751G.00/2–2054: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1497. Repeated information Paris 455, Vientiane unnumbered. I saw Laotian King and Prince Savang at Luang Prabang and Prince Souvanna Phouma at Vientiane February 17. All three expressed appreciation [Page 1061] of my visit and assurances that we desired to lend all possible assistance to Laos in dark moments of its second invasion by Viet Minh. Although one regular Viet Minh battalion and equivalent battalion Viet Minh Regional Troops within few kilometers Luang Prabang, none of three rulers is worried about ability garrison religious capital to repel attack up to divisional even two divisional strength. On contrary, they feel real confidence that Viet Minh will have to abandon idea of attacking Luang Prabang, if they have not already given up that project, and may be defeated or forced to withdraw from Muong Sai.
Savang and Souvanna Phouma were congratulating themselves on having ordered a “scorched earth” program in approaches to Luang Prabang. Savang insisted that this program, which had greatly added to grave food and supply difficulties of Viet Minh, had “saved” that city from attack.
Comment: I doubt that drastic “scorched earth” program was carried out over large area but certainly some villages were destroyed and Viet Minh advance undoubtedly complicated.
Savang stated that only a few days were necessary to complete fortification of Luang Prabang. Thereafter garrison force would attack two Viet Minh battalions in vicinity and drive them back to north. Prince insisted that food and military supply difficulties of Viet Minh were so great that he personally anticipated by, say, March 15, Viet Minh would have to call off greater part of their invasion, although they might seek, he thought, to occupy and hold a northern border—one along entire Chinese-Laotian frontier whence, in view of difficulties in distances and routes, it would be hard to expel them at any early date. Such an occupation would not be of great immediate military importance or of danger to really populated sections of Laos.
Savang expressed entire confidence in military ability of Colonel Crevecoeur commanding Northern Laos but was rather critical of General Franchi, who commanded in center and who should, in Savang’s view, with his superior strength, have forced early defeat and retreat of Viet Minh forces there.
As result of “scorched earth” program and Viet Minh advance, Laotian Government was having to look after some 3,000 refugees not far from Luang Prabang, but having no difficulties in feeding and supplying them. In fact, government had expected 15,000 refugees but their evacuation was prevented by rapidity of Viet Minh advance.
Savang expressed hope that this would be last Viet Minh invasion of Laos, although later might infiltrate or even occupy remote frontier region south of China border. Souvanna Phouma expressed about same views and hopes as Prince Savang. His principal concern was [Page 1062] that Viet Minh occupation of Thakhek destroyed his public works office there and supplies for area. With this loss, he said that public works part of Laotian five-year plan would be severely injured and delayed.
Comment:DeJean today rather confirmed Savang’s optimistic view. He said French Command was not too worried over Laotian situation. He said there had been some indications of withdrawal to north of certain Viet Minh units and Intelligence that some ten percent of Viet Minh forces were suffering from dysentery and that fifty percent of Viet Minh coolie forces were ill.