751G.00/3–2454: Telegram
The Consul at Hanoi (Sturm) to the Department of State
[Received 2:40 a.m.]
512. Repeated information Saigon 406, Paris 216. Paris limit distribution. Both Tillman Durdin of New York Times and Robert Guillain, who is covering Dien-Bien-Phu for Paris Le Monde testify to marked difference in attitude with regard to battle between Navarre’s staff and that of Cogny. Staff of Commander-in-Chief, at least in contacts with press, reflects optimism, while Cogny’s men make little effort disguise their pessimism.
Cogny’s past and present Cabinet chiefs have told me within past week that Cogny never approved concept of Dien-Bien-Phu but accepted it as “a sporting proposition” when Navarre decreed its execution. It is certain that Cogny objected strongly to Na San, and attempted discourage any comparisons between that abandoned stronghold and Dien-Bien-Phu, on grounds that latter would serve as a point of departure for operations throughout Thai country rather than as a point of resistance to Viet Minh attacks. Cogny remarked to Guillain about one month ago that Dien-Bien-Phu “had changed color in his hands,” meaning that fortress had tended to taking on color of Na San.
Durdin said that in his cables to New York Times he has deliberately avoided giving pessimistic reports, but that he fears press matter passed by censor for publication abroad may be giving too optimistic impression of prospects at Dien-Bien-Phu. His own estimate of the outcome is “50–50.” Guillain said he has been told by source close to Navarre that Commander-in-Chief feels “terribly alone,” in sense that his subordinate commanders and immediate staff do not share his own strategic ideas. For example, operation “Atlante,” which has caused bitter feeling among officers here, has been described by Navarre as “chance to win the war,” in strategic sense that vast coastal regions where “Atlante” is in progress had to be wrested from Viet Minh in order that enemy not use this area peacefully to prepare execution of Giap’s long-range strategic plan, formulated as early as 1951, which is to take Cochin China by way of Cambodia. When Guillain discussed this idea with Cogny, latter said “we are not fighting the war as it may be two years hence; I am obliged to make my plans in periods of no more than six months.”
Asked what immediate results he foresaw in France in event Dien-Bien-Phu should fall, Guillain, who appears share to some degree neutralist views of Le Monde, replied that Laniel government would fall [Page 1150] promptly by large majority, and that Parliament would call for immediate negotiations with Ho Chi-Minh. This remark may be of use in interpreting certain Paris Presse coverage of Dien-Bien-Phu.