Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, White House Office of Staff Secretary records

Memorandum by the Assistant Staff Secretary to the President (Minnich)¹

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

[Extract]

Indo China, 2/8/54

At the Legislative Conference this date, Sen. Saltonstall² pointed out that Adm. Radford and Deputy Secretary of Defense Kyes had testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the need for sending technicians to Viet Nam to assist in maintaining equipment provided by the United States, and that the Committee had been very loathe to agree to this involvement of US personnel.³ Sen. Saltonstall expected to hear much more discussion of it on the floor of the Senate.

The President said he could well understand the desire to avoid committing American troops in this war, but he did see the need for carrying on a US program in regard to Asia, and he saw some merit in using this small project to serve a very large purpose—that is, to prevent all of Southeast Asia from falling to the Communists. He recalled how the United States had despaired in the 1940’s of sending more equipment to Chiang Kai-Shek because he was not able to provide maintenance for it. Now, some ten years later, we find ourselves relying on a very much weakened Chiang Kai-Shek as one of the bulwarks against complete Communist domination of the area.

Sen. Saltonstall made clear that objections pertained to involvement of US troops, that a similar objection was not raised against sending civilians, and that a difference existed between actual maintenance of equipment and mere training of French and Vietnamese personnel in how to maintain equipment.

The President agreed that it was not completely desirable to undertake this project, but that the United States could not just stand aside in the crisis. He pointed out that we were pressing the French to increase their effort and that we were giving France firm notice that these technicians would be withdrawn on June 15th. As for sending civilian instead of military personnel, the President pointed to the length of time to recruit and transport the former, whereas the latter were already near the scene.

When the Senator repeated that the action could bring trouble with the Appropriations Committee as well as the Armed Services Committee, the President queried as to what alternative was available to prevent our position in Asia from deteriorating further. He went on to note how some risks were involved in any action we took, and that we must search our souls on these things in the light of preventing the loss of Asia.

Thinking out loud, he speculated on the possibility of utilizing Chiang’s forces in Indo China, then noted that such use would incite a great flow of Chinese Communists into the area—a consideration which had led Syngman Rhee to reject any suggestion of Chiang’s participation in the Korean fight. The President went on to state his continuing belief in the use of indigenous troops in any Asian battles, with the United States providing a mobile reserve for the overall security of the free world. Yet he believed that exceptions had to be made until the time when indigenous forces could be built up to an adequate point and they could be secure in the knowledge that U.S. air and naval forces stood ready to support them.

Turning again to the role of the French, the President noted the need for pressing them to do the job of which they were capable. At the same time, he was aware of how touchy were the French, M. Plevennot included, in regard to advice from us. The difficulty seemed to stem from the Colonial Secretary.

The discussion ended with agreement that the leadership would undertake further to explain the need for the action, and the President would begin action looking to use of civilian rather than military personnel after June 15th, should any still be needed.

At the next meeting, on February 15th, the President referred again to the subject to say that we had increased our Military Advisory Group in Indo China to take care of the need, but to last only until June 15th. After that, if absolutely necessary, the French could hire some civilians to do the job. He went on to say that the military situation was not so bad as it appeared in the newspaper accounts to be, that Gen. Navarre, because of political reasons, had had to disperse his forces to meet the several Viet Minh threats, and that Gen. Navarre could be in good shape if he could again concentrate his forces. He concluded by noting how tremendous a problem Bidault had in respect to French desires to end the struggle in Indo China.

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1. This memorandum by L. Arthur Minnich, Jr., Assistant Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower, recorded discussions on Indochina at White House Legislative Leadership Conferences from Feb. 8 to July 26, 1954. The drafting date is not indicated on the source text, nor are the participants at each meeting.
2. Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and member of the Appropriations Committee.
3. In a telephone conversation with Under Secretary of State Smith on Feb. 3, President Eisenhower stated that it was necessary to consult with Congressional leaders prior to ordering the 200 mechanics to Indochina. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, “Telephone Conversations”) No record of the testimony by Radford and Kyes before the Senate Armed Services Committee has been found in Department of State files.