751G.00/3–3054
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)1
Participants:
- Mr. Leslie Munro—Ambassador of New Zealand
- Mr. G. R. Laking—Counselor, New Zealand Embassy
- The Secretary
- C. Burke Elbrick—Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
[Here follows a brief discussion on subjects other than Indochina.]
The Ambassador then inquired concerning recent events in Indochina. The Secretary outlined at length the measures which this Government has taken to aid the French, noting specifically that the Navarre Plan (involving annual U.S. expenditures of over a billion dollars in money and matériel) was designed to permit the Indo-chinese indigenous forces ultimately to take over the prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh guerrilla forces, once the back of the Viet Minh had been broken. The Plan was predicated on political negotiations between France and the Associated States which would result in the latter’s independence in accordance with the French Government’s declaration of last July. Unfortunately, while the French are very willing to accept our money and war materials, they would admit no outside assistance in the training of indigenous troops or the direction of military activities, or in the political negotiations with the Associated States.
The Secretary said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff particularly were greatly concerned over the state of affairs in Indochina and felt that failure of French Union forces to control the situation there would result in the eventual loss of all the Southeast Asian area and would be a direct threat to Australia and New Zealand. The Secretary said that he and the President shared this concern and that from talks held with General Ely here in Washington and from reports of conversations in Paris with Messrs. Pleven, Laniel and Bidault, it was apparent that the French were increasingly disposed “to sell out” in Indochina; he therefore felt that it was extremely important that the UK and the US make every effort to stiffen French resistance in Indochina. The Secretary had been disappointed at Eden’s attitude when he had discussed this matter with him in Berlin and felt that Eden did not fully appreciate the dangers of this situation. The Secretary had informed British Ambassador Makins that he wished to discuss this problem again and Makins had indicated that he would seek instructions from his government and would probably be able to exchange views with the Secretary toward the end of this week. The Secretary said that the Australian and New Zealand governments would doubtless appreciate the dangers inherent in this situation and hoped that we could count on the support of those two governments in our efforts.
The Secretary said it is very important, because of the special relationship within ANZUS, to keep the Australian and New Zealand governments informed of developments in this situation, and Ambassador Munro expressed his appreciation. The Secretary said that it [Page 1189] might be possible, following conversations with the British, to hold an informal, off-the-record ANZUS Council meeting for this purpose in the very near future.
- This conversation was summarized in telegram 129 to Wellington, Apr. 1, repeated to Canberra as 159. (751G.00/4–154)↩