751G.00/3–1154
Memorandum by the Chairman of the Operations
Coordinating Board (Smith) to the President
top secret
[Washington,] March 11, 1954.
Subject:
- Report on Program for Indochina
On behalf of the Operations Coordinating Board I am transmitting for your
consideration a report on a program for securing military victory in
Indochina short of overt involvement by U.S. Combat Forces, in accordance
with the instructions of the National Security Council, NSC Action 1019a, January 21, 1954.1
This report was prepared by a Special Committee consisting of the Under
Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and Mr. C. D. Jackson.
This report outlines certain specific procedures, certain objectives, and
certain courses of action for immediate implementation by the Departments
and Agencies concerned.
[Page 1109]
The Operations Coordinating Board on March 3 approved this report and its
implementation is now under way under the coordination of the Board.2
[Annex]
Report by the President’s Special Committee on
Indochina3
top secret
[Washington, March 2, 1954.]
Part I
Indo-China
i—the problem
To set forth a program of action without resort to overt combat
operations by U.S. forces, designed to: (a)
secure the military defeat of Communist forces in Indo-China, and (b) establish a western oriented complex in
Southeast Asia incorporating Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Malaya,
Indonesia, and the Philippines.
ii—major considerations
- (A)
- Indo-China is considered the keystone of the arch of Southeast
Asia, and the Indo-Chinese peninsula must not be permitted to fall
under Communist domination. This requires the defeat in Indo-China
of military and quasi-military Communist forces and the development
of conditions conducive to successful resistance to any Communist
actions to dominate the area. Measures taken in Indo-China, however,
[Page 1110]
must be in
consonance with U.S. and allied action taken in the Far East and
Southeast Asia to defeat Communist efforts to extend their control
of the area.
- (B)
- Feasible actions to provide for the immediate U.S. assistance
requested by the French for operations in the Dien Bien Phu-Central
Laos sector have been taken. The measures recommended herein will
hardly affect the immediate tactical situation in those areas
(which, while serious, is not as critical as public pronouncements
suggest). They are designed to effect a general improvement in the
over-all situation in Indo-China, which is such that all actions
must be considered a matter of urgency to be implemented without
delay. They are also designed to achieve the desired results in
Indo-China without overt involvement by U.S. combat forces.
- (C)
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency have
developed a program of support for the Navarre Plan in Indo-China. This plan considers
certain basic immediate requirements for continued U.S. support for
Franco-Vietnamese operations and some of these recommendations have
been implemented. The remaining actions have been incorporated
hereunder in paragraph III (A). However, there is implicit in many
of these proposals a requirement for a stronger French political and
military effort as well as more effective support for Vietnamese
participation. The alternative to more precise and extensive action
by the French and Vietnamese, as proposed by the U.S., appears to be
a continued stalemate or debacle in Indo-China.
- (D)
- It would appear that France cannot withdraw her forces from
Indo-China without serious deterioration of her position as a world
power.
- (E)
- The key to the success of military operations continues to be the
generation of well-trained, properly led indigenous forces
effectively employed in combat operations against the Communist
forces in Viet Minh. The eventual goal must be the development of
homogenous indigenous units with a native officer corps. In this the
French have had, for whatever reason, insufficient success. Such
success will ultimately be dependent upon the inspiration of the
local population to fight for their own freedom from Communist
domination and the willingness of the French both to take the
measures to stimulate that inspiration and to more fully utilize the
native potential. At the same time, French sensitivities with
respect to their sacrifices, responsibilities, and capabilities must
be respected, as we persuade and assist them to correct existing
deficiencies.
- (F)
- The U.S. objective in Indo-China should be centralized U.S.
control and coordination of all U.S. military, military aid, and
“unconventional warfare” (which includes psychological warfare,
guerrilla warfare, and certain aspects of pacification operations)
mechanisms in Indo-China.
