751G.00/2–1054: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State
2919. Repeated information Saigon 313, Berlin 224. Berlin for USDel. Limit distribution. Jacquet today made following comments to us on situation Indochina:
Viet Minh now have military initiative and may retain it throughout balance present dry weather fighting season expected end sometime May. It not certain yet whether Viet Minh will attack Luang Prabang or by-pass it as they did Dien Bien Phu and attempt take administrative capital Vientiane. Although latter not psychologically as important as Luang Prabang where King resides, Vientiane of greater strategic importance. However, if Viet Minh attack Luang Prabang, Jacquet confident French Union forces can hold it.
Although Viet Minh currently have initiative and French largely forces to block Viet Minh moves as they occur, developments on military plane going much as Navarre had anticipated and he not unduly concerned. Navarre had never expected to be in position achieve any decisive victories over Viet Minh prior to dry weather fighting season beginning next October nor had he anticipated attaining military superiority until 1955. Although indicating his full concurrence in Navarre’s views, Jacquet stated he differed with Navarre on operation Atlante, which was progressing well, re using reserves at this critical juncture.
One element however of Navarre plan that has not gone as well as hoped has been development national armies Associated States and Navarre doubtful, according Jacquet, whether 100 Vietnamese battalion target would be met by end 1954.
Although not unduly concerned over course military developments Indochina, Jacquet emphasized his concern over Vietnamese political situation, describing Buu Loc Government, despite recognized [Page 1034] honesty and ability its members, as representing unfortunately nothing. Jacquet only posed question and did not indicate what he thought might prove to be a more satisfactory alternative to Buu Loc Government. He did say French Government seriously considering exerting increased pressure on Bao Dai to take a more active role with view to increasing Vietnamese participation in support military effort. This connection, Jacquet intimated DeJean had not entirely succeeded in dealing with internal Vietnamese political situation and that this one of difficult problems facing Pleven in Indochina.
Jacquet emphasized necessity for US Government to continue to give favorable consideration French requests for Indochina and that every effort be made expedite their fulfillment, particularly B–26s. He mentioned specifically that if by beginning fighting season in October French command had total 100 bombardment aircraft (B–26s) at its disposal, this would constitute decisive element in offensives undertaken thereafter.
He said loss Laos to Viet Minh, if that should occur, bound to have unfavorable impact on French opinion and that if Laniel Government should fall between now and end present dry weather fighting season (while Viet Minh have initiative), Indochina would figure prominently in any investiture debate thereafter. Such a development could only be viewed with deepest concern. Jacquet also stressed importance with which French viewed developments at Berlin with respect to possible eventual discussion of Indochina problem within context international conference.