751G.00/4–154: Despatch
The Deputy Chief of Mission at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
No. 423
Subject:
- Views of Vietnamese Chief of Staff on Current Political Situation
I desire supplement the telegram under reference1 by reporting in greater detail comments made by General Nguyen Van Hinh, Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese armed forces, in an hour-long interview which took place at his headquarters on March 30.
General Hinh expressed profound disgust at the inability of the Vietnamese people to consolidate their efforts, not only in prosecuting the war against the Communist enemy, but in achieving a national unity which would enable them to preserve their independence, once it had been won on the field of battle. He drew a disturbing picture of rival factions, politicians whose interest in office was more pecuniary than patriotic; of rival confessional groups, each with a private army [Page 1207] which served a dual purpose of securing exemption from military duty in the national armed forces and at the same time gave local satraps armed forces with which to exert influence; and of the bewildered peasantry, who only sought peace and had no national ideal toward which to set their sights.
General Hinh said that efforts to enforce conscription were met at every side by attempts at evasion. Not only had the Cao Daists, Hoa Haoists, and others secured exemptions from military service by enlistment in their own private armies, but persons of wealth and influence were able to buy their way out of military service. Furthermore, the swarm of bureaucracies in Saigon and other towns provided havens for many young men who had better be in uniform. Morale in the army itself was at its nadir. Officers and men could scarcely feel an enthusiasm to fight at low pay when they knew that fat caps [cats?] in Saigon, exempt from military service, were keeping garages of two and three automobiles and were making an average income of 300,000 piasters a month. Hinh said, “What I want to do is reduce each family to not more than one automobile and to take all income in excess of 5,000 piasters a month. I shall pay them back when the war is over.”
General Hinh said that graft and corruption were so rampant, particularly in South Vietnam, that the enemy had no difficulty in securing any supplies he wished. He said that a study of the import statistics on bicycles alone, in contrast to the number of bicycles registered with the police, revealed that almost twice as many bicycles were in Vietnam as were registered. He was confident that these useful vehicles had been diverted to the enemy.
Furthermore, he said he had made an actual census of certain villages in Cochin-China with respect to the consumption of sugar and had found that if indeed the inhabitants were eating that much sugar, it must have been at the rate of three kilos per day per capita. It was perfectly obvious that this commodity was going over to the enemy. Hinh likewise inveighed against the open sale of export licenses to interested politicians and such confessional groups as the Cao Daists. He said an export license for 10,000 tons of rice was worth 1,000,000 piasters in the open market, and that the Chinese rice merchants could make a profit of 15,000,000 piasters on a 10,000 ton transaction. Hinh also claimed that rice from South Vietnam legitimately exported under license found its way by clandestine means to South China, where it was returned to Vietnam in the form of war supplies to the Vietminh. (I checked this last assertion with the director general of Denis Freres on the same evening of my conversation with General Hinh, and was told that such a transaction would be out of the question, not only because rice exports were fully documented, but also because at the current time with an excess production, there is no reason [Page 1208] for Communist China to try by extraordinary means to find rice in Vietnam.)
It was obvious from his bitter comment on graft in Indochina, and particularly the sale of export licenses to the Cao Daist sect, that General Hinh was treading close to the toes of his father, former Prime Minister Tam, who on March 14 in Dalat had calmly told me that he had in fact as Prime Minister made available rice export licenses to the Cao Daists. Tam at that time said blandly, “It was very simple. The Cao Daists needed rice and money, but they did not have an export permit.”
Hinh said very earnestly that, although he felt a natural filial affection for his father, if it came to placing his father in the balance as against the best interests of Vietnam, his father would lose.
As revealed in the reference telegram, General Hinh sketched a program of quasi-military government for Vietnam which in effect would lead to military dictatorship. He said he did not like the word as it seemed unduly strong, but admitted the measures he contemplates, such as rule by martial law; a restricted war cabinet composed of Bao Dai, himself, and the Minister of War; and regional councils in which military members would have paramount influence, were equivalent to a military dictatorship.
General Hinh said that he had sent unofficial feelers to members of the French Government through contacts in Paris to inquire if there might be support for such a regime from France. The answer returned was, “Wait until we see the outcome of Dien Bien Phu.”
Hinh gave the over-all impression of a man who was completely fed up with the inept bureaucracy, the corrupt oligarchy, and the unpatriotic mass of people, particularly in South Vietnam. He agreed that the Northerners were more robust and said that even Governor Tri had concurred when he proposed that certain villages which sheltered the Vietminh be razed and the populations moved to other areas. At the same time, despite his impetuousity, Hinh freely conceded the necessity of operating with and through Bao Dai. He did not see how his scheme of military rule could succeed without the assent of the Chief of State. He said it was not necessary to place Bao Dai in uniform, as many have suggested, but merely that he should show himself more frequently attired in simple dress and appearing before the people in rice paddy and market place. He said jocularly that through his wife (who he claims has great influence over Bao Dai) he had told the monarch, “You must get out in an ordinary open shirt and take off that necktie with the dancing girls painted on it.”
At the same time Hinh runs certain risks. Although he may be confident of the support of his immediate staff and of many enlightened officers in the national army, he has working against him the hostility [Page 1209] of the confessional military groups, the apathy of the average conscript, and the enmity of such self-appointed regional Napoleons as Governor Giao of central Vietnam. He has likewise against him the court camarilla, which has counseled the Roman rule of divide et impera on Bao Dai, whose chief soothsayer and oracle is Nguyen De. Furthermore, he has against him the organized security forces of the Prefect of Saigon-Cholon, who apparently would rather use the police to protect his proteges than to maintain the public order with impartial severity. Hinh said that when he wished to stage a raid in Saigon or Cholon, the Prefect demanded 24 hours advance notice “with which to prepare the police.” Invariably, said Hinh, when his troops arrived, the birds had flown. The General said that henceforth he would take the law into his own hands if he felt it necessary, and that since the national army had no warrant of law to arrest civilians or imprison them, “There will be few imprisonments.” He said with reference to the recent petition for peace, signed by a number of relatively well-known fence sitters, (see Joint Weeka 13 of March 26 [27])2 if he had his way he would have created gibbets in the public market place and hung every signatory of that petition from the gallows.
On this high note our conversation ended.