Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/4–2252: Despatch

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State¹

confidential
No. 2784

Paris, April 22, 1952.

Subject:

• Minister of Associated States’ Statements in National Assembly Debate on Indochina

The Embassy encloses the text, as reported in the Journal Officiel, of the statements made by Mr. Jean Letourneau, Minister of State charged with Relations with the Associated States,² during the debate in the National Assembly on April 10, 1952 on the question of regularizing supplementary 1951 budgetary appropriations for Indochina.³ As stated in the Embassy’s telegram No. 6281 of April 11, 1952 (repeated to the Legation at Saigon as No. 369 and the Embassy at London unnumbered),⁴ the National Assembly approved the regularization of these appropriations by a vote of 403 to 100, with only the Communist Party in opposition.

The portions of Mr. Letourneau’s statements of chief interest are those dealing with the general question of French policy in Indochina, with particular reference to the question of the possibility of negotiation with Ho Chi-minh. He also attempted to answer some of the questions which had been raised by Mr. Pineau (Socialist),⁵ Chairman of the Subcommittee of the National Assembly’s Committee of National Defense which undertook a mission to Indochina in January 1952. These questions were raised by Mr. Pineau at the National Assembly debate of April 9, who spoke as a special reporter of the National Assembly’s Finance committee and set forth the essential points of the report drawn up by this parliamentary mission (see the Embassy’s telegram No. 6256 of April 10, 1952, repeated to the Legation at Saigon as No. 368 and to the Embassy at London unnumbered).⁶ Mr. Letourneau also dealt with the international aspects of the Indochina problem.

French Policy in Indochina

Mr. Letourneau said that he had accepted the formula under which he would proceed to Indochina as a Resident Minister⁷ as long as might be necessary but that this formula was not in itself a solution. He emphasized that one of his reasons for accepting such a status was the desire to avoid any thought that French policy in Indochina was going to change. He said that there had been a definite continuity in French policy in Indochina, that it had remained unchanged during his tenure of office and that this same policy had existed even before that time. If there were no peace in Indochina, it was neither the fault of the French Government nor of the men responsible for French policy, as there was no official bearing the responsibilities he now bore who would not make every effort to seek a solution, one which would be acceptable for the national conscience of the country and capable of ending the conflict. Somewhat enigmatically, he pointed out that there would be a chance of succeeding only if actions that were taken were taken without publicity since if publicity were given to all the contacts and conversations which have taken place, most of them without success, they would be without end result.

He warned the Socialist Party against abstention in the vote and said that no solution was possible in Indochina unless it was clearly stated that France would remain there as long as necessary. He said that the worst catastrophe for France is the existence of doubt that France would remain and fear that France would tomorrow abandon Indochina. He made clear that the only thing for France to do at present was to hold since it did not have the means of doing otherwise.

He expressed the opinion that France was defending in Indochina an advance outpost of the free world, thereby assisting a considerable number of countries who should be more cognizant of this action. (This statement was applauded on all sides except for the Communist Party.) He added that France’s action had permitted her to obtain, in particular from the United States, military and financial aid which was daily becoming more substantial and that France should thank the United States for this assistance. (This statement drew similar applause.) Arguing against the idea of withdrawal from Indochina, Mr. Letourneau said that if France now abandoned Indochina, no one in the free world would believe in France and her promises. He asked what would then become of the French Union and answered his own query by saying there would remain very little.

