751G.00/1–2954

Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Kyes) to the Secretary of the Air Force (Talbott)1

top secret
1.
Pursuant to a recommendation of the President’s Special Committee on Indo-China,2 the President on this date made the following decisions, in order to meet urgent French requests for assistance to cope with the military problem posed by the Communist operations:
a.
To transfer immediately to Indo-China 10 additional B–26 type aircraft to bring two French B–26 squadrons up to a strength of 25 planes each. This brings to a total of 22 the airplanes of this type to be delivered to Indo-China in the immediate future. It will be decided later as to how these 10 aircraft will be programmed for accounting purposes.
b.
To augment temporarily the U.S. MAAG in Indo-China by 200 U.S. Air Force mechanics to assist the French Air Force in the training of French personnel in the maintenance of C–47 and B–26 aircraft. These personnel are to be furnished on the understanding that they will be used only on bases where they are secure from capture and will not be exposed to combat. It is expected that these personnel may have to remain in Indo-China as late as 15 June 1954 while French Air Force mechanics are being provided and trained in adequate quantity to maintain this equipment.
c.
Action on the other urgent French requests, including provision of 25 additional B–26 aircraft and the balance of the 400 mechanics, will be deferred pending the return of Lt. General O’Daniel to Washington and the result of continuing efforts to provide the additional 200 mechanics from sources other than the USAF.
2.
It is requested that the Secretary of the Air Force take appropriate action to implement, as soon as possible, the decisions set forth in paragraphs 1 a and b above. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will inform General Valluy, of the French Military Mission to the United States, of this decision.3
Roger M. Kyes
  1. Copies of this memorandum were transmitted to the Under Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  2. See memorandum of the meeting of the Special Committee on Jan. 29, supra.
  3. General Valluy was informed by memorandum of Jan. 30; for text, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, p. 245.