, which was not unlike the Malayan problem but unfortunately it was vastly more difficult. Mr. Eden said he frankly did not know whether Indochina could be held.

2. The general problem of the whole area of Southeast Asia. In connection with this latter problem he thought it was important to have as many nations as possible in Southeast Asia behind a common effort to hold as much of the area as possible. He believed some form of NATO arrangement for Southeast Asia might be the solution. If such an arrangement could be effected, much more could be done but at present there was no basis for collective action. To build up a grouping would obviously take time but he agreed that it was most important to get the native peoples of the area fully in the picture as soon as this was feasible. While Burma would probably not wish to participate it was important to ask them to. The same is true of India and Pakistan, etc.

The Secretary said if invitations to join a pact went to India, Pakistan, etc., which were not really a part of Southeast Asia, it would raise the question of also extending invitations to the Chinese Nationalists, the South Koreans and possibly the Japanese. This might cause complications in getting ahead with the countries which are primarily threatened. We, of course, believe that countries like Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan and India should be kept informed and the Secretary had seen the Ambassadors of these countries prior to his departure from Washington to explain what we had in mind. Also, we thought that any security arrangement for Southeast Asia should be open ended so that eventually other countries might participate. However, to begin with we believed the arrangements should be confined to the ten countries he had indicated. Certainly an invitation to India would be rejected and it would raise the problem he mentioned above. Mr. Eden said he had not thought about the complications an invitation to India would cause. He could see that there would indeed be a real problem with respect to Formosa, South Korea, etc. If he could say that India was being kept fully informed, he thought his own problem would be met and that the Labor Party, which would certainly raise this question, could be given an answer which would be defensible. The Secretary agreed.

But to go back to what could be done now, Mr. Eden said that the situation in Europe when NATO was formed and the present situation in Southeast Asia were vastly different. In NATO we had drawn a line around our NATO area before aggression occurred. In Southeast Asia the Communists were already actively engaged in hostilities in Indochina and to draw a line at the China-Indochina border was not the same since indirect aggression has already taken place. “In other words”, he said, “the Communists are already engaged in active hostilities inside our screen in Southeast Asia.” He said it was, however, important to explore this matter further and suggested that Mr. Allen meet with Mr. Robertson and Mr. MacArthur tomorrow morning to develop ideas on what could be said and what could be done to build some real strength and unity in Southeast Asia.

Reverting to the situation at Dien Bien Phu, Mr. Dulles said that it was critical and one of the key problems for the French was aviation. They just did not have the air personnel to utilize effectively the aircraft which they now have. He said he would like Mr. Eden also to consider the possibility of having the U.K. dispatch some aviation mechanics to help service French planes in Indochina. Mr. Eden said that he had not thought about this but would look into it.

1. British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

2. Secretary Dulles visited London from Apr. 11–13. For documentation on his discussions with British officials on subjects other than Indochina, see volume vi. Dulles summarized his conversation with Foreign Secretary Eden on the evening of Apr. 11 in telegram 4490 from London (for Acting Secretary Smith), Apr. 12. The telegram read in part as follows:

   “3. Indochina and joint action in Southeast Asia. I explained to Eden in detail our apprehensions regarding French weakening at Geneva and our views on joint action in SEA. Eden indicated a real willingness to consider defense arrangements in SE Asia on the basis of united action but he is obviously against implementation of any coalition prior to Geneva. I believe he would strongly and actively support such action if Geneva fails. He was enthusiastic about Thailand support. He is very doubtful that Indochina can be held by additional air and sea support only and does not see where additional ground forces will come from. I had impression UK thinking not so much in terms of holding Indochina as in looking to possible arrangements for holding remainder of Southeast Asia if Vietnam goes.” For the complete text of telegram 4490, see ibid.

3. Brackets in the source text.