751G.00/4–1054: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1949. Repeated information Paris 637, Phnom Penh unnumbered. I went to Phnom Penh yesterday and had long talks with King and Tioulong, his new Foreign Minister, latter giving rather elaborate luncheon my honor.
They handed me Cambodian Government communiqué of April 7 transmitted mytel 1940, April 8,1 announcing total mobilization against Viet Minh aggression and assumption by King of command of forces, both French Union and Cambodian, operating in North and East Cambodia. King told me that he would take over command after midnight April 11. French will turn over to him ostensible operational command three Cambodian battalions which after protracted negotiations last fall Cambodians allowed to remain temporarily under French command and he will have equivalent of about two battalions of Cambodian troops including nearly complete battalion of Cambodian parachutists.
Both King and Tioulong confirmed DeJean’s story of objection of bonzes (Buddhist priests) and certain Cambodian nationalists to King using French troops to drive out invading Viet Minh battalions.2 In [Page 1301] Council of Kingdom held night of April 4–5, chief spokesman of opposition was Sam Nheang, who was Minister of Worship in preceding Cabinet and father of Sam Sary, Cambodian delegate to Paris negotiations. Sam Nheang speaks no French and is bitterly anti-French. He told King that he should not use French forces against Viet Minh and if Cambodian forces were insufficient to drive out invaders then let them stay. According Tioulong, King lost his temper and pounding table ordered Nheang to keep silent; Nheang, however, refused to be shouted down and insisted that he should be included in new Cabinet. King, however, refused.
King tells me he was so angry at this “senseless” opposition that he told Council he would not take operational command against Viet Minh but would leave Kingdom and meeting ended with that statement. Next day King thought better of it and called a new meeting and informed both opposition of Buddhist priests and democrats that there was no alternative to his using French troops, under his ostensible command, to drive out Viet Minh battalions. If he did not take command, General Navarre would be forced for security of his own troops to send force into Cambodia to drive out Viet Minh. Opposition finally reluctantly agreed. In series of late meetings, King was unable to find anyone capable of forming and presiding [over] a new national government and finally in meeting of Council of Kingdom which ended at 5 a.m. April 8, it was decided that King would again head government, delegating most of conduct of affairs however to Pennouth, who last year was President of Council. King told me scornfully that no one wanted to take responsibility of either negotiating new accords with French or taking action against Viet Minh. King remarked that if he had accepted point of view of opposition not to use French Union troops to drive out Viet Minh, it would have been equivalent of “national suicide”.
Both King and Tioulong raised question of direct financial aid from US to carry through mobilization and put new regular and village units in field. I told them that if they would submit detailed list of requirements, we would give them sympathetic study, although no promises would be made. We would, of course, have to coordinate and discuss matter with French. So far and probably for long time to come it had been practical necessity to handle military aid through French, since Cambodian Defense Ministry did not have proper logistic organization to handle arms aid. As regards budgetary assistance, part of what they had recently been receiving from French was of course American funds, but we had to rely on existing French organization to handle matter. French were thoroughly conversant with Cambodian budgetary procedures and we would have greatest difficulty and expense [Page 1302] in forming an organization to handle direct budgetary aid. I said that when Cambodian military system was perfected at some future date, if military aid was still required from US, we would consider dealing directly with them. At present time we were always ready to discuss their military development programs and in coordination with French endeavor to be of assistance.
- Telegram 1940 from Saigon, Apr. 8, containing a summary translation of the Cambodian Government communiqué, is not printed. (751G.00/4–854)↩
- Information received from Commissioner General Dejean regarding Cambodian policy was transmitted to Washington in telegram 1915 from Saigon, Apr. 9. (751G.00/4–954)↩