Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Asia”

Memorandum by Charles C. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff¹

top secret

[Washington,] March 23, 1954.

Importance of Southeast Asia

1. Importance of Indochina

The importance of Indochina derives primarily from the impact which its loss would have on the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia. Strategically, Communist conquest of the Tonkin Delta would open to the Communists the most feasible routes for any massive southward advance toward Southern Indochina and Thailand. Communist acquisition of Indochina would expose Thailand to communist infiltration, severe political pressures, and the threat of direct attack. The traditional propensity of the Siamese ruling group to accommodate to superior power (as was the case in their turnover to Japan during the last war) added to the difficulties which the Thais would have with their sizeable Chinese minority would make it almost certain that, unless there were direct U.S. military intervention, Thailand would shortly accommodate itself to international communism. The present Burmese situation is so precarious that Communist victory in Indochina and Communist pressures on Thailand would undoubtedly move the Burmese from their present position of fearful neutralism to one of active cooperation with the Communists. Communist victories would impel large numbers of the Chinese half of the Malayan population to move off of the fence onto the Chinese Communists side and would so severely increase the present British difficulties in dealing with Communist guerrillas that it would be doubtful if the British would be able to hang on in Malaya. Communist successes on the mainland would undoubtedly increase the already considerable strength of the Communist position in Indonesia and that country, too, could be expected to move into the Communist orbit.

2. Political and Prestige Importance

Southeast Asia is now the one place in the world where the Communist and non-Communist worlds confront each other on the field of battle in major hostilities. The outcome of the struggle will have major repercussions. Communist conquest or acquisition of Southeast Asia would spread doubt and fear among other threatened non-Communist countries and create the feeling that Communism was the “wave of the future” and that the United States and the Free World were unable, to halt its advance. Countries in the Far East, South Asia, and elsewhere in the world would be encouraged to adopt policies of accommodation to communist pressures and objectives.

3. Economic Importance

Southeast Asia (Malaya and Indonesia in particular) is the principal world source of natural rubber and tin. These materials are strategically important to both the West and to the Communists. Southeast Asia produced export surpluses of rice which are of critical importance to other countries of the Far East, and in particular to Japan and India. Communist acquisition of these rice surpluses would go far to remove a major problem in food for the Chinese Communists, and would provide the Communists with a powerful economic weapon against other countries of the Far East. Southeast Asia (particularly Indonesia) is an important secondary source of petroleum. Malaya is the largest net dollar earner for the United Kingdom, and its loss would seriously aggravate the economic problems of the U.K. Communist control of Southeast Asia would rob Japan of its potentially most important sources of raw materials and of potentially important markets.

4. Strategic

Southeast Asia is astride the most direct and best developed sea and air routes between the Western Pacific and India and the Near East. It has major naval operating bases (Singapore) and air bases. Communist control of Southeast Asia would render the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious.

5. General

Communist control of Southeast Asia could result in such economic and political pressures on Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan’s eventual accommodation to the Soviet bloc. The extension of Communist power into Burma would augment the communist threat to India and East Pakistan, enhance Communist opportunies for infiltration in these countries, and strengthen groups who favored communism or accommodation with communism. Communist control of Southeast Asia would create a communist potential for military isolation of Australia; would jeopardize the U.S. position in the Western Pacific; and would thus seriously jeopardize basic security interests of the U.S.

1. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that this memorandum was used by the Secretary of State as background for his Overseas Press Club Speech of Mar. 29; regarding that address, see the second editorial note, p. 1181.