751G.5/2–1554: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1450. Repeated information Paris 445, Hanoi unnumbered. It seems to us that Washington is taking an unduly alarmist view of recent [Page 1047] Viet Minh operations in north and central Laos and high plateaus. One almost gets impression that in Washington fear is that French may suffer very substantial if indeed not decisive defeats during remainder present crisis and that Navarre’s plan or schedule which contemplates breaking back of large scale Viet Minh military resistance with year or fifteen months from now is no longer realizable.
That is not view of Gen. Navarre who convinced his plan will move forward on schedule whatever reverses he may suffer in Laos in next three months. He admits possibility reverses since he has had for inescapable political reasons disperse his forces defend Luang Prabang, an action which he describes as “idiocy” from military point of view, but politically necessary keep Laotians and Vietnamese and Cambodians as well confident they will be protected if they remain in French Union. One thing that very greatly worries him is that new and existing units Vietnam national army, or rather many of their officers, not yet showing requisite fighting spirit and military efficiency. Efforts being made however with some promise of success give proper instruction and indoctrination to Vietnamese officer corps. He complains bitterly that at present he has use French and French Union units for all difficult military tasks because there are only relatively few Vietnamese units ready for severe combat. Another worry, which he has not directly avowed to me, is that he may be restrained by Paris from taking chances and losses which are part of any successful military operation. Certainly defeatist attitude of such high French officers as Generals Blanc and Fay (my telegram 1437)1 is far from encouraging. A third worry is that French may not give him the modest increase in cadres and personnel he is now demanding. Gen. Trapnell, other competent observers, and I believe his plan sound and, providing above mentioned problems are solved, and of course subject proviso that China does not intervene militarily, we believe Navarre will fulfill his plan. Gen. Trapnell points out that while over-all Viet Minh strength practically same as year ago, except for some increase in equipment and training, French forces, ground, sea, and air, considerably stronger than year ago. What makes over-all situation look unsatisfactory is present dispersal of French troops throughout Indochina.
I understand that top level discussions in course in Washington with aim of seeing whether there is anything we can do ensure success of Gen. Navarre’s plan on schedule or provide alternate plan or variants which would accelerate victorious action against Viet Minh.
I assume it politically impossible persuade France rapidly furnish massive reinforcements, say in the order of two or three divisions, which could turn present stalemate into early victory. It is of course [Page 1048] clear that it not our policy nor that of France for US participate as belligerents at least at this stage. I also assume that French have no available candidate clearly superior to Navarre who could successfully replace him now. Navarre may not have blinding energy and inspirational quality which marked Marshal DeLattre when latter first came to Indochina, but he an extremely intelligent, sound, stubborn soldier with plan for victory and the present no time to change horses in mid stream unless a clearly better steed is available.
Given these assumptions, there is no rabbit we can pull out of hat now to produce sudden victory. There are, however, a number of things which we can and should do to ensure and expedite victory. Most of them we cannot do directly. Mainly we must work through Vietnamese and/or French.
- (1)
- First we should back Navarre vis-à-vis his own government and Vietnamese as long as we are satisfied that his conduct and concept of war are effective.
- (2)
- Secondly, we should streamline our concept and operation of FOA mission here so that its program more directly serves cause of winning war. That does not mean its projects should all be of direct military interest. Projects should serve convince Vietnamese people their government is doing utmost for them, is thoroughly concerned with their welfare and providing them with something concrete, whereas Viet Minh gives them only promises and misery. Unfortunately, however capable FOA mission is, it cannot itself, alone, initiate a program sufficient to win large masses of people over to Bao Dai regime. New government has announced it is going to give us its ideas of new program for FOA. Until it has produced first draft, we can neither consult usefully with it nor reorganize or possibly expand our operations here. Meanwhile, we can attempt prod government to present us with superior program.
- (3)
- We can increase our contribution, not necessarily in terms of greatly increased expenditure, to psychological warfare program which Hellyer,2 head USIS here, has, after much work, finally gotten off to a start with Quat, Vietnamese Defense Minister, and Hinh, Vietnamese Chief of Staff.
- (4)
- We are already making contribution to increased French practice of “unconventional warfare” with some small but promising results. Unfortunately, we can only move rather slowly in this direction. We now working only with French and can hardly start now a program with Vietnamese Defense Ministry, which has about all it can do at present to expand its regular army units and shortly will be faced with problem of developing a militia in auxiliary support of regular forces. …
- (5)
- We must support Buu Loc as long as he gives promise of leading a government which is a sufficient improvement on its predecessors. Meanwhile, we can support through facilities of STEM or MAAG or other American groups the efforts of such members as have shown ability to make progress. At present there are not many: Governor [Page 1049] Tri of Tonkin, Quat, Defense Minister, and Hinh, Chief of Staff, who if not ideal is still only man presently in sight head up Vietnamese army. Perhaps Pham Van Huyen, Minister of Labor, may turn out to be a doer and, in that event we should try to support his project.
Fortunately, present first-hand review of Indochinese war situation being undertaken by Ministers of French Government and their principal military collaborators may serve as catalyst to thinking on how to win this war and to maintain victory by indigenous means after military phase of conflict is over. If, as I hope, Pleven and Ely accept invitation of Defense Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford, I believe that it will be possible formulate program of constructive action and achieve our policy goals in this area. We shall be prepared to comment at that time and Department should, if Pleven and Ely proceed to Washington, welcome any opportunity personally to discuss these matters with my government. If there is to be high level discussion in Washington, certainly Gen. Trapnell, who has most thorough knowledge and clearest view of this military situation of any American officer who has had to do with Indochina problem, should be present.