Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/10–2253: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

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Paris, October 22, 1953—1 p.m.

1575. Repeated information Saigon 153. Saigon eyes only for Ambassador. Limit distribution. Laniel feels that his government may be in serious difficulties in coming Indochina debate. He is asking for our help. He feels that it will be of real assistance to him if the Secretary or the President could make a public statement on Indochina prior to next Tuesday¹ when the Assembly debate is expected to reach its height. The key item which he hopes can be mentioned in such a statement is a reiteration of the feeling we expressed toward the French Union in the communiqué after the ministerial meetings in Washington last July.²

This matter was first raised and discussed extensively by Embassy officer with Jacquet and Fouchet, of Laniel’s Cabinet, during the course of yesterday.³ Last night, MacArthur and I dined alone with Laniel, and he put great emphasis on the help that such a declaration would be to him.⁴ I am sure that the Cabinet knows that he is requesting such a declaration from us and would be greatly disappointed if we cannot find a way to help.

Laniel told us that Bao Dai is leaving shortly for Vietnam, and that he hoped to be in a position on Tuesday to announce to the Assembly the names of the Vietnamese delegation which will come here for negotiations. We have just learned that Bao Dai plans to leave on Monday (Embtel 1573).⁵

There follows a series of suggestions for such a statement in the form of an informal draft which would be satisfactory to the French. Laniel emphasizes that these thoughts are only suggestions, and he has no desire or intention to suggest to Washington in any detail what we should say. However, [as] I mentioned before, he emphasized numerous times the importance of including a complimentary statement regarding the French Union as it is presently constituted and the importance of this lies in the fact that Laniel feels that it will be absolutely impossible to change the fundamental concept of the French Union, as set forth in the constitution which, in any event, provides for full equality for its member states (Embtel 1574).⁶ Changes that he has in mind are in the status of Vietnam within the French Union. He expects it to achieve full equality with other members of the Union, which is the ultimate goal for all members. Viewed in this light, the declaration by the National Congress in Saigon that Vietnam would not join the French Union in its present form is still entirely unsatisfactory if it is read to require a change in the fundamental constitution.

Suggested draft follows:

At the moment when an important offensive is underway in Indochina by the forces of the French Union, we find it inopportune to engage in any form of public speculation which might detract from the essential task of attaining the victory without which “independence” is a meaningless word.

The independence of Vietnam and the other Associated States is assured in the declaration of the French Govt of July 3, 1953. Provision has been made to determine the future relationship between France and each of the Associated States by means of free unrestricted negotiations on a basis of equality. The negotiations with Laos are already in their final stages while those with Vietnam and Cambodia will take place in the near future.

Regarding the question of the French Union, it is recalled that the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and France in the communiqué issued after their Washington talks of last July stated: “The French Union offers a harmonious and flexible framework within which the mutual interest of the participants may be guaranteed and their individual interests reconciled”.

Our own contribution to the common effort permits us to remind our Vietnamese friends that defeat will result in their subjugation under a form of totalitarian colonialism far worse than anything they have experienced in the past and will nullify the progress toward self-government they have already made and have every reason to expect to consummate in the near future. It is to avoid such a catastrophe and hasten the ultimate victory that the United States Government has recently increased its aid to France and the Associated States for the conduct of the war in the amount of $385 million in the hope that those responsible in Vietnam will join their efforts to those of the courageous French and Vietnamese soldiers who have given their lives to assure Vietnam the independence to which it aspires. End of suggested draft.

It is our opinion that this debate can be very serious for the Laniel Government. As we pointed out last summer, it is very probable that, when Communist votes are included, there is a majority in the French Assembly favorable to leaving Indochina. Unless Laniel can achieve stronger party discipline than has been noted in the past, it is perfectly possible that his government could fall. The situation is certainly serious, and I hope that Washington will be able to find a way to help.⁷

MacArthur concurs in this telegram.

Dillon

1. Oct. 27.
2. For the pertinent portion of the communiqué, July 14, see p. 678.
3. The memorandum by First Secretary Gibson of his conversation with Secretary of State for the Associated States Jacquet on the evening of Oct. 21 is not printed. (751G.00/10–2153)
4. The dinner conversation was reported in telegram 1592 from Paris, Oct. 23. The telegram summarized discussion of European matters and simply stated that Laniel “was much harassed by the Indochina problem.” (740.5/10–2353)
5. Telegram 1573 from Paris, Oct. 22, read as follows: “High Commissariat Vietnam has issued communiqué stating Bao Dai, having received report on Congress from Buu Loc, has decided return Vietnam by air October 26. This confirmed by Commissariat.” (751G.11/10–2253)
6. Not printed, but see footnote 1, infra.

7. In telegram 1581 from Paris, Oct. 22, Ambassador Dillon provided the following additional information: “Re Embtel 1575. Both Matignon [office of Premier Laniel] and Bidault have expressed hope today that any statement we find it possible to make on Indochina will include reference to our hopes for an early peace. This might be done by adding phrase ‘and thus help to bring about an early successful termination of hostilities’ to last sentence of suggested draft contained reference telegram.

   “Comment: French obviously wish to avoid any impression here we closing door to possibility negotiated peace. US on other hand must emphasize thought that any termination of hostilities must be successful.” (751G.00/10–2253)

   In telegram 719 from Saigon, Oct. 23, Ambassador Heath stated the following: “We heartily concur suggested draft set forth Paris telegram niact 1575, repeated Saigon 153. However, we are less enthusiastic over suggestion added in Paris telegram 1581, repeated Saigon 157 since it might encourage those persons in French Government who desire a negotiated peace to feel this gives US endorsement to their view. Thus suggest that statement be made by President himself.

   “If statement is approved, we propose to translate it into Vietnamese and send copy of text to each member of recent Vietnamese National Congress with my card.” (751G.00/10–2353)