751G.00/10–2353: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
1593. Repeated information Saigon 159. Embassy officer saw Vietnamese High Commissioner Prince Buu Loc yesterday at latter’s request. Had hour interview just before Buu Loc proceeded to Matignon receive French “note” from Laniel for Bao Dai and Government.1 He will take note to Cannes today and discuss action to be taken with Bao Dai before latter’s departure for Saigon October 26.
It was immediately evident that Buu Loc is very seriously worried about present atmosphere Paris concerning Indochina and he repeatedly [Page 843] asked officer if Embassy could exert its influence on French to preserve their “sangfroid” stand and not take any action which might extend present crisis. Described reaction French officials with whom he had conferred since his return from Saigon (presumably including Laniel and Jacquet) as being unexpectedly severe. He sympathized entirely with their reasons but regretted vehemence their attitude and attributed it to failure appreciate political immaturity Delegates of National Congress. He himself had been equally shocked at resolution advocating break with French Union “in its present form”. He believes it to be immature, unwise and deplorable in its effect. He had had no forewarning of it else he should have tried stave it off. His efforts counteract its effects later had only been partially successful.
Vietnamese is as much as individualist as Frenchman but lacks latter’s political sophistication. When for first time he found himself in democratically representative assembly, he lost his balance and indulged in emotional extravagances import of which he did not understand. Buu Loc was convinced most delegates, with possible exception recent Viet Minh converts who may have purposely set out sabotage Congress, now realized what they had done and would undo it if they could without losing “face”. He quoted last night’s France-Soir article by Lucien Bodard (“best journalist in Indochina”) to effect he had interrogated numerous delegates of Congress and had failed discover single one who would now declare he wished either break with France or replace Bao Dai as being entirely accurate. He regretted French public opinion had not paid sufficient attention favorable declarations which had been made to Congress. He quoted opening and closing speeches Tran Trong Kim and his own first speech as examples.
When questioned about Tam’s role in Congress, Buu Loc was especially bitter. Tam was so concerned with his own doubtful political future, he did little hold Congress in line. He was convinced Buu Loc wished replace him as Foreign Minister which was absurd.
Buu Loc hoped terms French note he was about receive would not be too severe. If it attempts force Vietnamese “retract publicly and lose face” it will fail and all will be lost. Neither must French open juridical argument which could go on for months. If this deplorable “incident” could be glossed over by mere understanding, tact and diplomacy both sides, he is convinced mutually satisfactory solution can be found. French Union should not pose an unsurmountable problem. There is nothing in French Constitution which prevents Vietnam [Page 844] from exercising its full independence while retaining its association with France on free and equal basis in French Union.
Buu Loc was hopeful Bao Dai’s presence Saigon would do much ease tension and bring dissidents down to earth. “Bao Dai has both his feet on ground while most of delegates appeared have theirs in air”. He took particular pains compliment Ambassadors Heath and De Jean for their role influencing delegates to be moderate. They both had outstanding appreciation of issues involved and “true friendship both Vietnam and France”.
In answer our question about effect all this would have on planned negotiations, he replied Laniel wanted Bao Dai name Vietnamese delegation immediately but it was impossible him do so under present circumstances referring particularly assembly debate and French “note”.
We were deeply impressed throughout by Buu Loc’s air of gravity which we had never seen present in him before. There is no doubt this time he believes French have been pushed too far and something must be done quickly make amends. As Department knows, Buu Loc’s reactions are usually reflection Bao Dai.
- On Oct. 21, following a meeting of the Council of Ministers, the French Government issued a communiqué announcing that a note would be transmitted to the Vietnamese Government asking for an explanation of its position in light of the resolutions passed by the Vietnamese National Congress. The text of the communiqué was transmitted to Washington in telegram 1574 from Paris, Oct. 22. (751G.00/10–2253) A summary of the main points of the French note was transmitted in telegram 296 from Hanoi, Nov. 19. (651.51G/11–1953) The Vietnamese Government replied on Nov. 16, stating that it reaffirmed its wish to maintain the ties of free association between France and Vietnam, but insisted on full sovereignty and a relationship of equals. A translation of the Vietnamese reply was sent to Washington in telegram 906 from Saigon, Nov. 23. (651.51G/11–2353)↩