Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

396.1 LO/10–1753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

secret

London, October 17, 1953—4 p.m.

Secto 23. Repeated information Paris unnumbered, Saigon unnumbered. Subject: Indochina discussion at tripartite meeting October 17 morning.

Re military picture Bidault reported Viet Minh preparing major effort in Tonkin delta with two divisions, two regiments and one “special division” grouped north of Hanoi and two divisions and one regiment assembled in south of delta. Does not expect new Viet Minh push into Laos, but this cannot be ruled out in view presence one division near Vinh.

Re “Navarre Plan” nine battalions from France will be in Indochina by end October. Aircraft carrier Arromanches has arrived, the additional Air Force personnel will be on hand by end of month and the additional US equipment is also arriving in quantity. Of the 54 commando battalions program 36 now activated with 18 to follow within next month thus completing ahead of schedule. Bidault reported Navarre also succeeded in creating a mobile battle corps by withdrawing elements from static defense but did not give figures.

Re political aspects Bidault said talks have started in Indochina following French July 3 announcement. These, however, relate to transfer of certain limited powers and essential negotiations will be conducted soon in Paris.

Re Laos matters progressing smoothly with Laotians first to recognize need for continued presence western technicians. Talks Paris started October 15.

Re Cambodia difficulties common knowledge. Quick agreement was reached concerning transfer of police and judicial powers, but military has been stumbling block. French have now agreed transfer territorial command west of Mekong to Cambodia, also command of five battalions on condition that three be returned to French command for operations. However, difficulties continue unresolved concerning date of return and use of these three battalions as well as re protection of French and other foreigners.

Re Vietnam talks have not yet started; no fault of French who appointed their delegation in August. Delay caused Bao Dai who wanted non-governmental representatives in his delegation also because difficulties with Tam, internal Vietnam politics and calling off [of?] National Congress. Latter not only disappointment but has caused unexpected great difficulties. Congress adjourned without designating panel of 20 from which 6 representatives to Paris talks were to be selected. Resolution denouncing French Union (Secto 12 repeated Paris 252 Saigon 3)¹ could have disastrous effect both on Paris talks and French public opinion. Bao Dai has sent telegram calling for remedial action, but Bidault not optimistic in view demagogic climate Saigon. Bidault warned that because public opinion and parliamentary pressure French Government could not continue present effort if nothing subsists of French Union, for example, in military field so important to all interested in Southeast Asia. Bidault remarked parenthetically that Bao Dai also much better than his reputation (Eden later mentioned that he had recently received rather glowing report on Bao Dai from MacDonald).

Bidault then raised question action in support of French should Viet Minh Air Force appear. According “entirely reliable sources” pilot training school established Nanning last April. Other sources report concentration jet equipment South China and completion air strip Langson. French have no jet planes Indochina as not best adapted for present operations, but French Air Force would become worthless day Viet Minh jets appear. While five powers staff agency at meeting June 1953 considered question military help in case Communist Chinese aggression Bidault wanted inquire at what point increasing Chinese aid would bring above support agreement into play.

Eden stated French report re Viet Minh planes communicated to British JCS and any information thereon will be given to French. While pointing out difficulties drawing up theoretical schedule of “percentages of intervention,” he recognized usefulness studying this important problem. UK fully understands link between Indochina and Malaya and improvement over past year would be wiped out if Navarre fails.

Secretary expressed great US appreciation French efforts Indochina which US sought to demonstrate in form very substantial financial and material aid.

Re possibility appearance Viet Minh planes US is studying this problem. Information given to US military who are checking their sources. The US is ready to consider what should be done if Communist China exceeds what could be considered a normal level of supplying military equipment.²

Dulles

1. Dated Oct. 17, p. 828.

2. Secretary Dulles briefed the National Security Council on the London Foreign Ministers conference at the 167th Meeting of the NSC, Oct. 22. The memorandum of discussion at that meeting indicates that Dulles stated the following with regard to the discussions at London concerning Indochina:

   “Bidault had reported on the military and political situation in Indochina. In the course of the Saturday [Oct. 17] meeting had come the news of the resolution adopted by the National Congress of the Vietnamese, denouncing the French Union. Initially, Bidault had been completely dismayed by the report. The situation, however, by Sunday morning seemed to him less serious, since by then the tone of the resolution had been much modified. Nevertheless, the upshot of all this had not been very hopeful. Premier Laniel had failed to forestall debate in the French Parliament on the Indochina war. It was quite possible, said Secretary Dulles, that this debate could end in the overthrow of the Laniel government and the consequent ruin of our ambitious plan to bring the war in Indochina to a successful conclusion.

   “With specific regard to the military situation in Indochina, Bidault had expressed to Secretary Dulles and Mr. Eden his great anxiety about the reports that jet planes would soon be made available to the Vietminh from Communist China. Secretary Dulles said that United States intelligence does not support French apprehensions in this regard. Our intelligence reported no airfields in Indochina capable of handling jet planes. If these planes were flown into Indochina from Chinese airfields, it would constitute direct and overt Chinese Communist intervention in the hostilities.” (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)