751G.00/3–2654
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Secretary of State1
Subject:
- Possible Use of the United Nations in the Indochina Situation.
In response to your request at this morning’s staff meeting, we have set down some possible courses of action in the United Nations on the Indochina problem.
1. Employment of the Peace Observation Commission.
The Security Council, the General Assembly or the Interim Committee could direct the Peace Observation Commission to send a subcommission and/or observers for reports on hostilities in the area.
[Page 1175]This might:
highlight and thus hamper the flow of Chinese assistance to Viet Minh,
tend to discourage invasion by Chinese Communists, provide basis for further United Nations action if desired, including a call for international assistance,
detract from the “colonial” character of the war,
help make United States assistance more palatable to US opinion.
The Soviets would very likely veto Security Council action. If the matter were referred to the General Assembly, it is probable that eventually the entire Indochina problem would be discussed and there would be strong pressures for negotiations with Ho Chi-Minh.
2. A Complaint of Aggression Against the Associated States.
The Associated States, perhaps in conjunction with Thailand and others, might raise the Indochina situation in the General Assembly or the Security Council to obtain a condemnation of aggression against the Associated States, with emphasis on Chinese Communist support, and to recommend that Members assist them to maintain their integrity.
This would:
give broader political and moral backing to the anti-Communist effort in Indochina (i.e. “internationalize” the problem),
serve to justify United States participation,
facilitate provision of assistance by other states.
On the other hand, such action would:
probably not receive more than 36 affirmative votes in the Assembly, with many abstentions,
stimulate efforts to have the Assembly add: (a) a call for a ceasefire and negotiated settlement; (b) a statement of objectives for such a settlement stressing the need for complete independence of the Associated States, perhaps with a plebiscite; (c) provision for limiting the conflict to Indochina and by implication excluding any military action in Communist Chinese territory; and (d) a provision for a United Nations Commission or mediator to bring about negotiations.
3. A United Nations Commission to Assist in Establishing Independent Governments in Indochina.
Assuming the military action is continued, the General Assembly could be asked to set up a commission composed perhaps of one member sympathetic to French interests (Belgium), one Asian state (Pakistan), and the United States, to work out with the French and the Associated States a plan for full independence in association with the French Union.
[Page 1176]Such a commission might:
undertake conversations with local groups including elements supporting Ho, though not negotiating directly with him,
arrange elections in two or three years,
sanction the presence of French forces in the area for a transition period, as a safeguard against aggression,
utilize the United Nations Technical Assistance Program to help rehabilitate the area.
4. United Nations Commission to Assist in Negotiated Settlement. If the French insist on negotiating for a settlement with the Viet Minh, the General Assembly might establish a commission similar to the United Nations Commission on Korea, to supervise the implementation of any agreement reached.
Such a commission could be empowered to:
- supervise a cease-fire,
- observe compliance with military provisions of a settlement,
- observe elections,
- consult with various elements of the population,
- make recommendations on the establishment of representative governments, economic relations, etc.
5. Temporary United Nations Administration of Indochina.
The General Assembly could (a) appoint an administrator or a commission with specified temporary powers of administration, or (b) request the Trusteeship Council to take over temporary administration.
Assuming French cooperation, this might:
provide for transitional period of consolidation prior to any election or plebiscite,
make possible the presence of French troops during this critical period,
provide international supervision of and assistance in the development of independent governments.
In the event of French decision to withdraw without delay, this might provide some possibility for filling in the vacuum left by French withdrawal. However, any such arrangement, even if agreed to by France, would be opposed by the Associated States and might impose an unmanageable task upon the United Nations with the consequent collapse of any authority in the area and the assumption of control by the Communists.
Conclusion
The advantages of action in the United Nations would be: (a) increased international stature for the Associated States; (b) opportunity for demonstrating that the war in Indochina is not just a “colonial” [Page 1177] war; (c) increased support of US public opinion for American assistance; (d) maintenance of the principle of collective resistance to aggression; (e) possibly some assistance from other United Nations Members in the war and in the rehabilitation of Indochina; and (f) if we cannot maintain Western position in Indochina, method of minimizing losses or facilitating acceptance of new status.
The disadvantages would be: (a) difficulty of controlling United Nations action in order to prevent recommendations we might not approve (e.g. pressure for negotiated settlement); (b) weakening of France’s position in Indochina with ultimate effect on the North African situation; (c) unless thoroughly concerted with the French, risk of serious breach between the United States and France; (d) possible acceleration of French abandonment of Indochina.
- This memorandum was drafted by David H. Popper and Eric Stein of UNP. Stein also prepared a memorandum titled “Desirability of UN Action as Basis for US Military Action in Indochina,” which was transmitted by David McK. Key, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, to the Secretary of State on Apr. 5. A handwritten notation on the source text of the Apr. 5 memorandum, by Roderic L. O’Connor, Special Assistant to Secretary Dulles, indicates that the Secretary agreed with Key at a meeting of Apr. 6 that the United Nations would have to be informed of any unified action. No details were discussed. The Secretary did not see the paper of Apr. 5. (PSA files, lot 54 D 190, “Indochina”)↩