751H.00/9–1553: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State1

secret

458. Repeated information Paris 131, Phnom Penh unnumbered, Bangkok 15. For attention Senator Knowland. Senator Knowland and I had an hour and half conversation with Cambodian Prime Minister Penn Nouth yesterday. After introductory polite remarks, Senator stated that in his capacity as Majority Leader of Senate he could assure Prime Minister American Congress and American people were willing to help countries which helped themselves defend their liberties against Communism and cooperated with their neighbors in mutual defense. Prime Minister evidently on theory that best defense is to take offensive said that he felt deeply injured that Washington press had misinterpreted his declaration about Communism. It was not an expression of foreign policy of Cambodia but was made entirely for purposes of internal politics. Cambodian foreign policy had been clearly expressed on many occasions and had not changed and should not be confused with statements made for internal consumption. He avoided defining however just what was Cambodia’s policy of mutual defense cooperation with its neighbors. He argued his statement was merely an invitation for Viet Minh to get out and for Issaraks to lay down their arms by October 1, and a threat that if they did not do so government would take action against them. To remark that Washington press was entirely independent and it was press own interpretation of the declaration, Penn Nouth said he could not accept that because these press attacks had “diplomatic inspiration” and, turning to Chargé Montllor,2 who was present, accused him of having said to Foreign Minister that America would withdraw its aid if declaration were maintained. Montllor denied this immediately saying that his last talk with Foreign Minister had occurred two days before declaration was issued and before he even knew such declaration was contemplated.

Comment: Montllor explained that he had a general exploratory conversation with Foreign Minister several days ago in which he had explained concepts and policy of American aid and he believes that Foreign Minister failed to report this conversation to Prime Minister until after latter’s declaration with which Foreign Minister was not in accord.

Senator Knowland remarked there was ground for confusion in American press interpretation since declaration stated that Cambodia had nothing against Communism as such. Penn Nouth replied that that was due to American misconception in regarding Indochina as [Page 803] a whole instead of as three separate countries with separate problems. Both Senator and I disclaimed that any such conception was entertained in Washington.

In reply to Prime Minister’s complaint that he could not make plans as Cambodia did not receive direct arms aid from US, Senator and I both stated that whether direct or indirect, aid was for the common use. Senator added that if Cambodians did not worry about Communism in neighboring countries, Americans might inquire, why should US worry about it in a country 10,000 miles away. That, he said, however, was not our policy. Prime Minister indicated that we were inclined to view the three countries as one and claimed that we have been discriminating in favor of Laos as opposed to Cambodia. He said that Laos was getting American arms for 30 battalions whereas Cambodia has only 8.

I again took issue with allegation that we consider three states as one but added that we think of one common defense. With regard to arming 30 Laotian battalions, I said no such request had ever been made but recalled that Laotian Prime Minister in talking with me two days before had spoken of putting regional forces into Laotian regular army. Laotian Prime Minister had not, however, talked in terms of anything like 30 battalions. Laotian army had at present only about 7 battalions and these were not completely armed.

Penn Nouth then asked how, with only 8 battalions in the National Army, 4 of which were under French command, they could participate and assist in general defense of Indochina. I asked about status of 5 Cambodian battalions included in Union forces. Penn Nouth replied that France had agreed to Cambodian proposal to turn the 5 battalions over to Royal Khmer Army and to proposition that 3 would then be made available to united command. He added, however, that French could have control of these troops for only a limited period although the exact limit had not been indicated. Senator then commented that it created an impossible situation for a commanding general if he did not know when the troops under him might be withdrawn. General Trapnell assented.

I asked Prime Minister if there were other limitations on use of the 3 battalions. Prime Minister replied evasively that Cambodia did not have agreements with either Laos or Vietnam regarding territorial deployment of their forces and that so long as Cambodia had not reached a full agreement with French on turning over Cambodian forces to Cambodia it was impossible to make agreements with Laos and Vietnam. He added, however, that in case of hot pursuit Cambodian troops could go over the frontiers of neighboring Associated States.

Senator then made two points: (1) that it is technique of Communism to divide and conquer and that mutual defense concept is [Page 804] based on mutuality of action in defense of joint interests, and (2) that security of Cambodia depends in great degree on stopping Communism before it reaches Cambodian frontier. He pointed out that US had given freedom to Philippines, Great Britain to India and Pakistan, and that now France was giving full independence to Associated States. On contrary record of Soviets is one of steady aggression and absorbing former free states. Senator commented that in his 8 years in the Senate he had constantly supported mutual defense concept in belief that the three countries were cooperating militarily and under unified command in defense against a common danger and enemy, that in all frankness he should add that if the independent states in this area are not cooperating against the enemy in a way that he had believed they were he would, as majority leader in the Senate, have to reconsider his point of view and report to President and to Senate on his findings.

I then pointed out there was real danger that Viet Minh may strike south or central Laos and that would be a direct threat to Cambodians if it is not met with a joint defense by Associated States and Union forces. Prime Minister reiterated rather pettishly that Cambodia has no agreement with Laos and asked why we did not call on Thailand, the Philippines, or other countries in this area to support Laos. He added that France has no intention of tying fate of Thailand and Laos together, whereas in this area France makes constant demands on Cambodia to support its immediate neighbors. Senator replied that so far as he knew no Thailand official had ever said that his government does not regard Communism in a neighboring country as a matter of concern to Thailand.

