PSA files, lot 58 D 207, “Vietnam Correspondence”
The Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal) to the Ambassador at Saigon (Heath)
eyes only
Dear Don: I am very conscious of the fact that you are in the dark about a good deal that has been going on here. My ability to keep you informed has not improved since I wrote you on January 22.
The special committee appointed by the President was chaired by Roger Kyes. It has had a couple of meetings. It assigned to a subcommittee, under the chairmanship of your old friend General Erskine, the preparation of a paper on what to do about Indochina. Of the group the Defense members were in addition to General Erskine, his Deputy, Bill Godel, Tick Bonesteel who had recently been made a Brigadier General, Captain Anderson of the Navy who is an aide of Admiral Radford and Colonel Alden of General Stewart’s staff (OMA). CIA was represented by George Aurell and Colonel Ed Lansdale of Philippine fame. Our representation included Bob McBride of the European Division and Charlie Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff and myself.
We spent a week on the preparation of a paper based upon a draft prepared by Godel. Our paper was submitted to the top committee on February 6.1 We have had no positive reaction as yet.
It was my thought that our work would not be brought to a successful conclusion unless we got your ideas and those of the Embassy in Paris regarding the various notions and the courses of action upon which we were working. I was unsuccessful in putting this across. I am sending you, however, for your eyes only information a draft of a telegram2 which I prepared so that you will have some idea of working level thinking here.
About the only concrete decisions which the special committee has as yet taken are those relating to the exploration through General [Page 1042] Ely of the acceptability of Mike O’Daniel as Trapnell’s successor (O’Daniel would apparently have to remove one star in order to take this job—he is willing) and the invitation to Pleven and Ely to come here after they leave Indochina. Incidentally, the invitation to Pleven was only dispatched after the Secretary had consulted Bidault in Berlin and the latter had replied that he thought it a good idea. I should be surprised if Pleven comes here before he has reported in Paris on his trip to Indochina. (I dreamt last night that Pleven arrived in Washington and told us that the French had decided to get out of Indochina unless we were prepared to put in two or three divisions within ninety days.)
All this soul-searching has been conducted in an atmosphere of intense public and Congressional interest. There have been leaks galore: leaks about planes; leaks about mechanics; leaks about O’Daniel and about the special committee. Most important, there has been a leaking of pessimism and a lack of confidence in French generalship and in French intentions. In this connection, Colonel Taber’s telegram of February 3d3 made a profound impression here. The net result has been a serious loss on the psychological warfare front just at a time when the enemy is making every effort to improve his psychological warfare position and to soften up French officials and public opinion. Our chances of ultimate success in Indochina have undoubtedly been reduced. We are not yet aware of just how serious the effect of these recent developments may have been. I hope that with increasing top level realization of the harm it has done, certain countercurrents may be set in motion. So far Bidault’s conduct in Berlin has been all that could be desired. Also, the statements which DeJean has made to you and which you have reported have been all to the good. We must, however, face the fact that there is extreme skepticism in the Pentagon with regard to French intentions and capabilities. O’Daniel’s views are taken less than seriously by many in positions of authority although his undoubted merits as a fighter and trainer of fighters are recognized. But it is believed by many that the war will not be won unless somehow American brains and will power can be injected in decisive fashion in view of French inadequacies in strategic planning and offensive spirit. When I asked just how our brains and will power would be applied to certain concrete situations I did not get a very clear-cut answer but am left in no doubt of the convictions of those with whom I spoke. This is a field in which we must find some way of moving forward. The liaison officer concept as developed by O’Daniel and to the extent, unfortunately problematical, that it reflects a meeting of the minds between Navarre and O’Daniel may be a partial answer. But we need something more. The Erskine subcommittee starting from a [Page 1043] purely Greek or Korean concept tried to devise something which would have a chance of acceptance by the French. Perhaps before this letter reaches you we will have telegraphed for your views in the premises. I am personally pessimistic about the chances of getting the French to accept any formal arrangement which would give us participation in their “command decisions” in the absence of any commitment of U.S. forces. But I do think that competent American officers speaking French might be able to be helpful to a marked degree and that such officers would not need any formal backing.
My own opinion is that there is no reason for us to change the policy which we adopted last September on the basis of a belief in the French Government’s assertions of its intent regarding the war in Indochina and on the basis of our confidence in Navarre. I do not believe that military developments so far, disappointing as they are, justify a change in our attitude or a withdrawal of our confidence. We have no alternative but to play the game to the end. I do not believe the end to be far distant. I am confident that it can be a successful one.
Sincerely,
- The draft of Feb. 6 has not been found in Department of State files. For Part I of the report of the Special Committee, Mar. 2, dealing with measures to be taken with regard to Indochina, see p. 1109.↩
- The draft telegram does not accompany the source text.↩
- See footnote 3, p. 1017.↩