751G.00/11–3053: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State
2113. Repeated information Saigon 208. Marc Jacquet, Secretary of State for Associated States, said following today regarding Ho Chi-Minh interview Swedish newspaper Expressen:
- 1.
- Jacquet has suspected possibility coming Ho Chi-Minh démarche for several reasons, including (a) Viet Minh radio line, and (b) Bao Dai’s increasing recent intransigency. Latter undoubtedly knew of Ho’s démarche in advance, and will now become more attentiste than ever.
- 2.
- Jacquet had no warning of Swedish newspaper being used as intermediary and made his statement to paper late Saturday evening1 without prior consultation with government (Embassy telegram 2096).2
- 3.
- He is distressed by Laniel’s reaction. They had two-hour session together this morning, in course of which Prime Minister explained why he had issued government “mise au point” to effect that interpretation Jacquet’s statements “can not in any way be considered as corresponding to the position of French Government”. Jacquet made no attempt conceal his displeasure that Prime Minister should attempt [Page 889] censure his comments which were “in keeping with related statements on subject made by other French officials in recent past”. Laniel informed him he had been obliged to issue mise au point because Jacquet statement would “be misunderstood by and get us in trouble with Americans” who would now think again that France would neglect military prosecution of war in effort to negotiate peace at all costs.
- 4.
- Jacquet disagrees, stating that because of consideration set forth below, policy must remain unchanged and was “to pursue war with greatest effort possible as a means of improving chances for a successful negotiated peace”. Laniel was mistaken to under-estimate American appreciation this fact, but was led by poor advisers within the government. This evident reference to Paul Reynaud.
- 5.
- Although Ho is undoubtedly in some military difficulties, this could not possibly explain démarche. In addition to obvious attempt to fan existing French desire for end to Indochina war, step also probably designed to throw wrench into Bermuda and shift blame continuation Indochina war to West. Nonetheless, Jacquet believes that Ho is serious and ready to make attempt to negotiate after Bermuda, “probably on impossible terms”.
- 6.
- He regards French task as now being more urgent and difficult than ever. Ho démarche would not only increase difficulties at home with “negotiate now on any terms” faction, but will at same time make it mandatory for government to achieve steps necessary to clear atmosphere for negotiation on any acceptable terms.
- 7.
- This means two major and immediate steps, both of which can be accomplished through Bao Dai, (a) present Tam government “which everyone judges correctly as a puppet government” must be removed and replaced by government with truly nationalist representation and following, (b) negotiation of bilateral treaty with France proclaiming Vietnamese independence and fixing new association must be undertaken and completed before any negotiation with Ho can take place. Only after these two steps have been accomplished can there be any hope carrying out a negotiation on “acceptable terms”. In the meanwhile, war must be pursued actively.
Comment: Jacquet is a Gaullist and his position in the government has not therefore, become easier. He remains, however, the French official in Paris who, in our opinion, is closest to the Indochina problem and best qualified to pass judgment concerning it. He has learned a great deal in recent months and his recent trip to the Associated States has helped even more. His conclusions appear to arise from detailed study, observation and analysis of the facts, rather than from a combination of spotty knowledge and emotional reasoning, which [Page 890] is not uncommon here. He appears to be less motivated by internal political conclusions than most. For these reasons his comments are worthy of note.
Interview left us with strong impression that Ho démarche has increased difficulties of government considerably. Bao Dai may now become both more hesitant and more difficult while prospects of negotiating mutually satisfactory treaty association with Vietnamese Government are reduced (why negotiate with France now that France is going to negotiate with the Viet Minh?). No one in Cabinet yet expects démarche will lead to anything specific in way of negotiations, but it was nevertheless brilliantly timed and will succeed in making everyone’s task more difficult.