Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/4–454

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)¹

top secret
eyes only

[Washington,] April 4, 1954.

Subject:

• Indochina

Participants:

• The Australian Ambassador, Sir Percy Spender
• The New Zealand Ambassador, Mr. Munro
• The Secretary of State
• The Under Secretary of State
• Admiral Radford
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mr. Bonbright

The meeting took place this afternoon at 4:00 at the Secretary’s house. The Secretary began by outlining the situation in much the same terms as he had used with Ambassador Makins and Ambassador Bonnet. He referred to our intensive studies in preparation for the Geneva Conference, to the deteriorating French position and the very real possibility that if nothing is done the French will be inclined to accept a settlement at Geneva which will amount to a sell-out. He said that we had explored various alternatives and had come to the conclusion that there was no negotiated settlement possible which did not boil down to either a disguised surrender of the French or a disguised surrender of the Communists. The situation was fraught with danger for the whole Southeast Asia area. He had talked recently to our Ambassador in Thailand, Mr. Donovan, and concluded that Thailand would not hold out. This in turn would step up the danger to Malaya. He had spoken of Malaya to Mr. Eden in Berlin who had said the present situation there was even under existing circumstances far from reassuring. The situation in Indonesia was in precarious balance. He was afraid all this would increase the direct threat to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and the entire off-shore chain of islands. The situation in Japan would be serious, and with the loss of Southeast Asia Japan would be tempted to accept an accommodation with the Communists whereby in exchange for raw materials they would find a market for their industry. The Secretary stressed that all of this would come about unless a new force was brought to bear on the problem.

The Secretary then referred to the military situation in Indochina where the Communists were making a determined effort to obtain a victory before Geneva and before the end of the usual fighting season. Admiral Radford expressed the view that the fight could, however, continue through the summer and that the conditions under which we had fought in New Guinea were worse than those in Indochina. General Smith also observed that there is no terrain and no climate in which fighting cannot go on.

The Secretary then stated that in our view the required new element in the situation should be the creation before Geneva of an ad hoc coalition of states directly interested in the area who would pledge themselves to work together and, if necessary, to contribute forces. He told the Ambassadors in strict confidence that we had already sounded out Congressional opinion and the Secretary could say that we were prepared to contribute and play our full part in a common effort. The Secretary indicated that next to France the interest of the United Kingdom was probably the most direct in view of Malaya, Hong Kong and ties of the Commonwealth, and that unless the United Kingdom were willing to come along with us it probably would not be possible. Speaking frankly, we could not fight alone to preserve the British position in Malaya. However, with the cooperation of the British and others the Secretary believed that the Congress would pass resolutions granting extra powers to the President. If we could carry out the program as we envisaged it we believed this would win the struggle. He thought that the Soviets in these circumstances would try to call off the Chinese and write off Ho. He had the impression from his conversations with Molotov in Berlin that the Soviets do not wish the Chinese to get involved in an extension of the war.

The Secretary stated that he had discussed our proposal with Ambassador Makins last Friday and, in somewhat different terms, with the French Ambassador on Saturday.² His talk with Sir Roger indicated that our proposal was in advance of anything the British were thinking about; indeed, their thoughts seemed to be directed toward the idea of a compromise at Geneva and toward finding the “least bad” alternative, which in their view seemed to be the division of Indochina, perhaps along the line of the 16th parallel.

The Secretary continued to stress at length how the attitude of the United Kingdom was the key to the problem. He admitted that the British had difficult political problems at home and wished to avoid a clash with China for various reasons including questions of trade, the vulnerability of Hong Kong, the effects on India, etc. The Secretary then referred to the situation in 1932 when the British had turned down the appeal of Mr. Stimson for joint action to halt the Japanese in Manchuria. At that time the British had refused on the ostensible grounds that they lacked the support of the United States in Europe, a condition which could not be said to prevail today.

The Secretary then asked Admiral Radford to comment on the military aspects of the situation. The Admiral indicated that the problem had been carefully studied in a series of meetings beginning with the first Singapore conference and that there had been complete agreement on the military side of the importance of holding Northern Indochina (Tonkin). These studies had led to the conclusion that it would not be possible to hold anywhere else in Indochina and the loss of the area would lead to political reactions elsewhere, although these might be somewhat delayed. The military could do little in such a situation. He pointed out that the British, with their naval and military forces in Malaya, Hong Kong and Korea, were as heavily committed as the French.

Speaking of the French military effort, Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that their leadership was poor and that their planning and conduct of operations were hampered by political factors in Paris and the lack of political support in Indochina itself. For example, the French had felt compelled to send troops to Luang Prabang although, militarily speaking, this was unsound. He felt that a defeat at Dien Bien Phu should not affect the military capability of the French to hold on but that the psychological effect in Vietnam would be very bad. He also believed that the French use of air power had been ineffective. He said that the danger was not limited to Dien Bien Phu since the French now feared action in the Delta and elsewhere. In the absence of reenforcements they might suffer a sizeable defeat in the not too distant future. This could lead to desertion of the natives and the situation was serious.

