751G.00/2–1554
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the
Acting Secretary of State1
top secret
[Washington,] February 15, 1954.
Subject:
- Your discussion on Indochina with Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in executive session on February 16.2
Attached are some condensed notes on major factors in the current Indochina
situation. These notes are divided as follows: military framework, political
framework, United States assistance, current military situation, current
political situation, enemy objectives, United States objectives and the work
of the President’s Special Committee (on the latter points these notes may
not be entirely abreast of latest developments).
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This meeting has aroused a great deal of press interest. It will make an
important contribution to the knowledge and understanding of the committee
regarding the admittedly critical situation which the French and we face in
Indochina. It is to be hoped that the impression which will reach the press
as to the proceedings of this executive session of the Foreign Relations
Committee will include:
- (a)
- Appreciation of French and Vietnamese efforts and sacrifices in
the face of a powerful enemy,
- (b)
- Conviction that France harbors no narrow colonial goals but is in
fact fighting on behalf of her equal associates in the French Union,
and
- (c)
- Confidence in French generalship and determination and belief that
carrying out of current strategic concept, with stepped up help from
us in present framework, can achieve highly important
results.
A continued flow of pessimism and mistrust from here could tip the precarious
balance of French support for the Indochina war in the wrong direction.
[Annex]
Memorandum Prepared by the Director of the Office of
Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal)
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
Subject:
- Notes on Indochina for Acting Secretary’s appearance before
executive session of Senate Foreign Relations Committee February
16.
- 1.
- Military Framework of Indochina War now in its
Eighth Year: 140,000 French and other non-natives and over
400,000 natives of Associated States plus French financial and
end-item support plus U.S. financial and end-item assistance
(currently over 60%) versus 300,000 natives in Vietminh plus vital
Chinese Communist assistance in matériel, supplies, training and
advice.
- 2.
- Political Framework: Important part of
nationalist movement is controlled by and supports Ho Chi-Minh and his Communist
apparatus; another part, probably less important, supports Bao Dai and his government and,
finally, an important segment is on the fence in the area of
non-Communist control. A clearer prospect of victory rather than
further promises of independence already agreed to by the French
would be the most effective generator of political vitality on our
side and would subtract from enemy support. In France, the support
of public and parliamentary opinion for the war is at a dangerously
low ebb. There is some defeatism in high French quarters, military
and civilian.
- 3.
- United States Assistance is now being
rendered in the framework of the Laniel–Navarre concept set forth in an exchange of notes in
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September, 1953, in
which France pledged affirmative military and political action and
U.S. agreed to further aid ($385 million additional for FY54). Concept got off to an auspicious
start. It contemplates decisive blows against the enemy’s regular
forces in the fighting season which begins October 1, 1954.
- 4.
- Current Military Situation (presumably to
be described by Defense representative). Estimates by our military
observers vary widely.
- 5.
- Current Political Situation: Negotiations
between the French and the Vietnamese, on a basis of equal
sovereignty and membership in the French Union are to take place in
Paris beginning February 25. A Franco-Laotian treaty was signed last
November. Relations between France and Cambodia have improved
markedly in recent weeks and negotiations in Paris should take place
in the near future. The Vietnamese Government is working on a plan
to create a representative National Assembly in the next few
months.
- 6.
- Enemy Objective is, in part, to create an
impression of military progress (real estate victories) in
connection with the Berlin talks and to soften up French public and
official opinion. But enemy has in fact made no important military
progress. Navarre and
Cogny still believe in
success of their strategic concept which involves largely defensive
moves this season followed by decisive offensive actions next year.
These actions will be made possible by the increased manpower being
recruited and trained on our side (over 120,000 new men for
Vietnamese Army in 1953 and 1954 plus perfected training and
equipping of pre-existing forces).
- 7.
- United States Objective should be to do
everything possible (a) to insure the success
of the Navarre Plan, so long
as our military authorities believe such success attainable, (b) to promote support of and confidence in
the Navarre Plan in France
and (c) to strengthen French resistance to
fallacious negotiation proposals and cease fire offers. The loss of
Indochina to the Communists would set off political repercussions
throughout Southeast Asia and elsewhere that would be most dangerous
to our national security interests. A defeat in Indochina or a
desertion of its non-Communist allies by France would mean a serious
blow to France’s position as an important element in free world
defense.
- 8.
- President’s Special Committee on Indochina
was designated January 16. To date it has
- (a)
- Coordinated emergency aid to French (planes and
mechanics).
- (b)
- Taken certain steps to promote closer top level
Franco-American cooperation on Indochina. (Invitation to
Pleven and
Ely: since no
answers yet received, it may be undesirable to discuss with
Senators.)
- (c)
- Taken under consideration a number of recommendations of a
military and political nature designed to render U.S.
assistance more effective in the present framework, i.e.,
limited to money, materiel
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and advice plus possible covert
participation in unconventional warfare activities. Chief
among these recommendations is one for ensuring a continuous
flow of U.S. advice and aid by raising present MAAG to a military mission
with expanded strength, including a planning staff and with
authority to advise and assist in training and planning and
to make recommendations concerning the conduct of
operations. The serious problem of not wounding French
sensitivities or undermining essential French
self-confidence must be faced here.
- 9.
- Finally, U.S. Government is studying merits
of various courses of action that would be open to it if it appears
clear that present Franco-Vietnamese military and political efforts
within present framework of U.S. assistance will be insufficient to
keep Indochina out of Communist hands. The views of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee are vital to progress in this
matter.