- (G)
- There is in Indo-China, or programmed for Indo-China (and
anticipating continued U.S. assistance) a sufficient amount of
equipment and supplies and a potential manpower pool sufficient
eventually to defeat the Communists decisively if properly utilized
and maintained and if the situation continues
to permit this manpower to be converted into military effectiveness.
In their own report the French have acknowledged that U.S. aid in
many areas has exceeded French capacity to absorb it.
- (H)
- Measures advocated by the U.S. must be so characterized by
determination, strength, confidence, and justice that they serve to
enhance the support of all Asians who seek freedom, both from
Communist domination and western colonization. Asians must be
convinced that they will have a far better future with the Free
World than under Communism and that there is not to be reinstitution
of colonialism.
- (I)
- The Communists in Indo-China, Southeast Asia, China, and Moscow
must be made aware that the United States, France, and the free
governments of the Far East are united, steadfast, and capable of
accomplishing their aims.
- (J)
- The U.S. must take the initiative in persuading the French and
Vietnamese to overcome these deficiencies. Such initiative must,
however, avoid French exploitation in its unilateral interest and
must avoid actions which will lead to involuntary U.S. combat
participation.
iii—actions required
- (A)
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Central
Intelligence Agency, have recommended certain courses of action
which are susceptible of immediate implementation. Of those not
already undertaken, the following should be completed as a matter of
urgency:
- 1.
The French air forces in Indo-China should be
augmented, particularly with respect to air and
ground-crew personnel from military and/or civilian
resources within the framework of the French Vietnamese
armed forces. Steps should be taken through existing
contacts with the French Government to satisfy these
requirements; to explore the possibilities of
establishing a volunteer air group; and to make the
necessary arrangements to replace the uniformed U.S.
military personnel being temporarily assigned to assist
the French in maintenance functions.
Action: Defense
. . . . . . .
- 3.
A source of funds in the amount of $124 millions to
meet additional urgent requirements for Indo-China for
all services must be determined. Currently for FY 1954 there has been
provided to the French effort in Indo-China a total of
$1,115 millions in military assistance, defense support,
and military support projects. Unless a source of funds
other than MDAP is made
available to meet these additional requirements, the
matériel action and training support for
[Page 1112]
Indo-China will have to
come at the expense of the world-wide FY 1954 MDA program.
Action; Defense
- (B)
The present situation in Indo-China, however, indicates that in
addition to the immediate actions outlined above, the following
steps must be taken as a matter of priority:
Politically
- 1.
- As a result of events which have occurred during recent
weeks, and particularly in the light of the forthcoming
Geneva Convention, certain actions which might have been
susceptible of direct negotiation with the French Government
now require more circumspect negotiation. Nonetheless, it
should remain the U.S. objective to obtain French active
acceptance formally or informally of the following:
- a.
- Modification of the mission of the U.S. MAAG, Indo-China, to
provide for expanded strength, including a planning
staff (composed initially of up to 10 highly
selected officer personnel); authority to conduct
liaison with senior training and planning staff
sections; and authority to make recommendations
concerning the conduct of operations. This
relationship may be justified entirely within the
framework of the present agreement with the French
Government that “the French Government will continue
to facilitate exchanges of information and views on
a continuing basis between French and U.S. military
authorities and will take into account the views
expressed by the latter with respect to the
development and carrying out of the French strategic
plans without in any way, of course, detracting from
exclusive French responsibility for adoption and
execution thereof.”4 It should be
presented that the U.S. has complete confidence that
France can win the struggle against the Communists
in Indo-China and that expanded U.S. representation
at the French Headquarters is designed to provide
the maximum and most effective assistance in aiding
the French to achieve common free world objectives
in Indo-China.
- b.
Gradual assignment of additional U.S. personnel
up to a level of 50 specially qualified personnel
in Indo-China as such assignments become feasible.
These individuals should have the mission of
acting as instructors, principally with the
Vietnamese forces and in non-combat areas as
recommended by the Chief, MAAG, and concurred in by the local
Commander.
. . . . . . .
- 2.