The Secretary then returned to his thesis that the French willingness and ability to hold out depends at least in part on whether they see any relief in sight. He understood from Ambassador Bonnet that his speech of March 29, which had been interpreted in France as a forecast that the U.S. would participate militarily, had bucked them up. The Secretary felt that what was required was a coalition broader than ANZUS which could change the character of the fight.

Finally, the Secretary explained why in his opinion we could not count on UN action as the answer to the problem.

Ambassador Spender then spoke about the difficulties of the situation in Australia at this time where an election campaign is under way which will not end until the election on May 29. He thought that the time element is extremely important and that an action which would be feasible after May 29 might not be feasible before that date. Untimely interjection of the issue might result in the election of a government whose policies would be contrary to our long-term aims. It was therefore important to him to have our estimate of whether the French situation might deteriorate hopelessly in the next two months if nothing were done. Admiral Radford expressed the view that if the French were willing to continue the fight he saw no reason why the situation should deteriorate in the next two months to the point where it would be irretrievable. General Smith pointed out, however, that if Dien Bien Phu falls before Geneva the pressures on the French to reach a settlement at any cost would be almost uncontrollable.

Ambassador Spender thought that the problem had two aspects: one the short term and one the long term. The ad hoc coalition would be directed toward the immediate problem. For the long term it is important that the independence of the Associated States be fully completed and their political integrity guaranteed. The Secretary agreed that it would be unwise to commit ourselves unless we were sure of the full independence of the Associated States and the French would be willing to share the responsibility for training.

Ambassador Munro then spoke briefly about the situation in New Zealand where he said elections would not be held until November. For his Government, however, the attitude of the United Kingdom would be of the greatest significance. He also pointed out that New Zealand had very precise commitments with regard to the Middle East and the Secretary’s proposal would involve changing them. The New Zealand Government would wish to know exactly what commitments our proposal would involve for them. Sir Percy then said that the Australian Cabinet was meeting tomorrow and his Government also would be interested in knowing the type of military assistance contemplated. Could or would the fighting be localized? Would we envisage the interdiction of supply lines in China? What would be the consequences if China openly entered the war?

Admiral Radford expressed the view that the contribution of an Australian carrier would be satisfactory and, indeed, excellent. He likewise thought that a New Zealand naval effort comparable to its contribution in Korea would be satisfactory. He thought that the interjection of added air power now would materially change the picture, plus some naval patrols. He did not think that the Chinese would openly intervene with troops and did not think that China was in a good position for a large effort in the area. With regard to the broader question, the Chinese have seen the Secretary’s statement of last September which put them on notice that if they intervened the war would spread. He repeated, however, in his view added air power would be enough to take care of the situation at the moment.

General Smith added that he did not believe what we do will need to cause Chinese intervention and the Secretary commented that if that happened we would need to consult together. We don’t think this situation will arise but if it does it should be possible to knock out their airfields and engage in certain activities along the South China coast.

Turning to the UN problem, Sir Percy inquired whether on the assumption that agreement was reached regarding the coalition we contemplated later getting UN authority for our action. The Secretary replied that we did. He was thinking in terms of invoking the Uniting for Peace Resolution with the idea of sending observation teams to the border. He also had in mind that through the UN we would call on others to make contributions to broaden the base as much as possible. This, however, would be in addition to the group we envisaged which was indispensable and would act under the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Sir Percy inquired whether we ruled out the possibility of a temporary UN trusteeship in conjunction with our military effort. He thought that this might gain Arab–Asian support. The Secretary stated, and Ambassador Munro agreed with him, that he did not like the trusteeship idea. In his view a trusteeship would have undesirable connotations, particularly in anti-colonial areas of the world, and that the answer was to be found in real independence for the Associated States.

In conclusion the two Ambassadors stated that they would report immediately to their Governments. Both agreed personally that action must be taken. Finally, the Secretary stressed again that unless it is known by the time of Geneva that the coalition was at least in the process of being set up, the situation would probably be lost and he could not guarantee that the United States Government and Congress would go along. He felt strongly that with the passage of time the danger would increase and the capacity for united action would be reduced. It would be difficult to hold the unity of the free world if we waited until the danger was at our very doorstep. He thought it was to our credit that the United States Government was now willing to play its full part in the proposed coalition and that this willingness should not be taken for granted forever. If the danger is not recognized by the British Commonwealth, which is much closer to the danger than we are, we will find it hard to move in the matter but [and?] we may write it off. The decision is up to the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

1. This meeting was summarized in telegram 163 to Canberra, Apr. 6, also sent to Wellington as telegram 133; for text, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, pp. 367–369.
2. For the memorandum of the Dulles–Makins conversation of Friday, Apr. 2, see p. 1214. For the memorandum of the Dulles–Bonnet conversation of Saturday, Apr. 3, see p. 1225.