Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

740.5/3–654: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Paris, March 6, 1954—6 p.m.

3238. Repeated information Saigon 361, London unnumbered. March 5 session Assembly debate on IC was brief,¹ lasting less than 4 hours, largely perfunctory in nature and set stage for second phase of debate scheduled to begin morning March 9. However, it was evident from the outset that Geneva conference overshadowed all other considerations and that at most the debate was not likely to result in anything more than an expression of the Assembly’s views in regard to the government’s position to be taken at Geneva. There was no indication that anyone in the Assembly really wished to disturb present prospect of reaching some settlement of Indochinese conflict at Geneva. Hence government’s position was one of confidence and oppositions largely one in name only since it apparently had no quarrel to pick with government’s Geneva objective.

In resume, deputies posing interpellations, Daniel Mayer (SOC), Giovoni (Communist), and De Chambrun (Progressive), opened session by calling on government to accept Nehru’s cease-fire proposal and to enter into immediate negotiations with Viet Minh. Laniel then stated government position which proved to be principal event of afternoon (summary of which follows in separate telegram).² Mitterand (UDSR), Daladier (Radical Socialist), and Le Laehenal (Independent Peasant), urged acceptance cease-fire prior Geneva. While opposing government’s consideration Nehru proposal or negotiations with Viet Minh, Frederic-Dupont (ARS) stated ARS placing all its hopes on Geneva. Last speaker was Sestebe (Independent Republican) who took position that is necessary find solution at Geneva.

It was really not debate since all of speakers, including Laniel, appeared to be in general agreement on desirability of finding an early settlement of IC conflict. Although Laniel in effect ruled out acceptance of cease-fire proposal prior to Geneva, he made it unmistakably clear that France hopes to find diplomatic solution to conflict then. On other hand, it was clearly evident that opposition, despite effectiveness of its oratory, was unable to muster any very effective arguments to support its position that an immediate cease-fire would improve prospects of settlement at Geneva. The government’s position that discussion of IC would be joined at Geneva in April and that government intended to do everything possible to find solution there, clearly cut ground from under opposition and it was apparent that latter recognized it. Embassy gained distinct impression during debate that with Geneva conference in offing, government in firm position to encounter effectively any Assembly pressure at this time for exploring possibility negotiations with Viet Minh or Nehru’s cease-fire proposal and that there is no likelihood of any action resulting that would pose immediate threat to continuation of, or result in an appreciable modification of present French position on IC prior Geneva. On other hand and as indicated above, in Embassy’s views principal significance debate lies in its preview of, and its possible impact on, French Government’s IC position for Geneva.

In his statement Laniel clearly ruled out any consideration by government of cease-fire proposal prior to Geneva by setting forth for first time those conditions that would have to be met prior to French agreement of any such move. Conditions that he outlined (contained separate telegram)³ were obviously such as to make them clearly unacceptable to Viet Minh. (Foreign Office official who had drafted Laniel speech said at time that these conditions had been drawn with just that thought in mind, i.e., to rule out any question France considering any cease-fire proposal prior Geneva.) Although this is element of Laniel’s speech which has been given prominence in press in Embassy’s view significance of Laniel’s statement lies in the clear indication, contained therein of the French government’s views on the forthcoming Geneva conference. It is not difficult to discern in Laniel’s statement that if settlement is to be reached on IC at Geneva, it will be up to France’s allies to make concessions to Communist China with all that that implies for US. (The same Foreign Office official when asked about recent French articles taking line to effect settlement of IC at Geneva hinges on revision US China policy, indicated that this would be, in his opinion, the fundamental issue at Geneva and one on which success or failure would rest.) Embassy’s only comment on this score at this time would be that implications apparent Laniel’s speech are pretty accurate forecast of how the French position for Geneva will shape up between now and April 26.

Dillon

1. For the record of the debate, see France, Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale, 1954, Débats, pp. 706–723.
2. The Embassy transmitted highlights of the statement by Premier Laniel in telegram 3240, Mar. 6; for text, see vol. xvi, p. 435. For the record of remarks by Laniel, see France, Journal Ofliciel, Assemblée Nationale, 1954, Débats, pp. 713715.

3. In telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, the conditions set forth by Laniel were described as follows:

   “(1) The total evacuation of Laos by troops having infiltrated there; (2) although military situation in Cambodia different, analogous precautions would be required there; (3) in northern Vietnam a sort of no man’s land would have to be created around the periphery of the Tonkin Delta and the Viet Minh units that have infiltrated the Delta would have to withdraw under strictly controlled evacuation; (4) in central Vietnam the Viet Minh units would have to withdraw to delimited zones in such manner as to guarantee security of our troops and the people; (5) in southern Vietnam, the Viet Minh forces should be disarmed or evacuated. To all these guarantees ought to be added other measures of security and control designed to assure that with suspension of fighting our adversaries cannot carry out certain activities, or proceed to reinforcement or regroupment, as was the case in Korea during the long period of conversations.” (751G.00/3–654)