751G.5/3–1952: Telegram

The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State

top secret

1829. Rptd info Paris 639, London 34. Re London’s tel 3988, March 121 and Paris tel 5623, March 15.2

Letourneau last month and very recently Gautier and Huu assured me Fr Govt not now engaged in or considering open negots with VM, and I credit these assurances.

I agree that sum of statements on subj by Fr leaders are equivocal. At very least, they seem invite offer to parley, either from VM or from neutrals like India, on an international framework in gen conf on FE matters fol conclusion Korean armistice.

It is true that possibility such negot has never been wholly absent from Fr mind. De Lattre actually confirmed (Legtel 1362 of February 2, 1951 also Legtel 1340, January 30, 1951)3 that Fr Govt or important part of it was favoring armistice negots just after his Vinh Yenh success. This was at time when Letourneau made his statement [Page 73] that “happily the doors have never been closed between the two camps”, a declaration entirely incompatible with the Vinh Yenh policy of categoric hostilities. Fr have never characterized IC hostilities as state of war but as rebellion. Latter can be more easily negotiated than total war. Dispersion, multi-dimensional character of fighting and fronts, and patchwork of defections and negots for defection involve broad and frequent contact between enemies in framework of intelligence operations. These channels may be, and probably have been, used for soundings by one side or other at critical turning points.

Fr long-range planning for worst contingency may give rise to still other rumors of negots (for example, head of SDECE pointed out that in case major disaster to delta, i.e. cutting of Hanoi–Haiphong road, withdrawal Fr and Eurasian civil element and rear troops cld only be managed by negot. He did not say whether these wld be with VM or Chi). We do not know but believe it possible Fr may have at some time made preliminary contacts in order identify possible channels of communication and that this activity may have given rise to reports.

To sum up it inconceivable to me that Fr at this precise time wld initiate negots looking toward an armistice and if they did that there wld be anything like a favorable response from VM. Latter with increasing Chi armament and other aid are still evidently thinking in terms of eventual victory. Fr have reports of lowered morale among VM troops as result recent battle operations and there good evidence lowered morale and growing anti-VM sentiment among populations subjected VM rule. But Fr have no reports indicating any slackening of will or optimism on part VM polit and milit command.

Heath
  1. Ante, p. 66.
  2. Ante, p. 69.
  3. Neither printed.