- It should also be a U.S. objective to seek (both with the
active French and other appropriate governments as well as
with the necessary U.S. authorities) the methods of
attaining the following:
- a.
- Modification of present Foreign Legion enlistment
requirements with reduced enlistment period for
service in Indo-China
[Page 1113]
and expansion of the Foreign
Legion to include the formation of air units.
- b.
- Recruitment in certain foreign countries,
especially Germany, Italy, and possibly Asia, of
non-French personnel with appropriate technical
qualifications for service in Indo-China with the
Foreign Legion.
- c.
Provision of certain U.S. personnel, on a
voluntary basis, for service in the French forces
without sacrifice of their U.S. citizenship.
Action: Defense,
State
- 3.
- In addition to the urgent actions outlined above, the
following additional actions are suggested as contributing
to the advancement of U.S. interests with respect to
Indo-China:
- a.
The U.S. should continue to stress and
emphasize in every way our purpose in helping the
peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos through the
French is to maintain their independence, and
should reiterate our position regarding that
independence.
Action: Operations
Coordinating Board
- b.
A vigorous U.S. effort might be made to restore
Bao Dai’s
health and to persuade him and … to take a more
active part in the struggle against the Viet Minh.
This effort should include action designed to
encourage Bao
Dai to withdraw from his semiisolation
to visit his troops, to reside in his capital and
otherwise to comport himself like a dynamic Chief
of State. This effort might be correlated with
measures designed to have some U.S. military
assistance delivered directly to the Associated
States instead of through the French. Such action
might appropriately be taken upon the conclusion
of or during the latter phases of the Geneva
conference.
Action: Operations
Coordinating Board
Militarily
- 1.
- A general officer of two-star rank, as designated by the
Department of Defense, should be appointed Chief, MAAG, Indo-China, upon relief
of the present Chief in February 1954. He will be subject to
the coordination of the U.S. Ambassador to Indo-China, but
will be under the military command of U.S.
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. He will command all U.S.
military personnel and covert assets in Indo-China relative
to his mission and will be personally responsible for
preventing the involvement of uniformed U.S. personnel in
combat.
- 2.
- Subsequent to the receipt of French governmental approval
(and desirably at their invitation), but at the earliest
possible time, the Chief, MAAG, Indo-China, should be provided with
necessary staff sections, and assigned additional duties
involving expanded liaison with the French and Vietnam
forces. He should be directed and authorized to advise and
assist the Franco-Vietnamese command in training and
planning, and to make recommendations concerning the
[Page 1114]
conduct of
operations. In this connection he should urgently seek the
following:
- a.
- Development and implementation of a sound concept
and operational plan for the conduct of operations
in Indo-China.
- b.
- Intensive and aggressive operations with a view to
winning a victory of consequence at the earliest
time, and exploitation of this success politically
and psychologically.
- c.
- Effective pacification of French-Vietnamese held
areas, emphasizing security of individuals and
property through proper utilization of defense
groups and guards and institutions of adequate local
civil administration.
- d.
Training and properly equipping Vietnam units
with emphasis upon the institution of adequate
officer, NCO, and
technical training courses.
. . . . . . .
Action: Defense, … FOA
- 3.
Concurrently with the tasks assigned above,
arrangements should be made to develop an over-all
concept designed to achieve the subjugation of Communist
forces in Indo-China and the pacification of the area.
This concept should be provided the Chief, MAAG, Indo-China, as
guidance in seeking the accomplishment of the task
assigned in paragraph 2 above.
Action: Defense, …
Information and
Psychological
- 1.
- Concurrently with the political and military actions
outlined above, and under the coordination of the Operations
Coordinating Board, a specific domestic and foreign
information campaign should be developed and maintained,
particularly for the period leading up to the Geneva
conference, to de-emphasize “hysteria” publicity, and to
bring about widespread recognition of and appropriate
attention to the following themes:
- a.