At this point I read pertinent passages relating to a common effort from pentalateral MDAP agreement3 to emphasize obligation of five countries to cooperate in meeting the common threat. Penn Nouth replied even more pettishly that that agreement was only between France and US and did not really include Cambodia. I took immediate and warm issue with that statement pointing out that I personally had negotiated the agreement with Cambodia, Laos and French and [garble] changes [garble] by Cambodians and other parties. I [garble] Cambodian plan [garble] freedom in military field there was nothing that Cambodia could do. At this point conversation was broken off for lunch.

At Senator’s suggestion, I saw Penn Nouth alone after lunch. I said to him that while we sympathized with Cambodia’s desire for freedom and independence of action, Cambodian stand on limitations on French operational command of three battalions violated two principles [Page 805] which were explicit in the pentapartite agreement and our arms aid program to Indochina.

One was necessity of military cooperation between the three states and other was practical necessity of a unified command. This unified command happened to be French and for obvious reason just as command of forces in Korea was placed in American hands. I thereupon besought him very emphatically to withdraw his temporal and geographical limitations on use of the three battalions. As regards his intimation that it would be necessary to come to an agreement with the other two Associated States before Cambodian troops could be allowed to go to their territories, I said there could be no objection to making such arrangements with neighboring states in Indochina but he well knew that it would take six months at least and probably a year before any such arrangements could be made whereas the danger was immediate. He replied that a mere three battalions would make little difference in fate of war in Indochina. I said that in these months of near equilibrium of forces it might mean difference between victory and defeat. More important than practical effect were the principles of mutual cooperation and unified command.

He appeared to weaken and said that he might make such an arrangement but it would have to be secret. I said I would not attempt to suggest terms or form of agreement but must urge on him necessity of turning three battalions over without strings attached to them. I remarked that when I had talked with King and with him previously he had never raised question of these five battalions. Penn Nouth rejoined that French had suddenly come forward with a demand that they be allowed to maintain a garrison at Phnom Penh airport, which was completely out of line with whole course of discussions on surrender of French powers. I replied that I had not heard of this demand.

(Note: In talking with Dejean last night the latter said that demand for airport was purely Risterucci’s idea. He said French colony was so terrorized as result of incidents in Phnom Penh and fairly recent ambiguous statements by Cambodian Government regarding protection of French in Phnom Penh that Risterucci felt it was necessary to have French forces visibly adjacent to capital. Dejean said there is no military necessity to occupy airport and French would not insist upon it in case of Cambodian objections).

I remarked I was well aware of popular enthusiasm particularly among youth generated by King’s mobilization order. That enthusiasm was directed toward defense of Cambodia if attacked from without, noble but narrow aim. I hoped to see it develop into a crusading spirit of joining with its neighbors and France against common danger of Communist engulfment.

[Page 806]

In conclusion, I said to Penn Nouth I thought it would be desirable for me to see King and Prime Minister agreed that he would put through request.

Comment: Senator Knowland’s remarks and observations on necessity of mutual defense cooperation between Cambodia and other Associated States and French were impressively delivered and very useful.…

It may be necessary to warn King and his government that Cambodia’s failure to cooperate militarily even to a minimum degree with High Command and its Indochina neighbors must be followed by cessation of American aid and its re-allocation to countries which are actually engaged in fighting Communists. I believe no such steps should be taken until I have talked again with Penn Nouth and with King. They have had a very definite warning from Senator Knowland that as far as Congress is concerned persistence in policy of noncooperation might involve withdrawal of American aid.4

Heath
  1. This telegram was transmitted in three parts.
  2. Joseph J. Montllor.
  3. For text of the pentalateral military assistance agreement signed at Saigon, Dec. 23, 1950, see United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), 1952, vol. 3 (pt. 2), pp. 2756–2799.
  4. In telegram 446 to Saigon, Sept. 16, the Department expressed agreement with Ambassador Heath that no decision should be taken regarding the cessation of aid to Cambodia pending further study and further developments. (751R.00/9–1553) In a memorandum to Robertson and Bonsal dated Sept. 17, Ogburn of FE warned that the question of aid suspension should be examined very carefully, for the principle involved transcended relations with Cambodia and Southeast Asian affairs in general. (751H.5/7–1753)

    Meanwhile, Ambassador Heath reported in telegram 449 from Saigon, Sept. 14, that military aid to Cambodia had actually been suspended since the previous May. General Trapnell, Chief of MAAG, Saigon, had taken the action on his own initiative. (751H.00/9–1453) In telegram 489 of Sept. 19, Heath relayed the following additional information from General Trapnell. Deliveries of MDAP equipment had been suspended in June (not May) due to large-scale desertions from Cambodian forces involving the loss of equipment. All items destined for Cambodia were being stored in Saigon. Cambodian authorities had not been informed of the suspension of military aid deliveries. (751H.00/9–1953)