Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/4–354

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)¹

top secret
eyes only

[Washington,] April 3, 1954.

Subject:

• Indochina

Participants:

• Ambassador Bonnet
• The Secretary
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mr. Bonbright

The Ambassador came in at 12: 30 this morning [afternoon] at the Secretary’s request. The conversation lasted an hour.

After conveying to the Ambassador his condolences in connection with the recent death of M. Bonnet’s mother, the Secretary began by asking M. Bonnet whether he had seen his speech of March 29. The Ambassador replied that he had read it carefully and had been struck by two things: (1) the determination of the United States not to permit Southeast Asia to fall into Communist hands, and (2) the determination of the United States not to recognize the Chinese Communist regime and not to vote for the admission of that regime into the United Nations. The Ambassador observed that the Secretary had been silent on the subject of trade with China and wondered whether concessions in this field might be contemplated. The Secretary replied that he had deliberately omitted the question of trade from his speech since he had wished to cover only the military and political aspects of the problem. Our present position was that the embargo should be maintained.

The Secretary then stated that he would like to obtain the views of the French Government regarding a possible internationalization of the Indochinese conflict or the broadening of the base of support for carrying out the fight. He observed that up to now the French Government had been opposed to any action in the United Nations. M. Bonnet said that the French Government was placing its hopes on a solution of the problem at Geneva. His Government did not have clearly in mind what kind of solution could be obtained, but they were anxious for the tripartite preparations for the conference to begin promptly. The Secretary informed him that he had just decided to agree to the tripartite discussions to begin on April 12. The Ambassador expressed gratification and hoped that we would be prepared to discuss substance as well as procedure. The Secretary was noncommittal on this point. He pointed out that very important problems were involved and that he was not sure that our representatives at the tripartite talks would be able to go very far without additional instructions from Washington.

The Secretary then went on to say that he could see no possible negotiated solution of the problem which did not boil down to: (1) a face-saving formula to disguise the surrender of the French Union forces and the subsequent loss of the area to Communists; or (2) a face-saving formula to cover the retreat of the Viet Minh. We had carefully considered various ways out of the impasse and they led to no satisfactory end. We could not, as in the case of Korea, draw a line of demarcation between the opposing parties since the situation did not lend itself to that kind of compromise in view of the fact that the Viet Minh were everywhere. A mixed, or coalition, government would only be the beginning of disaster. On the other hand, if we were strong and resolute enough to make the Chinese Communists see that their present line of action could lead to a possible extension of the conflict, a solution might be found under the second alternative to which he had referred, for if the Chinese were convinced that the extension of their power in Southeast Asia would not be permitted without the danger of war, they might quit. To accomplish this what was required was a strong coalition of states which had vital interests in the area, which recognized the threat to the area, and were ready to fight if necessary. The states we had in mind, in addition to the United States, were France, the Associated States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines. If such a group were prepared to fight to protect their interests in the area there might be a successful negotiation at Geneva. If, on the other hand, a negotiated settlement were reached on the basis of the first alternative this would not only lead to the greatest difficulties for Malaya, Indochina, and the offshore island defenses of the free world, but would have serious repercussions in Europe and North Africa. By and large he considered that the future of France as a great power was at stake.

Ambassador Bonnet interposed at this point to inquire whether the United States Congress would be prepared to sanction American military involvement in Indochina. The Secretary replied that in his opinion the answer was “yes”, provided the action were as part of a coalition such as he had referred to and provided, of course, there was a continuation of the French military effort. There would be strong feeling here against our “going it alone” in order to save the British Commonwealth.

The Ambassador then inquired whether the Secretary envisaged that the negotiations for the setting up of the coalition would run parallel to the Geneva Conference, to which the Secretary replied that the coalition should be formed first in order to permit us to go to Geneva with the required strength. With reference to the continuation of the French military effort, M. Bonnet said that he had been impressed in his recent visit to France by the growing strength of public opinion in favor of a truce and a settlement. He feared that many Frenchmen would look upon the coalition described by the Secretary as a cover for France to continue bearing 90 per cent of the manpower burden as we had done in Korea. This the French could not do. The Secretary indicated that we recognized this and it was for this purpose that we were suggesting a coalition which would add strength to the effort now being borne by the French Union forces. In his view more of the ground forces burden should be shifted to the Associated States as rapidly as possible. He went on to say that we, too, desired a settlement but asked if we could get it by being strong or by being weak.

