State-JCS meetings, lot 61 D 417

Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting at the Pentagon Building, March 12, 1954, 11:30 a.m.1

top secret

Present

  • Admiral Radford
  • General Twining
  • Admiral Carney
  • General Thomas2
  • General Ridgway
  • General Lemnitzer
  • General Everest
  • General Carns
  • General Fox
  • Admiral Gardner
  • General Partridge
  • General Collins3
  • Mr. Walter Robertson
  • Mr. Livingston Merchant
  • Mr. Robert Bowie
  • Mr. Douglas MacArthur II
  • Mr. Julius Katz
  • Mr. Walworth Barbour
  • Mr. Philip Bonsal
  • Mr. Charles Stelle
  • Mr. John Goodyear
  • Defense
  • Admiral Davis
  • CIA
  • General Cabell
  • Mr. Robert Amory
  • NSC
  • General Gerhart
  • Mr. S. Everett Gleason

[Here follows discussion of subjects other than Indochina.]

Mr. MacArthur then brought up the question of U.S. reaction to possible Chinese Communist introduction of air power in Indochina.

[Page 1118]

Mr. Robertson pointed out that M. Pleven had asked the U.S. Government for a statement of the U.S. position in the event an enemy air force should appear in Indochina. (Mr. Robertson left a memorandum and attachments with the Joint Chiefs on this subject.)4 Admiral Radford pointed out that there were no air fields in Viet Minh territory which could be used by jets, and added that though there were reports of certain jet air fields in south China, he was not aware that there were any there. The Admiral added that if any MIGs did appear over Indochina, the French could give them a run for their money. He pointed out that the MIG was not a low-level flying aircraft, and that aircraft now available to the French (piston type) should be able to deal with them.

The Admiral added that there were many unpleasant questions which must be brought up and discussed, and a position on them agreed, before the Korean Political Conference on April 26. He said further that since General Ely was expected to visit the U.S. sometime in April, it was necessary to anticipate questions that the General might ask. Mr. Robertson agreed with alacrity.

There was further discussion on General Ely’s visit. Admiral Radford said that General Valluy had given him a memorandum5 referring to: (1) additional aircraft needed by the French; (2) the relationship of the United States to the military training program; and (3) psychological warfare operations in Indochina.

With respect to additional aircraft, Admiral Radford said our position was that the French were not maintaining the aircraft they already had in the way that they should, nor were they using these aircraft to the full extent possible. United States mechanics in Indochina, the Admiral continued, would have to be returned by June 15, and the French should explore the possibility of substituting Japanese, Philippine or Chinese Nationalist mechanics, adding that we could assist them to get mechanics from that source if they wanted them.

With respect to the training program, Admiral Radford said that with the MAAG we were already in a position to help, and that he had discussed this question with General Navarre and Ambassador Heath last summer.

Elaborating on the psychological warfare aspect, the Admiral said that the U.S. desired to have greater participation in it, but that we were blocked both by organizational difficulties, and by personalities.

[Page 1119]

Admiral Radford felt sure that General Ely in the course of his visit would probably bring up these subjects, and would also refer to the possibility of Chinese Communist aircraft (particularly jet) over Indochina and our position in that eventuality.

Again on this general subject, Admiral Radford remarked that he was holding a press conference at two o’clock that afternoon, and that since no doubt he would be asked about the status of the O’Daniel mission, he was prepared to say that General O’Daniel was being sent out to replace General Trapnell as head of the MAAG. There was some discussion about the feasibility of making this announcement, but it was ultimately agreed that there was really no reason why it should not be done.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

  1. This Department of State draft was not cleared with the participants.
  2. Lt. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, Assistant to the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
  3. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Representative to the Military Committee and the Standing Group of NATO.
  4. The memorandum, titled “U.S. Reaction to Chinese Communist Introduction of Air Power in Indochina,” Mar. 12, requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on various aspects of the question. A copy of the memorandum is in file 751G.00/3–1254. Regarding the request by French Defense Minister Pleven, see telegram 1567 from Saigon, Feb. 28, p. 1085. For the memorandum of Apr. 8 prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to the Department of State request, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, pp. 378–379.
  5. Not identified.