751G.00/1–2954
Memorandum by W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, to the Acting Secretary of State
secret
[Washington,] January 29, 1954.
Subject:
- Recent Disquieting Intelligence on Operations in Indochina
- 1.
-
Dien Bien Phu. A CINCFE “instruction team,” after visiting Tonkin, and particularly Dien Bien Phu, reported 28 January (Tab A):1
- a.
- French making little effort to maintain contact with Viet Minh forces.
- b.
- In event major Viet Minh attack, French 105 and 155 ammo would last only 4–6 days. USARMA Saigon comments this is probably true although contrasts with previous French G–4 report that 30 days supply was on hand.
- c.
- Unless Viet Minh camouflage technique better than ChiCom in Korea, indications of 3 Divisions Viet Minh force around Dien Bien Phu not apparent.
(It is believed possible that terrain Dien Bien Phu better adapted camouflage than Korea but also possible French intelligence overestimates VM forces.)
- 2.
- Central Laos. Despite French recovery of Thakhek and numerical superiority around Seno, Viet Minh retains initiative on principal E–W highway and may have capability to cut the main N–S route of French supply between Pakse-Seno (Tab B).2
- 3.
- South Annam. French landing operation (25 battalions) at Tuy Hoa, January 20, to clear coastal region, has apparently not yet made contact with Viet Minh. Reports indicate Viet Minh had prior knowledge French operation.
- 4.
- Tonkin Delta.
- a.
- USARMA Saigon reports that Viet Minh has intensified road mining, employing new non-metallic mine difficult to detect with standard equipment.
- b.
- According to Governor Tri of Tonkin, Vietnamese National Army Regular Battalion No. 6 was cut to pieces January 23 in Viet Minh ambush losing 50 killed, over 200 missing, and virtually all armament. (200 missing figure and loss of arms indicates continuing poor state military training and political indoctrination.)
- c.
- French mobile striking force in Delta is now reduced from 40 (before Central Laos and Dien Bien Phu) to 15 battalions. (This would appear to virtually eliminate French capabilities for offensive operations in the Delta.)
- 5.
- French Casualty Allowance. Unofficial reports continue to be received that French forces are limited in operations by a prescribed allowance for casualties, based on replacement capabilities. Most recently, this allowance was quoted as 3% of force committed.
- 6.
- Enemy Capabilities. Watch Committee, 28 January, reports Viet Minh may develop capability both to reduce Dien Bien Phu and to push into Northern Laos. The G–2Sitrep of January 22 reported that the high rate of Viet Minh logistical buildup in Dien Bien Phu area, if continued for 1 month, would permit 60 days combat supplies for 3 Viet Minh Divisions.
W. Park
Armstrong, Jr.