The Ambassador then inquired whether the Secretary was optimistic about getting the British, the Australians and the New Zealanders to go along with us. The Secretary indicated that he thought there might be great difficulties, particularly with the British. The latter are presently very much torn and subject to different pressures. On the one hand they have their interests in the Far East, including Malaya and Hong Kong; on the other hand, their general policy is to try to gain time in Asia. The political situation in Britain is not easy and the Government is faced with a difficult debate tomorrow on the hydrogen bomb. However, there is no use in assuming failure and one cannot tell unless one tries. Australia and New Zealand will probably be willing to urge the British in the right direction.

In response to M. Bonnet’s question as to how the approach to the other Governments should be made, the Secretary stated that we would be guided by the desires of the French Government. Possibly they and we could make the approach together. In this connection, he said that he had seen a number of the representatives of the countries involved who had come to see him in recent days following his speech. These representatives would have a general idea of what he had in his mind but nothing yet had been done of a formal nature. The heart of the matter was the attitude of the French Government. If they proved unwilling there was no use in proceeding. We would have to let Indochina go and see what sort of an arrangement we could reach with the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand with a view to seeing what could be done to prevent the Communist power from extending beyond Indochina.

M. Bonnet inquired whether if no satisfactory solution was reached at Geneva and the fighting continued in Indochina the other nations would take action against the Viet Minh. The Secretary indicated that it might be against Communist China. M. Bonnet asked whether United States air support would be made available, to which the Secretary replied in the affirmative.

The Ambassador referred again to the section in the Secretary’s speech where he stated that united action was required and asked whether we preferred the coalition idea to action in the United Nations. The Secretary answered that he did not exclude action in the United Nations and, in any event, it would be necessary to bring the matter to the attention of the United Nations in some formal way. However, he doubted if there was a good basis for effective action in the UN where we would be faced with the Soviet veto in the Security Council and by long drawn out speeches in the Assembly. We should lay the matter before the United Nations but not count on that organization. Our actions could be justified under Article 51 of the Charter. Other members of the ad hoc coalition had vital interests in the area which could be shown to be in danger. For its part, the United States has obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaties which it has concluded with Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines.

The Ambassador returned to the question of the attitude of the United States Congress and asked again whether if the British declined to enter the coalition the United States Government and Congress were prepared to “go it alone.” The Secretary stated that he was certain that if the coalition were established the United States would play its full part. The difficulties would be greatly increased—although he would not say it was impossible—if the British would not agree. In the latter contingency, we might wait until the threat to Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines was closer.

Returning to the problem of Geneva, the Secretary stated that we must have an alternative. In his view we obtained an armistice in Korea primarily because the Chinese feared that we would knock out their industrial area north of the Yalu. A coalition along the lines he described would offer us an alternative at Geneva without which we would be lost. M. Bonnet observed, speaking personally, that the alternative for the Chinese and Soviets at Geneva was to be found in the Secretary’s speech and his warning that we would not allow the area to fall under their control. He believed as a result of the Secretary’s March 29 speech that in Paris and probably elsewhere there was a strong impression that the United States would actively intervene, by itself if necessary, to prevent Indochina from falling into Communist hands. This, he thought, would be a more important factor to the Communists than the coalition, although he recognized that the coalition would obviously be of assistance to the United States in connection with its domestic problem. The Secretary emphasized again that in an area where our Allies have important stakes the United States should not be left alone. If our Allies held back there would be grave repercussions here on our relations with our Allies around the world.

The Secretary concluded this part of the conversation by informing the Ambassador that we had just agreed to comply with the request for assistance which we received from the French Government last night (to airlift two parachute battalions from North Africa to Indochina). He stressed that in every case where the French had come to us urgently for assistance we had complied with their request, often in a matter of hours. The Ambassador stated that this fact was fully known and appreciated in France.

1. The main points made by the Secretary of State during this conversation were summarized in telegram 3476 to Paris, Apr. 3, also sent to London as telegram 5175. For text, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, pp. 293–294.