Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

711.58/3–2554: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

confidential

Paris, March 25, 1954—8 p.m.

3544. Repeated information Saigon 401. Secretary Defense Wilson’s announcement in his recent press conference¹ that he and General Ely were discussing the question of an American training mission in Vietnam and other subsequent press and radio reports to the same general effect, culminating in this morning’s radio news broadcast wherein it was claimed that a Pentagon spokesman had stated that the question of sending an American mission to Vietnam to train Vietnamese troops was being seriously considered “as a morale booster to the French Union forces there” have again caused the most unfavorable reaction here.

Foreign Office has discussed the matter with us and has pointed out that according to their information, no such subject was discussed by Ely in Washington and that they were obliged to instruct that, in any case, the position of the French Government in the matter remains unchanged, i.e., that the terms of reference of the MAAG mission in Indochina are the same whether the mission is headed by Trapnell, O’Daniel or anyone else, and that there is no question of any other American training mission being sent to Indochina. The Foreign Office deplores the constant recurrence of speculation in the matter from Washington in spite of the facts and reminds us of the damaging effect it has in France and Vietnam at this time when the Indochina question is so delicate and the nature of the United States role and our interest in the matter is so much a part of that question and can so easily be distorted.

Foreign Office press officer informs us that they are obliged to deny similar rumors ostensibly originating in the Pentagon several times a day and can only conclude that the American sources responsible for the rumors are either unaware of the position of the French Government or are indulging in irresponsible wishful thinking.

From this side there is much to be said for the Foreign Office position. At a time when nerves are taut and emotions run high, as the Dien-Bien-Phu battle is prolonged and news of casualties comes in, it is unfortunate to lend any encouragement to the impression here that “the Americans are going to tell us how to fight this war provided we rather than they fight it” which inevitably leads to the next conclusion “in the case, why don’t we turn it over to them entirely?”²

Dillon

1. See footnote 3, p. 1158.

2. In telegram 1823 from Saigon, Mar. 29, Ambassador Heath stated the following:

   “We thoroughly agree with logic of Paris telegram 3544 sent Department, repeated Saigon 401. Furthermore, in connection with General O’Daniel’s assumption of command of MAAG Saigon (incidentally, O’Daniel informs me that although orders have not yet been received he plans arrive here April 15), we note with regret according to London Times of March 24 that Secretary of Defense on being asked if General O’Daniel’s aim when he arrived in IC would be to try to speed up training replied, ‘if I did not think he had a good chance, he would not be going.’ Such comments as these whether true or not will seriously handicap efficacy of General O’Daniel’s operation here to say nothing, as reftel points out, of increasing feeling on part of French authorities that, if we are so anxious to train the Vietnamese, we might as well fight this war entirely without French participation.” (711.5851G/3–2954)