Question of Negotiations with Ho Chi-minh

Mr. Letourneau said that he had often been asked why an appeal was not made to Ho Chi-minh, why could Ho not be told that France was ready to negotiate. These questioners had said that if Ho Chi-minh did not reply—and they had expressed doubt that he would reply—at least France’s conscience would be relieved of a great weight and it would be made clear that France had not sought the fight but that the fight had been imposed upon France. Although Mr. Letourneau’s earlier statement regarding secret conversations contained some implication that these conversations might have been directed toward negotiation with Ho Chi-minh, Mr. Letourneau made categorically clear that he was strongly opposed to the idea of seeking negotiations with Ho Chi-minh. He said that he could not follow the foregoing reasoning. He continued that he had on many occasions stressed the French desire for peace, a desire which could not be questioned. He then stated that if France made a solemn appeal to Ho Chi-minh—and he was certain that there would be no reply—it would be an indication that France had forgotten the events associated with the fall of 1946, when the modus vivendi established permitted the Vietminh through duplicity and cunning to endanger the security of French troops. He summarized that an appeal to Ho Chi-minh would destroy the morale of the French Expeditionary Corps and create panic among the Indochinese people because they would know from that moment that France was going to abandon them to Ho Chi-minh. He said that to the degree that he believed it necessary to seek every means of ending the conflict to that same degree he warned against any confidence in such an appeal to Ho Chi-minh, as it would have results completely contrary to those that supporters of this thesis were seeking in all honesty and in good faith. (These statements were applauded on the center, right and extreme right and from certain benches on the left.)

Vietnam

Mr. Letourneau reiterated his thesis that France must hold in Indochina, pointing out that this was the view also of the National Assembly’s mission in January, and that France must make the necessary effort which would permit the national armies of the Associated States gradually to supplement the French effort. He called for an increased effort on the part of the Associated States. He said that France did not contest their independence and that their first duty was their own effort to preserve this independence. He said that the Vietnamese National Army had given evidence of its value in actual combat and that the national armies, as the late Marshal de Lattre had believed, were a solution to the reduction of the French effort. Mr. Letourneau expressed his intention of carrying out French policy in Indochina with the maximum liberality. He said that the independence of the Associated States must not be questioned and that he intended to implement French policy within the framework of the accords governing their relations with France. He asked that the Associated States be willing to note this and to state that they were defending their independence not against France but with France, thanks to the French presence and French friendship. He warned that the more the Associated States tried to loosen the bonds uniting them to France the more they ran the risk of the loss of their independence.

International

Returning to the Vietminh question, Mr. Letourneau said that it was only through bringing discouragement to the Vietminh that there was a possibility of the latter trying to end the conflict. He expressed the opinion that other than through the development of the National Armies there was no hope or chance, probably not even on the international level. Mr. Letourneau recalled that he had been asked why France’s allies should not be requested to take part in the fight. He explained that the present problem is of such a nature that there was little assurance of the reply that would be received. He reminded the Assembly that the posing of the Indochina problem within the framework of the United Nations would appear to some as equivalent to bringing up an internal problem of the French Union. He said that the French Government had, however, discussed the matter with France’s allies and had achieved some results in obtaining from them, in fields compatible with French responsibilities, assurances of support, a support which was not of negligible proportions. He said that the French Government had not ceased its efforts to obtain from her friends and allies precise guarantees and commitments in the event of an international war arising from invasion of Tonkin. He said that the French Government would not cease its efforts to obtain extremely formal guarantees in this regard. While he could say nothing of the present state of these conversations, they had made progress since the visit of the late Marshal de Lattre to the United States. He welcomed Mr. Eden’s statements regarding the consequences for the aggressor in the event of the aggression in Southeast Asia⁸ and expressed the hope that in the weeks to come the French Government would obtain the commitments which the importance of the struggle for the free world gave it the right to seek.

Answers to Mr. Pineau’s Queries

Mr. Letourneau said that it was his opinion that 55 billion francs in additional funds would be sufficient for 1952 and that Mr. Pineau had erred when he predicted that 100 billion francs of additional appropriations would be needed. Mr. Letourneau gave as his reasons that so long as there was no sudden change in the military situation, so long as prices remained stable for the items ordered and the pay of the troops continued at the same level, there would be no need for more than the 55 billion francs anticipated. He said that France had no chance, unless by a complete change in military conditions, to be able to make in Indochina a supplementary effort with respect to troop strength. He pointed out that the estimates were based on the maximum expenditures in 1951 when the heaviest fighting had occurred and that France was now witnessing an accelerated pace of United States military aid. He said that telegrams from Saigon gave him constant reports of the number of ships arriving with American matériel and that deliveries were arriving at the desired time.

