Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 184th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, February 11, 19541
eyes only
[Extracts]
Present at this meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend [Page 1036] the meeting. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Warren Olney, 3rd, for the Attorney General (for Items 1 and 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 1, 3 and 4); Mrs. Katherine G. Howard for the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Items 1 and 3); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the General Services Administrator; General Willard S. Paul, Office of Defense Mobilization; Mr. A. Russell Ash, Office of Defense Mobilization; Mr. Harold L. Aitken, Federal Civil Defense Administration; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; and the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC.
Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.
. . . . . . .
2. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
The Director of Central Intelligence reported that the main Vietminh force moving south from Dien Bien Phu had now reached a point some 30 or 40 miles from Luang Prabang, the capital of Laos. They were now encountering some difficulty in supplies. The surrounding force which remained at Dien Bien Phu was now sufficiently reduced so that a frontal attack on the French strongpoint appeared unlikely. The Vietminh victories were rather more psychological than military in character. Mr. Dulles reported no significant changes in other areas of Indochina.
Mr. Dulles then referred to a recent report from Ambassador Heath of a conversation with General Navarre.2Navarre admitted that the next few months were going to be very difficult. While it was military “idiocy” to divert French Union forces to defend Luang Prabang, it was essential to do so from a political point of view. General Navarre remains convinced of the soundness of his plan, and saw no reason why he should not achieve a victory in 1955.
Referring to the discussion of last week, Mr. Dulles said that … the possibilities of developing more dynamic leadership in Vietnam, with particular reference to the President’s emphasis on religious dynamism … thus far had not been very helpful. The major problem in Indochina remained political rather than military, and how to change the military and psychological climate of defeatism was extremely tough.
[Page 1037]Mr. Dulles stated that … Ho Chi-Minh … was probably still alive, but he was a very strange leader indeed. He had made no public appearances . …
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5. United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia (NSC Action No. 1019; NSC 5405)3
Mr. Cutler summarized previous Council action on this problem, and called the Council’s attention to General O’Daniel’s recent report4 and to a variety of other intelligence, much of it conflicting, with respect to conditions in Indochina. He then called upon Secretary Smith to make his oral report.
Secretary Smith said that the problem that the Special Committee was dealing with had two phases. The first of these involved emergency assistance to the French, and Secretary Smith said he would call on Secretary Kyes to speak to this matter.
Secretary Kyes said that we had sent 200 airmen and a certain number of aircraft which the French had asked for on an emergency basis. Certain other French requests had been analyzed and found to be impractical. General O’Daniel had certain other suggestions which the Committee was in the process of scrutinizing.
There ensued a discussion of the CAT pilots. These were ready to go, said Mr. Dulles, but the French have not yet asked for them.
Admiral Radford commented in further detail on Secretary Kyes’ remarks, and explained that we were sending the French 22 of the B–26 aircraft which they had requested, but that we have not yet acted on an additional 25 which the French hope to have. Admiral Radford also commented on the confusion which prevailed in the French request for additional assistance, especially as regards the number of maintenance personnel they needed for the American aircraft.
At the conclusion of this discussion, Secretary Smith turned to the second phase of the problem, namely, the political. He pointed out that the Soviets had been extremely active at the Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin, and were doing their best to induce the French to give up the struggle in Indochina. It was, unhappily, clear that this was precisely what the French in Paris wanted to do. They were very much disappointed in the progress of the Navarre plan, and particularly depressed over the lack of response of the native population of Indochina to the hopes and promises which France had held out.
[Page 1038]General Erskine, continued Secretary Smith, had made certain recommendations on the so-called long-term problem—alternatives open to the United States in the event that the Navarre plan fails and the French give up.5 Secretary Smith said he would not go into detail at this point on these recommendations. He concluded by referring to the fact that Rene Pleven was now in Indochina, and that Secretary Wilson had sent him a message inviting him to return to France by way of the United States. This move of Secretary Wilson’s was the result of a conversation between Secretary Dulles and Bidault at Berlin.6
The President commented on the extraordinary confusion in the reports which reached him from the area of Indochina. There were almost as many judgments as there were authors of messages. There were, nevertheless, only two critical factors in the situation. The first was to win over the Vietnamese population; the other to instill some spirit into the French.
Governor Stassen said that he desired to take issue with the prevailing pessimism, and stated that we were better off today in Indochina than we thought we would be a year ago. No real defeats had been endured by the French Union forces at the hands of the Viet Minh. Secretary Smith said that he perhaps would agree with Governor Stassen’s judgment if it were confined strictly to the military situation. Governor Stassen went on to point out that our “funds situation” remains good, and that we were perfectly able to do what the French asked us to do without exceeding our budget. His advice, therefore, was to stick to our guns and try to see the thing through.
The President commented that the mood of discouragement came from the evident lack of a spiritual force among the French and the Vietnamese. This was a commodity which it was excessively difficult for one nation to supply to another.
Admiral Radford stated that he believed he could give some explanation of the differences in the reports which came, on the one hand, from our Service attachés and other semi-permanent personnel in Indochina, and on the other hand, from visitors like General O’Daniel. Our attaches tend to become frustrated as a result of continuously [Page 1039] being on the scene. Moreover, they tend to look at a situaation from a strictly Service point of view. It should also be remembered that General Trapnell had been captured at Bataan and had been a prisoner of war of the Japanese throughout the rest of World War II. Such an experience inevitably left its mark.
With respect to the efficiency of our military missions in Indochina, Secretary Smith commented that the Air Force had done by far the best job, the Navy had run a very poor second, and the Army was far behind the Navy.
Ambassador Lodge said that he had had a lot of experience in dealing with the French, and that if you get behind them and push hard enough they will do what is required.
The President observed that he had just about reached the conclusion that it was time for a change of Ambassadors in Indochina.
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- Prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on Feb. 12.↩
- Reference is to telegram 1410 from Saigon, Feb. 9, p. 1026.↩
- For NSC Action No. 1019, see extract from the memorandum of discussion at the 181st Meeting of the National Security Council, Jan. 21, p. 986. For extracts from NSC 5405, Jan. 16, see p. 971.↩
- See footnote 2 to Tedul 37, Feb. 10, p. 1032.↩
- Part II of the report by the working committee headed by General Erskine to the Special Committee headed by Under Secretary Smith, Apr. 5, was concerned with the contingency here under reference. Regarding Part II of the Working Committee Report, see footnote 8, p. 1257.↩
- The proposal that Defense Minister Pleven and General Ely be invited to Washington was approved by President Eisenhower during a telephone conversation of Feb. 10. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, “Telephone Conversations”) The text of the invitation from Secretary of Defense Wilson to Pleven was transmitted to the U.S. Delegation at Berlin in telegram Tedul 39, Feb. 10. (033.5111/2–1054) In telegram Dulte 63 of the same date, Secretary Dulles reported that he had raised the question of an invitation for Pleven to visit Washington in a conversation with Foreign Minister Bidault, who had responded favorably. (033.5111/2–1054)↩