Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/2–2854: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Saigon, February 28, 1954—3 p.m.

1567. Repeated information Paris 473. In past two days I have talked with Bao Dai, French State Secretary for War De Chevigne, and Defense Minister Pleven.

1. I found Bao Dai in much more hopeful mood than during his talk with Stassen and me (see Embtel 1506, February 21 [22]). Referring to idea he launched at last interview of massive evacuations Tonkin Delta, Bao Dai said he realized it would be logistically difficult to point of impossibility, although it was very practical in other respects and would have effective military results. One reason he had proposed it was his fear that sooner or later Chinese would intervene and invade Tonkin. He was not going to leave “his” people there under Chinese yoke.

2. Real enemy was Communist China. He had no doubts that if there were no Chinese intervention, Franco-Vietnamese forces would overcome Viet Minh. He feared that Chiang Kai Shek was no longer a leader who could drive communism out of China, but offered no alternative candidate.

3. He said he was unalterably opposed to idea of any armistice with Ho Chi-Minh and he asserted that, even if French withdrew their forces, troops and officers of Vietnamese national army would reject any suggestion of armistice and fight on against Viet Minh.

4. He had been deeply impressed by Pleven whom he considered a great man. He had told Pleven that he had not asked for new agreements with France to complete Vietnamese independence at this stage. It was France alone which raised issue by its July 3 declaration. Since issue had been raised, he had detailed to Pleven requests which Vietnam would make at forthcoming conference. He had urged Pleven in French interest not to let concessions to these requests be wrung from France through negotiations but that France should take initiative and offer concessions without being asked to do so. Pleven had replied that he thought well of this idea but would have to take it up with his government on his return to Paris. Bao Dai then said to me he had asked Pleven what France wanted in return. He had posed this question to Pleven with some fear that latter would reply requesting immoderate privileges for France and restrictions which would not go down with Vietnamese nationalists. But Pleven had simply said in reply that all France wanted was a “strong Vietnam.”

5. Bao Dai in praising Pleven made clear his poor opinion of Jacquet. He said he had told Jacquet to his face that he was reactionary. Bao Dai was also perturbed over French “colonialist” officials and supports in Paris who were intriguing in general against a new deal for Vietnam and in particular for removal of De Jean. Latter event would be a calamity since De Jean of all French officials sent here had highest and clearest view of future Franco-Vietnamese relations.

6. Bao Dai then spoke enthusiastically of Buu Loc’s reliability and performance to date as Prime Minister. He said that I could speak with complete frankness and trust to Buu Loc. If we had something to complain of in operation of government to say so frankly. If we had suggestions they would be well received.

7. Finally Bao Dai said that he thoroughly realized now that not only was Vietnam deeply indebted to [for] material aid to France and US but that Vietnam owed a moral debt to these countries and indeed to whole free world and had moral mission to fulfill. War was not just war against rebels but war for freedom.

Comment: In private conversation Bao Dai does not usually indulge in lofty moral and idealistic sentiments. He usually speaks in terms of down-to-earth realism. His remarks were only words but they were a welcome change in attitude if only a verbal one. I was tempted to reply to these lofty phrases by saying that Bao Dai should live up to them by coming out of woods and exerting really national leadership but decided that approach should be reserved for a later occasion.

Immediately after my return from Dalat I saw De Chevigne.

1. De Chevigne insisted at length on opposition in France to continuation of military effort. Only argument against this feeling would be a convincing, detailed program and timetable whereby both Vietnam National Army and government and people would dynamically engage in war. De Chevigne called this a “Vietnamization” of war. If that failed to occur, there would be no other alternative than “internationalization” of war under UN and that was an uncertain and not really desirable solution.

2. Present military situation was not bad and French forces were fighting with determination and skill. But morale could not be maintained unless Vietnam National Army and government made really determined and successful effort. Could not expect even professional soldiers to fight with efficiency in cause in which they saw no national interest and no evidence of national determination on part of country they were defending. Bao Dai must be made to visit and live with his Vietnamese troops.

3. De Chevigne expressed disbelief in Navarre plan or in substantial victory for Franco-Vietnamese forces during 1954–55 campaign season. I took decided issue with this and said that General Trapnell and I were convinced that, given quantitative and qualitative improvement of Vietnam Army, back of Viet Minh military resistance could be broken during that period, although guerrilla war might last for a much longer period. I added that we had confidence in Navarre and in his plan.

4. De Chevigne said that military situation was by no means unsatisfactory but could change adversely overnight if suddenly some MIGs appeared over Dien Bien Phu, which in such event could not be held. I said if MIGs did appear, in my personal opinion, it would constitute direct Chinese intervention since there are no Viet Minh Air Force or usable airfields in Viet Minh territory.

5. In conclusion, De Chevigne praised great tact which American political and military representation here had exercised in execution of American aid programs. He had talked to innumerable French military authorities here and found them unanimous in their appreciation of the aid and the manner in which it was extended. Necessary end-use inspections had been accomplished thoroughly but in a most tactful manner. He hoped that General O’Daniel who would succeed General Trapnell would show same tactful understanding of this situation.

I had a rather long talk with Pleven later yesterday.

1. Pleven said he had no idea in what mood he would find French Government on his return but feared to find there and in Parliament a desire to terminate French military effort in Indochina. Only way to overcome that opposition would be for Vietnamese (as De Chevigne had proposed) to come through with a convincing program and timetable of governmental and military performance. Something had to be done to get Bao Dai to exert some leadership and also to prevent Imperial Cabinet from meddling when government was endeavoring to do a necessary job. He had been shocked to hear from Dr. Nghiep,¹ the excellent Public Health Minister, that he had withdrawn doctors of his medical team he had sent to provinces occupied by Atlante operation because pacification region had been entrusted by Bao Dai to Giao² whose Public Health Director was utterly incompetent. Nghiep has asked Buu Loc to remove Giao’s Health Director but latter replied he could not do so because of Imperial Cabinet. I remarked that I personally thought Giao, although he had certain virtues, should be removed himself and that I would discuss matter with Nghiep and, if De Jean thought well, would talk to Buu Loc and Bao Dai himself about this failure of Giao. I told Pleven that Bao Dai had expressed greatest esteem for him (and also of De Jean) and that if anyone could effectively sermonize Bao Dai he perhaps was the man. Pleven said that was not his job. I replied I thought that as Defense Minister it was his job. Bao Dai would listen to him. I thought he could call on our government to do anything it could in seconding French efforts in bringing about some dynamism in Vietnamese military picture. I remarked I told De Jean once that, if there were some unpleasant home truths which for reasons of maintaining harmonious relations French themselves did not want to convey to Bao Dai or his government, I would be glad to take lead.

2. Pleven then said that even if he could obtain convincing assurances of better Vietnamese governmental and military effort here, unless he had some fairly precise assurances of what would be American reaction to sudden appearance of a “Viet Minh Air Force,” he could hardly, in conscience, plead for prolongation or increase of French military effort in Indochina. Although such planes would bear Viet Minh markings, they would in effect be a Chinese Communist Air Force. This contingency had never been, so far as he knew, subject of discussion between France and US. If American Government would regard such an occurrence as Chinese Communist belligerent intervention in this war and was prepared to undertake some counteraction, a precise warning should be given to Communist China at an appropriate moment, which would be forthcoming conference at Geneva. In making this suggestion, he was speaking personally as he had not discussed it with his government, but he intended to ask General Ely on his forthcoming visit to US to explore this matter thoroughly.

Heath

1. Tan Ham Nghiep.
2. Pham Van Giao, Governor of Central Vietnam.