751G.00/2–2454: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
[Received 10:40 a.m.]
1525. Repeated information Paris 465, Hanoi 235. Re Deptel 1506, February 19 [22], This morning saw Navarre who returned last night from inspection Central Vietnam. Navarre said that statement attributed to him in official account of interview (Embtel 1509, February 22)1 was not a correct verbatim report. Some correspondent had [Page 1071] stated in rather skeptical tone of voice that his impression was that Navarre would not be able to inflict decisive defeat on Viet Minh in 1955 and asked whether his impression was not correct. Navarre said he replied as quoted in our telegram that he expected in 1955 to be able to deprive Viet Minh of all areas vital to maintenance of their battle forces.
Navarre then went on to say that he still believed he would be able to “break the back” of large-scale Viet Minh military resistance year or 15 months from now but in reiterating that belief he reminded me that he had always attached certain “ifs” to realization of that belief. Most important proviso was that Vietnamese Ministry of Defense provide him with anticipated increase of Vietnamese battalions ready for serious combat operations. He had no real complaint to make of efforts of Vietnamese Defense Ministry or Vietnamese officers charged with training of Vietnamese forces. Given lackadaisical atmosphere and attitude toward war of Vietnamese administration and population, it is truly remarkable that Vietnamese officers have done as well as they have. Remedy must be found in a more determined and efficient Vietnamese political leadership and administration. If that were not forthcoming, he could not realize his schedule.
He said how could one expect a national war spirit when Bao Dai remained removed from his people, spending his days hunting. He had consistently urged Bao Dai to inspect Vietnamese military units either accompanied by him (General Navarre) or alone as he pleased. Twice he thought he had persuaded him, and in fact Bao Dai had agreed to make some military visits, only to call them off at last moment. Perhaps if there were somebody continuously posted with Bao Dai, he might prod latter to take active interest in his army. However, that was not his, Navarre’s, job. If he had authority, he would be tempted to deliver ultimatum to Bao Dai to take up residence in Saigon within 15 days or relinquish his authority over army and administration.
Navarre said there was a second “if” to fulfillment of his plan on schedule. That was that Chinese Communist armament aid should not be stepped up to provide Viet Minh with same armament and firepower which Franco-Vietnamese forces now enjoy.
He pointed out that Vietnamese Government had been unable to assert authority over Hoahaos and Caodaist sects. These two sects had been able to induce considerable number of desertions and acts of indiscipline among Vietnamese units in south.
- Telegram 1509 from Saigon, Feb. 23, not printed, commented on reports alleging that General Navarre had made remarks at a press conference to the effect that the war was stalemated. (751G.00/2–2354)↩