751G.5/2–1354: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State
2951. Repeated information Saigon 319, Berlin 239. Berlin for USDel. Situation at Paris as regards IC largely in state of suspense with French being treated to a daily kaleidoscopic array of despatches from US, IC and Berlin regarding developments on military plane IC, developments at Washington regarding possible future courses of US action with respect IC, and developments at Berlin with respect to the possibility of agreement being reached on some formula that would permit the negotiations of an eventual cessation of aid to Viet Minh. There has been remarkably little reaction noted thus far at Paris to the constantly changing and often confusing picture portrayed by these despatches with the French apparently content for most part to assume a position of attentive watchfulness while reserving judgment until Pleven’s views on the military situation and Bidault’s views on the possibility of negotiating a cessation of Chinese Communist aid to Viet Minh have been made known.
- 1.
- Re French reaction military developments IC: While recognizing the all-too-apparent elements of weakness in the French political fabric as regards IC, the Embassy fails to share the Alsops’ recently expressed view that “the French mood is such that the French Government will abandon the IC struggle if their forces in IC merely suffer a serious reverse”. Although in the final analysis one can only speculate, in the Embassy’s opinion, even if the Viet Minh succeed in obtaining control of substantial areas of Laos, including the cities of Luang Prabang or Vientiane, the Embassy seriously doubts whether a parliamentary or governmental majority could be found in favor of immediate abandonment of IC. While the Viet Minh threat posed [Page 1045] to Laos is serious and while there is considerable evidence of resignation to some degree of success being achieved during the present fighting season in Laos by the Viet Minh, fact remains that Laos does not loom as large in French thinking as Vietnam, nor would the loss of parts of Laos have the same impact on French thinking as loss of key areas in Vietnam. On balance, and as Embassy indicated in its despatch 1788 of January 14,1 although present dry weather fighting season ends without either side having altered the relative military balance significantly, but perhaps with the French having suffered reverses in Laos (as it now appears may prove to be case), Embassy of opinion conclusion still stands that French failure to agree on satisfactory alternate solution may prove principal hope in continuation French military effort for at least another and perhaps more encouraging fighting season.
- 2.
- Re US reaction military developments IC: In broad outline reports from US this past week underscore concern evidenced at highest levels US Government over developments IC and indicate US Government making every effort to determine how best deal with situation including extent and nature possible additional US action. Although general impression conveyed by these reports one of uncertainty as to how far US prepared to go in supporting IC effort, it becoming increasingly evident to French that whereas US financial and material assistance may be augmented to meet needs of situation, the possibility of US personnel being sent Indochina to participate combat missions under present circumstances remote. Despite absence any non-Communist criticism over disclosure French request for US air maintenance personnel and subsequent announcement that 200 US technicians being sent Indochina, Embassy still considers that as far as French thinking is concerned, so long as Chinese Communists do not actively enter war, hope of reaching an early and satisfactory solution of Indochina conflict hinges on avoidance involvement US or allied troops and risks thereby of internationalizing war. Hence President’s position in opposition sending US troops Indochina under present circumstances2 not expected provoke any significant reaction France. (Foreign Office source quoted by AFP as stating President’s position “conforms to French thesis”).
- 3.
- Re Berlin developments, while watching course military developments Indochina with one eye, French continue to watch Indochina aspect of developments at Berlin with other eye, and perhaps even more closely. Undeniably, and apart from how it is to be arrived at or when rationale adopted, French appear to be generally hopeful and in fact expectant that Bidault can find some way to negotiate a termination [Page 1046] of aid to Viet Minh. However, and almost for first time, French journalists are beginning to pose question as to what the Chinese Communist price might be for cessation of aid. In this context, and in relation to limited FE conference proposals made at Berlin, Embassy fears that US might bear brunt of blame should no agreement be reached envisaging conference on Indochina with US present following one on Korea. French opinion becoming increasingly speculative as to what part, if any, of Communist China’s price US would be willing to pay. If Bidault returns and indicates that he was unsuccessful in finding some formula offering hope of ending Chinese Communist aid to Viet Minh, increasing consideration may be expected to be given in France looking toward eventual direct negotiations with Viet Minh.