751G.00/3–2754
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)
Subject:
- Secretary’s forthcoming speech on Indo-China and China1
Participants:
- The Secretary of State
- Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
- J. C. H. Bonbright, EUR
In the course of his conversation with the British Ambassador on the EDC and other questions the Secretary informed Sir Roger that he was making a speech on March 29 in which he would deal with the question of US policy toward Indo-China and the Chinese Communist regime. With regard to the former he indicated that this speech was designed in part for consumption in France where the idea seemed to be growing that the US should buy peace in Indo-China by concessions perhaps in the form of recognition of the Communist regime and its admission to the UN. He planned to make it clear that this Government would not make concrete concessions in return for Chinese Communist promises. The Secretary said that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were extremely worried over the possibilities of a French “pull out” and indicated that his thoughts were running along the lines of some action in the UN, which we had long favored, or some form of regional grouping in South East Asia for defense purposes. In response to an inquiry from the Ambassador as to whether the Secretary had in mind an organization like NATO, the Secretary said that he had reached no firm conclusions, that for the moment he was thinking more in terms of a temporary arrangement which might or might not in time take on a permanent form like NATO.2
On the question of recognition the Secretary pointed out that he was avoiding words like “never”. However, as he had told Molotov in Berlin, the Chinese Communists make no secret of the fact that they hate and despise us and will do everything they can to force our withdrawal from the Western Pacific. In the circumstances, it was out of the question for this government to take any step which would increase the prestige of a regime which was our avowed enemy nor would we help them to join an organization such as the UN where they would be [Page 1181] given a wider forum for attacking us and opposing our policies. Sir Roger expressed the opinion that he did not believe this attitude would cause difficulties with his government. As for the UK position, as far as he knew, it was completely unchanged. In this connection he referred to a recent speech by Sir Gladwyn Jebb and said that this was not to be regarded as an expression of the views of the British Government.3
- See the second editorial note, p. 1181.↩
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For full documentation on the origins of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), see volume xii.
The record of a telephone conversation between Dulles and Makins at 11:42 a.m., Mar. 29, read as follows: “The Sec. returned his [Makins’] call, and Sir Roger said he reported his talk with the Sec. on Saturday [Mar. 27] and he had received a message from London raising the point that ‘possibility of joint action’ would not mean that we are saying they are committed to joint military action. The Sec. said it was clear it would not.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers. “Telephone Conversations”)
↩ - For documentation on the question of recognition of the People’s Republic of China, see vol. iii, pp. 620 ff.↩