Secretary’s Memoranda, lot 53 D 444, “Bruce”
Memorandum of Conversation, by Paul J. Sturm1
Present:
- Mr. Jean Monnet, Commissaire Général du Plan de Modernisation et d’Equipement
- Mr. Pierre Uri, Conseiller Economique et Financier
- Mr. Sturm, Consul at Hanoi (on consultation in Paris)2
At his invitation I called on Mr. Jean Monnet, Commissaire Général du Plan de Modernisation et d’Equipement, at 11 o’clock this morning. I had known Mr. Monnet in Algiers during the war, and brought him letters from close mutual friends. Since Mr. Monnet was unable to receive me immediately he had me discuss the general problem of France’s position in Indochina with one of his principal assistants, Mr. Pierre Uri, Conseiller Economique et Financier. It appeared evident from my conversation with Mr. Uri that the interest of Mr. Monnet and his colleagues in the Indochinese problem relates primarily to its effect on the French economy and the position of France in Europe. Mr. Uri quoted statistics indicating that the equivalent of the whole current American contribution to French defense is being absorbed by Indochina, where only half the actual military expenditures are being met by such contribution. Mr. Uri indicated that this course cannot be long pursued and that the moment for radical decision may arrive abruptly.
When Mr. Monnet came into the room he explained that he had been detained by questions arising from the current meeting of the Ministers of the Council of Europe. He expressed interest in my assignment to Hanoi and declared that Indochina was the key to the present French political and military position. He said that he intended to speak to me very personally and frankly and went on to say that in his view France had no alternative except to withdraw from Indochina, on pain of failing to meet its commitments in Europe. He said that American critics had indicated the necessity for fiscal and other reforms in France to strengthen the nation’s international position, and while admitting that reforms were still necessary, he said that the French rate of taxation, about 30% of the national income, is the highest in the world and implied that the burden on the French people could not be increased. Mr. Monnet said that he had expressed these sentiments to Messrs. Acheson and Harriman3 at Lisbon and that they [Page 76] were well aware of his feelings. Apart from the purely economic aspect, Mr. Monnet said, there was the question of the army cadres which by their presence in Indochina prevent the proper constitution of the army in France, He added that it is impossible to contemplate the reconstitution of a German army without a corresponding strengthening of army establishments in Metropolitan France.
Mr. Monnet said very emphatically that the French in Indochina were up against an immediate crisis, the solution of which could not be long delayed. He said that the western world would awake one morning to find that France was no longer able to do anything further in Indochina. I referred to the interest of the western powers generally in the maintenance of Southeast Asian defenses against Communism, which gave Mr. Monnet the opportunity of stating that resistance in that area is one of common interest to all the western powers and that the burden accordingly must be more equitably distributed. I referred to Secretary Acheson’s recent statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the course of foreign aid hearings as evidence that there is acute consciousness in Washington of the danger in Indochina.4 Mr. Monnet said that if that was the case, there should be immediate action and that long-range planning would not meet the requirement. With further reference to Mr. Monnet’s statement regarding possible French withdrawal, I indicated that this would appear to be extremely difficult since the French in Indochina have a very large tiger by the tail. He immediately agreed that withdrawal would be catastrophic but might nevertheless be dictated by events.
Mr. Monnet asked me if I had talked to any Ministers in Paris and I replied that I had not. He said that I should talk to Mr. Pleven5 and said that he would try to arrange an interview. I told him that I had talked to members of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Associated States. Sardonically he commented that such persons would be “polite” and reassuring with regard to French intentions in Indochina, but that I should not be taken in by any statements they might make for the pressure of events would certainly give them the lie.
During the course of this conversation I received the impression that both Mr. Monnet and his staff have relatively little concern with the Far East and feel that France’s interest lies overwhelmingly in Europe. My references on several occasions to the interest of the western democracies in Southeast Asia as a whole met with no real response, [Page 77] and I was left with the impression that if Mr. Monnet were in a position to dictate the policy, he would leave the Far East to whatever arrangements the United States and the United Kingdom might be able to make there, with a minimum of French participation. In other words, Monnet would liquidate whatever now remains of French interests in Indochina.
- On Mar. 25, Philip W. Bonsal, Chargé in France, transmitted this memorandum to Ambassador David K. E. Bruce in Washington. Bruce had been named Under Secretary of State on Feb. 7, entering into office on Apr. 1.↩
- Sturm was en route to his post.↩
- W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security.↩
- Reference is to testimony by Secretary Acheson In support of the Mutual Security Program on Mar. 18. A portion of his remarks dealt with Indochina and its effect on the French financial situation; for text, see Mutual Security Act of 1952: Hearings before the Committee on foreign relations, United States Senate (82d Cong., 2d sess.). p. 93.↩
- René Pleven, Minister of Defense since Mar. 8, 1952; former Premier.↩