The enclosed Special Annex on Indochina, originally distributed December 31,
1953, and subsequently recalled, is re-circulated in a
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limited number of copies for the use of the
Planning Board in its current consideration of the subject.
[Enclosure]
Special Annex On Indochina4
first contingency
1. If it is determined that in the absence of an offer of U.S. military
participation the French would seek to conclude the struggle on terms
likely to result in the loss of Indochina to the Communists, the United
States should:
Alternative One
[Refuse to commit U.S. forces to the French military effort, accepting
the probable loss to the Communists of Indochina, and the necessity for
expanded U.S. efforts to prevent the loss of the remainder of Southeast
Asia.]5
Alternative Two
[Offer U.S. service forces, and if necessary combat forces, subject to
mutually acceptable command and strategy agreements, for use in
Indochina to prevent the loss of that country to the communists.]
2. In considering any offer of direct U.S. military participation in the
French military effort account must be taken of:
- a.
- The risk of large-scale Chinese Communist intervention and of
the anti-colonial reactions of countries in the Near and Far
East; and
- b.
- The probability that the timely communication to the French
and Vietnamese of a U.S. decision to intervene would prevent
their reaching a decision to negotiate on unacceptable terms or
abandon their present military effort. Because of this
probability, the United States should make the fundamental
choice between the alternatives
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in paragraph 1 above, as far as possible
in advance of such a decision by the French or
Vietnamese.
- c.
- Availability of U.S. forces at the time. (See Enclosure
B)6
3. If a decision is made to participate with U.S. forces in the French
military effort and the French agree to continue the war under these
circumstances, the United States should:
- a.
- Seek the perfecting of the independence of the Associated
States on terms which would be acceptable to them and to the
French, and which would provide maximum safeguards against
communist domination.
- b.
- Insist upon the most rapid build-up of indigenous forces and
participate in training these forces by providing U.S. officers
and equipment either in Indochina or in nearby suitable
areas.
- c.
- Negotiate at the highest level the necessary command
arrangements.
- d.
- Insist upon maintenance of at least the present level of
French forces in the joint effort.
- e.
- Continue necessary U.S. assistance and support.
- f.
- Provide sufficient U.S. forces to make possible the success of
the joint effort.
- g.
- Take all diplomatic and political actions which will assist in
making clear the purpose of the defense effort and facilitate
its success.
- h.
- Explore with the French the desirability of internationalizing
the conflict.
4. If the U.S. and French governments should agree to internationalize
the conflict, the United States should seek either:
- a.
- To organize a UN effort, possibly through appeal by the
Associated States, or
- b.
- To organize a regional effort outside the UN, including as
many nations as possible, particularly the following: the UK,
Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, and
possibly Nationalist China.
second contingency
5. If the French refuse to continue participation in the war in
Indochina, despite all offers of U.S. assistance outlined above, the
United States should:
Alternative One
[Refuse to commit U.S. forces to replace the French forces in Indochina,
accepting the probable loss to the Communists of Indochina and the
necessity for expanded U.S. efforts to prevent the loss of the remainder
of Southeast Asia.]
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Alternative Two
[Urge the French to phase their withdrawal to permit the implementation
of one of the following alternatives (See Enclosure A for details):7
- Alternative A. Support and intensify
the development of indigenous forces and deploy U.S. and Allied
forces (ground, sea and air) to Indochina to undertake
operations with the objective of reducing Communist activity to
the status of scattered guerrilla bands.
- Alternative B. Support and intensify
the development of indigenous forces; deploy sufficient U.S. and
Allied ground forces to hold critical strong points vacated by
the French; and provide air and naval support for such
operations as may be taken until such time as indigenous forces
can undertake the objective in Alternative A above.
- Alternative C. Support and intensify
the development of indigenous forces and provide U.S. and Allied
air and naval support for such operations as can be conducted by
indigenous ground forces.
- Alternative D. Support and intensify
the development of indigenous forces by U.S. supervision of
training and provision of necessary logistic support for such
operations as can be conducted by the indigenous forces.]
6. The following analysis of alternatives A to D above assumes:
- a.
- There is no resumption of hostilities in Korea. b. The Chinese
Communists or Soviets do not intervene in force in
Indochina.
- c.
- Combat operations are limited to Indochina.
- d.
- French Union forces will retain essentially their present
positions, particularly in the Tonkin Delta, until the
withdrawal of French forces from Indochina can be phased with
U.S. force commitments. Furthermore, the French will comply with
existing agreements concerning MDAP equipment and supplies furnished them in
Indochina by the United States.
7. Any significant alteration in these assumptions could result in
seriously jeopardizing the success of the alternatives. For example, the
force requirements indicated in Enclosure A are based on the assumption
that Communist China will not overtly intervene, but will continue a
policy of covert assistance to the Viet Minh. However, overt Communist
Chinese intervention is a distinct possibility, with which the United
States must be prepared to cope should it occur. Logically, it follows
that should overt Communist Chinese intervention occur, the United
States will be faced with a radically altered military situation in the
Far East. Such a possibility would precipitate a situation not unlike
that of renewed Communist aggression in Korea. Under
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such circumstances there is no suitable
alternative to a course of action similar to that recommended by the
Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to Council
Action No. 972—b.8
8. The following political actions might be taken prior to or in
conjunction with any one or a combination of the foregoing alternatives:
- a.
- Reiterate a previous warning that should the Chinese
Communists overtly intervene in Indochina, the United States can
be expected to take retaliatory action which might not be
confined to Indochina.
- b.
- Seek to obtain UN action to include force contributions in
Indochina similar to that taken with regard to Korea, with the
provision that the United States be designated executive
agent.
- c.
- Seek to organize a regional effort outside the UN including as
many nations as possible, particularly the following: the UK,
Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines and
possibly Nationalist China.
9. The four alternatives outlined above possess the following advantages
and disadvantages.
- a.
- Alternative A is the most positive and
offers the greatest assurance of success. Its disadvantages include
an increased calculated risk adversely affecting war plans, major
alterations in fiscal and budgetary policies and programs, major
increases in military production and mobilization schedules, and a
reversal of policy planning to reduce the size of the U.S. Armed
Forces. The deployment of U.S. troops in accordance with present
policies and commitments limits the number of forces readily
available to 5 divisions (including the 2 divisions scheduled for
redeployment from Korea in March, 1954), whereas 7 divisions are
required for a successful implementation of Alternative A.
- b.
- Alternative B, if resolutely prosecuted,
probably offers some chance for success, although considerably less
than Alternative A. Alternative B would be satisfactory as a
temporary measure, provided that the United States was prepared to
follow through with Alternative A, if necessary to succeed in
denying Indochina to Communism. Alternative B requires retention of
present forces, and increases in military production, and
re-examination of fiscal and budgetary policies and programs; but
less adversely affects war plans than Alternative A above.
Furthermore, it can readily result in a continuing stalemate similar
to Korea.
- c.
- Alternative G has relatively simple
logistic problems. At best, it provides very questionable assurances
of success and would likely result in a military defeat.
- d.
- Alternative D is even weaker than
Alternative C and would very likely result in a military
defeat.
- e.
- Whether Alternative A, B or C is initially adopted, if U.S. forces
engage in combat in Indochina, the United States must be prepared to
commit whatever forces are necessary to insure military
success.