Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Secretary’s Letters, lot 56 D 459. “President”

The Secretary of State to the President

secret

[Washington,] September 29, 1953.

Memorandum For The President

All of the understandings we sought with the French regarding Indochina have now been concluded and it is expected that the Exchange of Notes, or Agreements,¹ will be signed at 6 p.m. Paris time today. An agreed communiqué will be issued at 6 p.m. Paris time tomorrow (noon, Washington time).

I attach a copy of the communiqué.

John Foster Dulles

[Annex]

Text Of Joint Communiquė Relating To Additional U.S. Aid For Indochina, To Be Released On Sept. 30 At 12 Noon, Washington Time, And At 6 P.M. Paris Time²

The forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina have for eight years been engaged in a bitter struggle to prevent the engulfment of Southeast Asia by the forces of international communism. The heroic efforts and sacrifices of these French Union Allies in assuring the liberty of the new and Independent States of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam have earned the admiration and support of the free world. In recognition of the French Union effort the United States Government has in the past furnished aid of various kinds to the Governments of France and the Associated States to assist in bringing the long struggle to an early and victorious conclusion.

The French Government is firmly resolved to carry out in full its declaration of July 3, 1953 by which it announced its intention of perfecting the independence of the three Associated States in Indochina, through negotiations with the Associated States.

The Governments of France and the United States have now agreed that, in support of plans of the French Government for the intensified prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh, the United States will make available to the French Government prior to December 31, 1954 additional financial resources not to exceed 385 million dollars. This aid is in addition to funds already earmarked by the United States for aid to France and the Associated States.

The French Government is determined to make every effort to break up and destroy the regular enemy forces in Indochina. Toward this end the Government intends to carry through, in close cooperation with the Cambodian, Laotian and Vietnamese Governments, the plans for increasing the Associated States forces while increasing temporarily French forces to levels considered necessary to assure the success of existing military plans. The additional United States aid is designed to help make it possible to achieve these objectives with maximum speed and effectiveness.

The increased French effort in Indochina will not entail any basic or permanent alteration of the French Government’s plans and programs for its NATO forces.

1. Infra.

2. This text was made public in Department of State Press Release No. 529, Sept. 30, 1953.

   This communiqué was the result of negotiations between U.S. and French officials in Paris, with instructions from the Department of State playing an important role in matters of both form and substance. A major point of contention was the French desire that the communiqué allude to the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Indochina, or at least not rule out that possibility. An advance French draft, transmitted to Washington in telegram 1255, Sept. 26, included the following paragraph:

   “On a purely military plane, aware that an increased effort is necessary to assure the success of existing plans for the destruction of the enemy’s battle forces, it was decided to send, temporarily, reinforcements to its expeditionary corps and to intensify, in cooperation with the Associated States, the formation of strong national armies which will be able to impose upon the Communist enemy a regime of liberty and independence under restored peaceful conditions.”

   In the same telegram, Ambassador Dillon commented as follows: “We had informed Foreign Office of importance we attached to point that communiqué reflect intention carry out Navarre plan and avoid any hint negotiations possible. Above is best attempt satisfy these requirements which Foreign Office states they can get through government in present political climate regarding Indochina. They state impossible get Cabinet approval any text which excludes possibility negotiated peace.” (751G.5 MSP/9–2653)

   In telegram 1170 to Paris, Sept. 26, the Department objected vigorously to the French draft. The telegram read in part as follows: “General tone draft communiqué is disappointingly soft and vague.… We would hope that French Government would agree that any indication of weakness at this juncture can only undercut Laniel–Navarre plan and negate additional effort which France with further US assistance is about to make. Communiqué at sharp variance both with energetic and determined tenor of exchange of letters and with specific assurances contained therein.… This matter is most important here where we have had overcome truly great difficulties find necessary funds and in meeting Congressional views. You should intervene personally with Laniel.” (751G.5 MSP/9–2653)

   In telegram 1273 from Paris, Sept. 28, Ambassador Dillon reported that as the result of his intervention that afternoon with Foreign Minister Bidault, the Foreign Ministry had agreed to a slightly revised U.S. draft. That agreed text, transmitted in telegram 1273, is virtually identical with the communiqué as released on Sept. 30. (751G.5 MSP/9–2853)