751G.00/3–2454: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
[Received 11: 50 a.m.]
1781. Repeated information Paris 565, Hanoi 297. I saw Bao Dai at Dalat yesterday evening. I found him in rather a determined and belligerent mood, a welcome change from his not infrequent attitudes of pessimism and querulous criticism.
I started conversation by saying that I had noted in press that he had decided to form a provisional assembly and constitute a high privy council. Bao Dai said that he would discuss matter when Buu-Loc returned but he had by no means definitely decided on such steps. What he wanted to create was a high “war council” that would really contribute to winning war against Viet Minh, or, otherwise stated, the survival of Vietnam. All other political plans and efforts should be subordinated to this great aim.
Ambassador De Jean had explained to him that French parliamentary opinion doubted that Bao Dai regime and Buu-Loc government were truly representative. He could of course constitute a provisional national assembly but he must observe that such an institution at this time might well result in greater national division and squabbling and gravely detract from national war effort. He therefore seriously questioned whether launching of such institutions at this time was in either French or Vietnamese interest.
He would not say that Vietnamese national army was ideal or perfect or that war effort to date was sufficient but nevertheless he felt that events of last months had shown Vietnamese were on right track in making expansion of army the overriding aim. To that end he was leaving today for several days stay in Hanoi, to be climaxed on March 26 by big public ceremony where Vietnamese officers would take oath of allegiance to him. Both in this ceremony and in speech he intended to give on that occasion he would make it clear that national army and he as its titular chief were determined to fight this war on to victory and not indulge in negotiations with enemy which could have no result other than gains for Communist side. He asked whether I would attend this ceremony and I replied I would be very glad to.
As regards the army, he remarked that Hinh, if not ideal as Chief of Staff, was intelligent and active and had achieved results. If Hinh [Page 1153] was not too well liked in the army because of a certain prideful youthfulness, he was obeyed and was completely obedient to him, Bao Dai.
He was displeased that Buu-Loc had not heeded his urgent summons to return immediately to take hold of government and situation. Whereas in our last conversation he had expressed complete confidence in Buu-Loc’s governing powers, he now said that Buu-Loc’s record had so far been one of words rather than deeds and latter were urgently needed now. Such actions as eliminating serving of champagne at official functions made no outstanding impression on situation. I interrupted with remark that I thought Buu-Loc’s promise to eliminate and punish graft had made a good impression. Bao Dai said trouble was Buu-Loc had done nothing concrete to that end. Bao Dai asserted, somewhat surprisingly, that he was all in favor of Buu-Loc punishing corruption and that he would support him. He did not, however, want this program confined to punishing a few petty officials who had made away with a few hundred piasters, while letting others who had probably stolen millions go scot free. He said of course it would be difficult to obtain legal proof of large peculations. He observed that ex-Presidents Huu’s and Tam’s fortunes had strangely and vastly increased during their terms of office.
Bao Dai then intimated in carefully chosen, veiled words that, if Buu-Loc did not come up to mark, he, Bao Dai, might take over government for a period.
Bao Dai said he had not definitely made up his mind as to attitude that Vietnam will take toward conference at Geneva. It would be repugnant for him to sit across table from Viet Minh delegation. Viet Minh were only rebels who should surrender on promise of fair treatment. They were not entitled to negotiate as equals with his government. French idea that China could be induced in some way to stop supplying arms to Viet Minh seemed totally absurd to him. If such request were made, China would counter by suggestion that France and US stop sending aid to Bao Dai. He feared conference would result in propaganda advantage for Viet Minh, who would appear there not as conquerors but as poor devils who had fought for independence of Vietnam for years and were prepared to strike an armistice on terms which unfortunately would be attractive to certain sectors of French opinion.
I remarked that French thesis was that Laniel government which had quite steadfastly stood for prosecution of war in Vietnam would have been in difficulties if they had not proposed conference on Indochina at Geneva and might have been succeeded by a government disposed to come to terms with Ho-Chi-Minh. Bao Dai said that he had no real fears of such development. Only half present French Government was really in favor of carrying on war. He, Bao Dai, would personally not fear even accession of Mendes-France to power. It was all [Page 1154] very well to talk of ending war by negotiation but Mendes-France or any one else, if he came to power, would be faced by responsibilities and realities of military situation here.
He, Bao Dai, was not worried about fate of Dien-Bien-Phu. He felt that French Union troops would hold it. Even if Giap succeeded in taking Dien-Bien-Phu, it would be at price of terrific loss to Viet Minh battle corps. He knew Giap and he could not believe that latter had on his own initiative decided to assault that strong position. He must have been ordered to do so by Moscow and Peiping. Everything tended to show that it was decision of latter, including fact that China recently had been stepping up munitions for Viet Minh artillery at Dien-BienPhu.
Bao Dai said he had no complaint to make of General Navarre, except that he had launched operation “Atlante” in central Vietnam “too early” and to do so had denuded South Vietnam of battalions necessary to carry on pacification of region. Now, Navarre was asking that command in South Vietnam be returned to French hands. This was his right under Franco-Vietnamese military agreements but it was regrettable because of its effect on national war spirit. Cao-Daists and Hoa-Haos were supporting this return of command to French hands because they thought they could thus be confirmed in their ambition to set up regions now in their control as “feudal states within the state”. Cao-Daist representatives in Paris, Bao Dai asserted, were approaching parliamentary groups with suggestion that Cochin China, former French colony, be set up under a combined Franco-Vietnamese autonomous government, a proposition which was pleasing to many sectors of French opinion.
Bao Dai said that he regretted, but did not seem unduly disturbed, that negotiations in Paris were being held up because of Bidault’s refusal to accept Vietnamese thesis that new arrangements with France should consist of two documents, one confirming unrestricted independence of Vietnam and second Vietnam’s voluntary adherence to French Union with supporting agreements giving concessions to legitimate French interests.
Bao Dai then stated “I do not believe French will cease their military effort here but in case they should make a deal with Ho-Chi-Minh, can I count on receipt of continuing aid from US in order to fight on?” I replied this was a hypothetical question which could only be answered, if at all, by my government. However, he knew heavy financial aid we had given toward expansion of Vietnamese army and I could inform him that there was general appreciation and awareness in Washington of necessity of holding line against Communism in Vietnam. I remarked that, as he knew, De Jean did not believe it would be possible to conclude an armistice with Viet Minh except on terms of absolute surrender of latter. I personally shared this view.
[Page 1155]Comment: I am personally rather encouraged to hear Bao Dai talk of keeping up fight and indicating he would take a more active part. De Jean, whom I informed in a general way of my conversation, feels the same way. It is a good thing that Bao Dai is going to Hanoi. Question is whether Bao Dai will really follow through on his indications of greater personal activity and leadership. I intend of course to encourage him in that direction.