Referring to Pineau’s charge that the French Government had no control over French appropriations for the Associated States National Armies, Mr. Letourneau said that this was not true and that France had absolute control through the French administrative missions’ supervision at every stage.

Mr. Letourneau admitted that there had been delays in deliveries from the Metropole but pointed out the difficulties involved in supplying an army 12,000 kilometers from the Metropole. He said that while France was at war in Indochina it was still on a peacetime economy and that he had no right to impose priorities on French private industry. He then went into an explanation of the difficulties accompanying orders for and deliveries of helicopters and barbed wire. He also gave a full explanation of the reasons for the original occupation of Hoa Binh and for the subsequent withdrawal from this point. He explained the progress being made in the restoration of the situation in the Delta area and in pacification in Cochinchina and Annam. He said that Cambodia represented no serious military problem, since there were only small groups of bandits or rebels, but that there was a political problem which at the moment is a source of concern even for the security of the country.

Conclusions

The French Government has met another test on the Indochina problem in the National Assembly, but this occasion was not a major test and a full-scale debate on Indochina is now expected to take place after the National Assembly reconvenes in late May. Mr. Letourneau’s return from Indochina in mid-May is probably related to the expectation of such a debate.

One element of some importance in the debate just concluded was the abstention of the Socialist deputies in the vote despite Mr. Letourneau’s warning that doubt cast on French determination to remain in Indochina would have a seriously adverse effect on the French effort. While the Socialist spokesman made clear that the Socialists were not advocating simple withdrawal, he did point to previous Socialist reservations and criticism of French policy in Indochina and emphasized the Socialist desire for peace. He denied that Socialist abstention could be interpreted as an act expressing lack of confidence in the French Expeditionary Corps.

In his statements Mr. Letourneau summed up French policy in Indochina in fairly simple terms: To hold and to build up the National Armies of the Associated States. He made clear that the creation of these armies represented the only means by which the French effort might be reduced. This is, of course, not new but Mr. Letourneau appeared to give considerably increased emphasis to the idea that nothing should be done or said which would indicate any lack of French determination to remain in Indochina.

His strongly expressed opposition to the launching of an appeal for peace to Ho Chi-minh was backed up with sound reasons. He did not, however, say that France would reject Vietminh overtures for negotiations. In fact, Mr. Letourneau did say that only if the Vietminh became discouraged would there be a chance of their seeking ways to end the conflict.

At this juncture the problems facing the French Government in Indochina remain unchanged—those of finding men and money. In an almost unnoticed passage in his statement Mr. Letourneau himself said that there was no chance, unless military conditions changed completely, that France could supplement the number of its troops in Indochina. It is, therefore, to the National Armies that the French Government looks for relief on this score. On the material side the French Government continues to bear the major portion of a burden which has become increasingly heavy, the continued acceptance of which has so far been made possible only through United States assistance supplementing the French effort. The debate just concluded did not endanger the continuation of the previous French policy in Indochina but a more serious test is likely to come when a full scale debate on this major question occurs in the National Assembly after its reconvening in May.

James Clement Dunn

1. A copy of this despatch was transmitted to the Legation at Saigon.
2. Not printed.
3. For the record of the proceedings under reference, see France, Journal Official, Assemblée Nationale, 1952, Débats, pp. 2092 ff.
4. Not printed.
5. Christian Pineau, a prominent member of the Socialist Party; former minister.
6. Telegram 6256 from Paris, reporting on Pineau’s remarks in the National Assembly, is not printed. (751.21/4–1052)
7. On Apr. 1, Letourneau had been appointed High Commissioner in Indochina, while retaining his cabinet position of Minister for the Associated States. General Raoul Salan, Acting Commander in Chief of French Union Forces in Indochina, was confirmed as permanent commander.
8. Reference is presumably to remarks by Foreign Secretary Eden at Columbia University on Jan. 11, described in footnote 8, p. 20.