- France, in supporting the fight of the Associated
States of Indo-China against Communist domination,
is the principal nation now shedding its blood for
the freedom of others.
- b.
- The French Government has made major sacrifices in
terms of its young military manpower, its economic
resources, and its political position in order to
defend the cause of liberty and freedom from
Communism in Indo-China.
- c.
- The French Government has accepted the principle
of self government and sovereignty for the
Associated States of Indo-China and has in fact more
than satisfied the initial demands of Ho Chi-Minh, thus
providing evidence that the Viet Minh are fighting
not for freedom but for the Communist cause.
- d.
- The cause of the Associated States of Indo-China
is the cause of all countries in South Asia who
desire freedom from Communist domination and self
determination with respect to their political and
economic objectives.
- e.
- The cause of Viet Minh as with all Communists is
the cause of colonization and subservience to
Kremlin rule as was the cause in China, in North
Korea and in the European satellites.
Action: State, Defense, … USIA
- 2.
- A specific U.S. psychological warfare program for
Indo-China should be developed immediately, including overt
and covert projects, under Operations Coordinating Board
coordination, with paramount emphasis on the establishment
of a climate of opinion which associates all outside support
with the achievement of Indo-Chinese national aspiration.
Benefit will accrue from U.S. courses of action in direct
proportion to the degree they are implemented through
indigenous peoples rather than through direct support of the
French. The U.S. psychological warfare program should
therefore provide for the following:
- a.
The establishment under the U.S. Ambassador to
Indo-China of an operations advisory group,
including representatives of the U.S. Military
Mission in Indo-China, the Department of State,
the Foreign Operations Administration … as
appropriate to coordinate the non-military aspects
of U.S. psychological operations within
Indo-China. The Chief, MAAG, Indo-China, should be responsible
for coordinating all psychological warfare
activities directly relative to his expanded
mission with this group.
Action: State, Defense, …
FOA, USIA
- b.
Appropriate psychological warfare equipment and
supplies should be assigned to the French and
Vietnam forces, and key technical personnel should
be assigned to the MAAG for such use as the Chief MAAG may desire.
Action: Defense, … FOA
- c.
A specific mechanism should be established
within the U.S. to provide for the orientation of
all official U.S. personnel assigned to duty or
visiting Indo-China so that maximum favorable
psychological effect is derived from all their
activities and contacts.
Action: Operations
Coordinating Board
- d.
Development of indigenous leadership which will
be truly representative and symbolic of
Indo-Chinese national aspirations and win the
loyalty and support of the people.
Action: State, Defense,
…
- e.
Subsidization of indigenous newspapers and
public information media, including provision of
equipment and supplies as well as air transport to
remote population centers.
Action; … USIA
- f.
Upon establishment of necessary agreements with
the French Government as prescribed above,
augmentation of the US–Vietnam guerrilla warfare
potential in Indo-China.
Action:
Defense,
[Page 1116]
iv—conclusions and
recommendations
- (A)
- If the above actions can be completed at an early date with full
French support (and on the assumption that the Chinese Communists do
not intervene overtly in Indo-China), it is considered that this
program will have the effect of reversing the present situation and
give promise of leading to an ultimate victory in Indo-China without
overt use of U.S. military forces.
- (B)
- However, should the immediate situation in Indo-China deteriorate
drastically or should French intransigence make the substantial
accomplishment of the program outlined herein impossible, the U.S.
may wish to consider direct military action in Southeast Asia to
ensure the maintenance of our vital interests in the area. Under
such circumstances, an area concept including Malaya, Thailand,
Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, as well as Indo-China, would
appear essential. These ramifications are to be considered in Part
II of this study as assigned to the Special Committee.5
- (C)
- It is recommended that this program be
approved by the Operations Coordinating Board and submitted to the
President for immediate implementation.
- (D)
- It is recommended that the Department of
Defense develop, for the immediate attention of the Special
Committee, a concept of operations and considerations involved in
the use of U.S. armed forces in Indo-China, should such involvement
be determined upon.
