751G.00/11–1953: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
879. Repeated information Paris 252, Hanoi unnumbered. I accompanied Senator Smith (N.J.)1 and Dr. Francis Wilcox2 on call on General Navarre who explained “Navarre plan” while deprecating having his name attached to it. Navarre stated that circumstances would require him to wage an essentially defensive war in north until summer 1954, but this would not preclude French tactical offensives in that region or clean-up of Tonkin delta. Meanwhile, as Vietnamese Army built up, he planned offensive operations to destroy Viet Minh Forces in south and central Vietnam. This should be accomplished by next June by which time, as a result of expansion of his own forces, of military and economic losses and difficulties which would be inflicted on Viet Minh, by using some of new Vietnamese National Army units and freeing certain French Union units from their present state of warfare duties, he would have a sufficient striking force to force main Viet Minh Armies in north to decisive battles. He hoped that by April 1, 1955 or certainly by May, or June, to have inflicted military defeat on Viet Minh. This did not mean that hostilities would then be entirely over since there were vast regions of forests, jungle, and mountains from which Viet Minh could still indulge in guerrilla harassment. It might take another two years or so to wipe out such last-stand guerrilla operations but that campaign would be essentially a police rather than military operation and Vietnam would have forces to cope with it alone.
[Page 877]Navarre believed there was no Chinese intention at present to intervene as a belligerent. There would be danger of such intervention later when Viet Minh began to suffer serious reverses. In this respect there is perhaps a distinction to be drawn between Korea and Vietnam. If Chinese Communists had not entered war when MacArthur’s3 troops stood at Yalu, all north Korea would have been lost in few days to communism. Defeat of Viet Minh would not come about in one dramatic military movement which might provoke Chinese intervention but would come about more gradually. He felt Chinese would not want intervene since they must have some fear of ultimate consequences of such action.
In reply to Senator Smith’s question Navarre said that American aid now programmed should be sufficient successfully to accomplish his plan. He had two worries. One was that prior to his arrival French had agreed to give a degree of autonomy to Vietnamese National Army which interfered with successful unified command. He had operational command over Vietnamese Army but no direct powers over its formation, instruction and administration. He was about in same situation as General Gruenther in relations to Armies of Belgium, Holland and other European states. But General Gruenther was dealing with solid, adult armies. Navarre said he should have more direct authority over training and formation of cadres of Vietnamese Forces and in selection and promotion of officers. With respect to latter there was too much favoritism, family influence, and too much insistence that officers must hold “diplomas.” It would be difficult to persuade Vietnam to relinquish any of its present degree of military autonomy but he thought it might be accomplished by “diplomacy.”
Second problem was how to instill these troops with a really warlike spirit. He did not specify in this conversation just how this was to be achieved. In previous conversations he has deplored reclusive habits of Bao Dai and absence of really dynamic government.