751G.5 MSP/1–554: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Joyce) to the Department of State

confidential

2502. Repeated information Saigon 255. Jacquet is incensed at what he regards as deformation of his comments on Indochina which are quoted in Joseph Alsop’s January 4 Washington Post article (Deptel 2376 January 4).1 Jacquet’s account of what actually transpired in interview is that Alsop forced question of what would be French reaction to sending of US troops to Indochina (under French command) stating, “I intend to force the hand of the American Government in this matter as the only means of saving the situation.”

To the unexpected suggestion that US troops be sent to Indochina Jacquet replied that this was only one of many possible courses which might provide a solution to the Indochina impasse. Among others, he included (a) negotiating with Ho directly, (b) negotiating on an international plane either with Peking or as part of a four or five power conference, (c) placing the matter in the hands of the UN. He stated that in his opinion if French public opinion was not presented with precise plan of action for Indochina within the next three to six months pressure on the Assembly would be such that it would be unable to support any government which did not present the prospects for a prompt Indochina solution not excluding withdrawal as a last solution.

It is an apparent distortion of this statement which led Alsop to report that the National Assembly would insist on the recall of the French expeditionary force unless Allied reinforcements were provided within the next three to six months. The statement should have read according to Jacquet “within three to six months French public [Page 941] opinion will oblige the National Assembly to support only that government which can promise a solution to the Indochina problem even if the solution is withdrawal.”

As for Bidault’s statement that French Government would have to abandon Indochina in a matter of weeks unless American troops were made available, Jacquet reports this statement even more distorted. Bidault has been more opposed to American troop participation than any other member of the Cabinet and that as we know the policy of the French Government for years has been to seek all forms of American aid other than direct troop intervention.

Furthermore, Jacquet told Alsop that whatever is done on a political plane, the Indochina military position must be improved within the near future if the French Government is to gain support for any policy but withdrawal. As he pointed out this too has been said many times before.

Jacquet attributed Alsop’s distortions of what was said to the latters emotional fervor and personal belief in the need for sending US troops. He quoted Alsop as saying that if US troops were sent to Indochina, he “wanted to take part in the campaign.” Jacquet said that rather than seek his opinion, Alsop inflicted his own. He also described Alsop’s French as being poor and admitted the possibility that this may have been a contributing cause to his misrepresentation. Foreign Office also referred this morning to Alsop’s attempts to advance his own theories, rather than receive an account of French opinions.

We took pains to remind Jacquet as we had Foreign Office this morning of disastrous effect such an article as Alsops could have on US opinion, particularly at this time when questions of further specialized aid are being considered. He was only too aware of this and deplored results that irresponsible newspaper report might have on hitherto unprecedented degree of understanding and cooperation between our two governments in this difficult and supremely important question.

On the current situation, Jacquet stated that the greatest danger at the moment comes from Paul Reynaud who is again with Edgar Faure’s support (who prefer negotiation however) pushing the Cabinet to embark on the immediate adoption of a policy of withdrawal. He stated that he, Bidault, and Pleven, had had great difficulty in last Cabinet meeting of December 30 in putting down Reynaud on this proposal. Reynaud is aware of the great difficulties that any evacuation plan would entail and the length of time required to carry it out and therefore recommends that process be begun at once.

As to present military situation in Indochina, Jacquet is not too disturbed. His greatest concern is with the fact that the Viet Minh have now brought in anti-aircraft and may cause an abandonment of the field at Dien Bien Phu.

Joyce
  1. Telegram 2376 to Paris, Jan. 4, repeated for information to Saigon as telegram 1160, read as follows:

    “Alsop column carried Washington Post January 4 entitled ‘French Want More Help in Indochina’ attributes to Jacquet statement National Assembly would insist on recall French Expeditionary force unless allied reinforcements provided ‘within the next three to six months.’ Article also ascribes to Bidault remark French Government would move to abandon Indochina struggle ‘in a matter of weeks’ unless American troops available. General tone article more pessimistic than recent reporting from Embassy Paris … and quotations from Jacquet and Bidault regarding American troops for Indochina are alarming. Department desires Embassy’s estimate Alsop presentation urgently.” (751G.5 MSP/1–454)