Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 187th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 4, 1954¹

top secret
eyes only

March 4, 1954

[Extracts]

The following were present at the 187th NSC meeting: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Morrison for the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Commissioner Campbell, AEC; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Mr. Cutler and Mr. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

. . . . . . .

With regard to Indochina, Governor Stassen said that he returned with a strong feeling that the military situation in that area was a great deal better than we had imagined.² Indeed, he had found the French actually hoping for a major enemy attack because they were so confident that they could crush it. Of course, it was extremely unfortunate that in the present kind of warfare so many French officers and non-coms were being killed, particularly by the savage mine warfare. He believed that the United States had available shoes which would prevent the maiming of soldiers as a result of the explosion of plastic mines which could not be detected.

Governor Stassen said that General Navarre continued to look forward to the opening of his big offensive on October 1. He did not feel, however, that he had on hand as yet all the supplies he needed to mount this offensive. These supplies would have to be on hand by August 1, and Governor Stassen felt that the United States had most of the needed items in supply in Japan and Okinawa. Accordingly, our logistical back-up of the Navarre offensive should be based on Japan and Okinawa rather than on the round-about line from the United States itself.

Governor Stassen also found a need for a more adequate French military government organization to move in and accomplish the pacification of areas taken away from the enemy in the fighting.

Most significant of all, said Governor Stassen, was the recent conviction of the French that it was really possible to create an effective fighting force out of the Vietnamese natives. The French had now come to believe that their early failures to achieve this objective were chiefly to be explained by the premature use of the native battalions, and they were now being provided with more thorough training.

With respect to U.S. personnel, both military and civilian, Governor Stassen recommended that no individual stay longer there than a period of two years. This was a front line operation.

Of the Emperor Bao Dai, Governor Stassen said he received a very poor impression of an individual who was weak physically and lacking in courage. Nevertheless, his new government contained some very promising officials. Moreover, Governor Stassen thought highly of the King of Cambodia, and believed the situation in that state very hopeful.

. . . . . . .

6. Proposed ROK offer of troops to Laos (NSC Action No. 1043-a; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 2, 1954)³

Mr. Cutler called attention to the three studies of this problem which were attached to the Planning Board’s recommendation that the offer of a Korean division to Laos be rejected. While the Planning Board was in unanimous agreement that General Hull should be instructed to tell President Rhee that the United States felt that this offer should not be made, Mr. Cutler pointed out the difference in opinion between the Departments of State and Defense with regard to the basis on which this opinion was to rest. The State Department believed that General Hull should explain this decision as motivated by “military considerations”, whereas the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that it should be based upon “the best interests of the free world”.

The President said, with great emphasis, that he thought the basis should be that public opinion in the United States would never support the removal of an ROK division for adventures in other parts of the world while the United States itself was still obliged to maintain forces in Korea. He would certainly hate to have to explain such a situation to the mothers of American soldiers.

Secretary Smith said that this was precisely what the State Department had in mind when it spoke of rejecting the offer for military reasons.

The President then asked Admiral Radford for his views. Admiral Radford replied that he had felt that military reasons offered the soundest basis on which to reject Rhee’s offer, but that the Chiefs of Staff had out-voted him on the issue. He therefore proposed that the Joint Chiefs should send General Hull a message indicating that he was to frame a rejection, in talking with President Rhee, on military grounds, and then to add what the President had said as to the impossibility of public acceptance of this move in the United States.

The President replied that he did not think the basis he had in mind should be described as “military reasons”, but simply as domestic political reasons. In any case, he wanted General Hull to make quite clear to President Rhee that domestic opinion in the United States would never stand for the removal of a Korean division to Indochina.

In that case, Admiral Radford said, it was necessary to say nothing more than this in the JCS instructions to General Hull.

The Vice President commented that the best way of handling Rhee, in his opinion, was simply to tell him the truth.

The National Security Council:⁴

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the recommendation contained in paragraph 4 of the reference memorandum.⁵

b. Agreed that the Department of Defense should transmit a message to General Hull directing him to advise the ROK Government that, after full consideration at the highest levels in the United States Government which commends the ROK Government for its determination to combat communist aggression in Asia even outside the borders of Korea, it is considered that it is not desirable at this time that a division of the Korean Army be sent to Laos because U.S. public opinion would not support the maintenance of U.S. forces in Korea while ROK forces were withdrawn from Korea for action elsewhere.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

. . . . . . .

1. Prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on Mar. 5.
2. Harold E. Stassen, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, delivered these remarks in the context of an overall report on his recent trip to Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
3. For NSC Action No. 1043, see the memorandum of discussion at the 185th Meeting of the National Security Council, Feb. 17, p. 1054. The memorandum of Mar. 2, not printed, by Executive Secretary Lay to the National Security Council, transmitted three studies on the proposed offer of the Republic of Korea of troops for Laos: a study on political implications, by the Department of State; a report on military aspects by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mar. 1, concurred in by the Acting Secretary of Defense (for text, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, pp. 259–263); and a memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence assessing probable reactions to Korean participation in the Indochina war. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D148, “ROK Offer”)
4. Points a and b below constituted NSC Action No. 1054, Mar. 4. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”)
5. Paragraph 4 of the memorandum of Mar. 2 from the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council contained the recommendation that the Korean Government be advised that the United States did not consider it desirable that a Korean division be sent to Laos. (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 148, “ROK Offer”)