751G.11/l-1854: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State1
1265. Repeated information Paris 385, Hanoi unnumbered. Had long talk with Bao Dai yesterday and have never seen him more confident [Page 978] and pleased with situation. While new government, he said, had no names of great prestige, it was government of young, able, reliable and devoted men. He mentioned especially Quat, Le Thang and Dac Khe.2 Latter had ability, courage and decisiveness. He talked a little too much and, Bao Dai remarked with chuckle, in spite of his independence, he was always ill at ease and over-embarrassed in his, Bao Dai’s, presence. Le Thang was very intelligent and resourceful, and Quat was really first class and loyal. It was true that Tran Van Tuyen3 had taken public stand announcing he was not member of government, but Tuyen had asked Bao Dai to attach him to imperial cabinet, and Bao Dai intended to do so since Tuyen was ingenious and active.
Without asserting that present government was an ideal one, he could trust it, both from standpoint of loyalty and certainty that it would not make any blunders. He said every time he left for France he feared that Tam would do or say something that would cause trouble for which he would have to bear blame since he could not disavow his appointed chief of government. He was also thoroughly satisfied with De Jean and Navarre. (Ung An, Bao Dai representative in Saigon, told me that though formation of government has required 20 days, De Jean had never tried to “mix in” the matter. Previous French High Commissioners he alleged had always attempted to intervene in greater or lesser degree in Vietnamese Government changes. (Bao Dai said he was already in substantial agreement with De Jean as to main points of negotiation with France.) Vietnam had only two new things to ask of France, for Bao Dai considered that transfer of services and powers still in French hands had already been granted in principle by French declaration of July 3. Bao Dai wanted name of French Union changed to Union of Associated States. De Jean had agreed, but both realized that this change of name might encounter opposition in French parliament. He had suggested to De Jean that he (De Jean) leave for France before long to try to “sell” this proposal. Second Vietnamese request was for abolition of Ministry of Associated States and placing Vietnamese Relations in French Foreign Office. (With this De Jean is privately in hearty agreement).
There would be no difficulty about counter-privileges and advantages for France which were clearly promised in Buu Loc’s speech at inauguration dinner on 16th. He hoped that speech would reassure French as to sincerity his gratitude for French sacrifices in IC.
[Page 979]As regards continuation of military and customs arrangements among AS, he understood from De Jean that France would be willing to step out of present quadripartite arrangements and allow AS negotiate new tripartite arrangements. Vietnam was quite willing carry on with customs union provided Cambodia wished. I remarked that in my last talk with Cambodian King, latter seemed to be reconsidering his position of last summer against continuation of customs and economic arrangements with other AS. Bao Dai said he must have a meeting with King, whom he has known for good many years. Vietnam had no designs against Cambodia; on contrary, it would like cooperate militarily and in all other ways.
Bao Dai said he expected to negotiate these matters with De Jean (and presumably with Jacquet who arrives January 19) so that sending of delegation to Paris would be essentially a ceremonial signing of agreements already reached in principle or in detail.
Aside from conclusion of future contractual arrangements with France, he (Bao Dai) wished to negotiate away any objections France might have toward establishment of Vietnamese diplomatic relations with Japan and Nationalist China. Bao Dai said only reason for long delay in establishing relations with Japan was Tam’s somewhat anti-Japanese attitude. He did not anticipate any particular French objections to Vietnamese diplomatic relations with Japan. In case of recognition of Nationalist China which he, Bao Dai, favored, he was afraid lest French might object that this might be taken as a provocation by Communist China and decide latter to direct intervention in IC war. He personally thought that fear was without foundation and inquired as to US attitude toward such recognition.
I informed [him] that on instructions from my government, I had already answered a Laotian inquiry by stating that I viewed such recognition as a logical, advantageous step for Laos and we felt it would be equally logical and advantageous for Vietnam. My government has not so far urged this point of view on either Vietnam or France presumably in view of military responsibilities of France for protection of IC. Bao Dai said he thought US should use its influence with France to persuade her to withdraw any objection to Vietnam’s diplomatic relations with Formosa. He then inquired whether Formosa really wanted to establish such relations with Vietnam, and I replied that it was my belief that it did and the Formosa had already, I understood, made certain overtures to Laos and Cambodia. When I had seen Chiang Kai-shek in December, latter had charged me particularly to convey his friendly greetings to Bao Dai, telling him that he was following with interest and sympathy developments here.
Bao Dai and I then discussed difficulties of government and attaining national unity in Vietnam. There was no aristocracy on whom he [Page 980] could rely. Political parties were only little groups of leaders or would-be leaders without popular following. This was less true of Dai Viet and Bao Dai repeated his confidence in ability and loyalty of such Dai Viet leaders as Quat and Le Thang. Catholic Church was an element of stability and would probably favor a truly national government of monarchical character. It was not true that Bishop Thuc and his brother, Ngo Dinh Diem, were against Bao Dai and monarchy because of family rivalry. As matter of fact, Bao Dai said, Ngo Dinh Diem, despite his attitude of opposition, was former mandarin and had certain “nostalgia” to return to his former connection with monarchy. It was true that other religious groups, Cao Daist and Hoa Haos, were uncertain in their loyalty and ambitions, but this, Bao Dai thought, was largely fault of French who still were paying their confessional troops. Certain French military authorities could not, he said give up idea of retaining these mercenary troops under French control. I suggested it might be possible to negotiate discontinuance of France paying these troops. Bao Dai said that when that stopped, he would not have much difficulty in keeping these two sects and their “armies” in line.
He went on to say that so-called “elite of Vietnam” were an element that could not be depended on. He had agreed that Buu Loc should see all “fence-sitting” Nationalist leaders, but he felt certain in advance that, in spite of their protestations of desire to achieve national unity and of loyalty to Bao Dai, they would not enter into government. His premonitions had been confirmed. He attributed their continued refusal to work with government largely to their fear of accepting any responsibility.
Real support of monarchy, Bao Dai argued, was among the peasants. That had always been case, even when as in former times monarch was “invisible” to masses.
He thought that eventual form of Vietnamese Government might well be along American lines. Privy council, which he had appointed and which I hoped ex-presidents Tam and Huu would join, would be precursor of something like our Senate or House of Lords; a check on National Assembly which would eventually be elected. Parliamentary democracy had worked in England, he said, because of attachment to throne and slight “brake” afforded by House of Lords. It certainly did not work in France, to his very great regret, because French were great people of genius and ability. He greatly fears that if within 2 years France did not solve its governmental problems, she would be in great economic and political difficulties, with Communists perhaps well entrenched. Bao Dai expressed interest in powers and role of our Supreme Court. I remarked that as an American I naturally thought that our governmental system was worth studying, but of course, [Page 981] eventual governmental system in Vietnam should take into account traditions and structure of the country.
Bao Dai said that he expected to go to France before long. His chronic malady of liverflukes was yielding to treatment, but his newest affliction was boils for which so far local physicians had not found remedy. He mentioned his afflictions humorously and only in response to my question as to state of his health.
- This telegram was transmitted in three parts.↩
- Reference is to Phan Huy Quat, the Minister of Defense; Le Thang, the Minister of Information; and Nguyen Dac Khe, Minister Attached to the Presidency of the Government in Charge of National Democratization.↩
- Tran Van Tuyen, Vietnamese nationalist; Secretary General of the League for National Resistance.↩