Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 185th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, February 17, 19541
eyes only
[Extracts]
The following were present at the 185th meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 1, 2 and 4); the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 4); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 1, 2 and 4); the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research & Development); Mr. Slezak for the Secretary of the Army; the Acting Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. Bolte for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; Gen. John E. Hull, Department of Defense (for Item 7); Gen. Willard S. Paul, Office of Defense Mobilization, and Mr. Shapley, Bureau of the Budget (for Items 1 and 2); Mr. Sullivan, Department of Defense, Mr. Ash, Office of Defense Mobilization, and Mr. Hurley, Office of Defense Mobilization (for Items 1 and 2); the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; Richard L. Hall, NSC Special Staff Member; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
A summary of the discussion at the meeting follows, together with the main points taken.
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3. Contemplated Offer by President Rhee of an ROK Division for Service in Indochina
At the suggestion of Secretary Kyes, Admiral Radford explained that when General Hull returned to his post he would have to be in a position to discuss with President Rhee the latter’s proposed offer to send an ROK division to help the French Union forces in Indochina. General Hull was accordingly in need of guidance. Admiral Radford explained that the Chief of Staff of the Army thought that [Page 1055] President Rhee’s proposal had merit, as did General Hull himself. The United States would, of course, be obliged to transport the ROK division and provide logistic support for it. However, we had the matériel on hand to do this, both in Korea and in Indochina. There were, continued Admiral Radford, certain advantages and certain disadvantages in Rhee’s proposal. Admiral Radford had no report as to General Twining’s reaction, but explained that Admiral Carney believed that if Rhee made this offer it should be made to the French and not to the Government of Laos, which had originally appealed for assistance when the Vietminh incursion into its territory took place. Finally, said Admiral Radford, the State Department had not as yet had any opportunity to study the problems raised by Rhee’s offer.
The President indicated that his immediate reaction was that the offer required most careful study, not least of all for the possible effect it might have in provoking Communist China. In addition, said the President, how would the American public react to a situation in which the United States continued to maintain forces in Korea while a whole division of the ROK Army was sent out of the country? After all, our most immediate concern has been to assist Korea to take care of itself. Should we, then, let the South Koreans go “adventuring” in foreign parts? One last thing, said the President: If we transport the Korean division and put it down in Indochina, was not this sufficient notice that the United States was involving itself in the war? All these points had to be looked at, said the President, and he was anxious to have General Hull express an opinion.
General Hull stated that the problem was more political than military. All he needed to know was our Government’s reaction to Rhee’s proposal to make this offer. General Hull said that he did not think that the United States should let itself get directly involved, and that he believed he could handle Rhee if he were authorized to tell him that his proposed offer was receiving consideration by the United States Government. We of course should not accept the offer or sponsor it, but merely tell Rhee whether or not it would embarrass the United States to have him make this offer.
Secretary Smith said that, in connection with the issue raised by General Hull, the Council should be aware that President Rhee was proposing to increase the number of ROK divisions from 20 to 35. This presented new problems, but as for the offer of the division, this Government should scrutinize the proposal very, very carefully. About all that General Hull could safely tell Rhee at the present time was that his proposal was being considered by the United States Government at the highest levels.
The President concurred in Secretary Smith’s suggestion, and indicated that he wished Admiral Radford to consider also whether it [Page 1056] was desirable for the ROK Army to go from 20 to 35 divisions. At first glance, said the President, it seemed to him highly doubtful whether South Korea could provide sufficient replacements to support an army of 35 divisions.
The National Security Council:2
- a.
- Agreed that General Hull should be authorized to advise President Rhee that this contemplated offer is being considered at the highest levels in the United States Government; and that the NSC Planning Board should prepare recommendations thereon for Council consideration.
- b.
- Noted the President’s request that the Department of Defense study and report to the Council, through the NSC Planning Board, on the desirability of an increase in the number of ROK Army divisions from the 20 presently authorized to 35, as suggested by the ROK Government.
Note: The above actions approved by the President and subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.
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