751G.5/9–253
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs (
Nash
) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Washington
, September 2, 1953.
Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to a letter
to you dated 24 April 19531 with which
was forwarded a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the
proposed French Strategic Plan (Letourneau–Allard) for the successful conclusion of the war
in Indo-China. Certain weaknesses in the subject plan were listed in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum such as an apparent lack of aggressiveness,
inadequate organizational and tactical concepts, and a failure to give
sufficient consideration to the development of indigenous leaders. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff stated that although they believed the plan to be workable
they considered that it could be improved considerably. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff, therefore, recommended that as much pressure as was feasible should
be placed on the French from the political point of view to obtain a
clear-cut commitment to overcome at least to some extent the listed
deficiencies.
The plan presented by the French Command[er] in Indo-China, General Navarre, to General John W. O’Daniel, appears to overcome most
of the objections to the Letourneau–Allard plan. In brief the Navarre plan calls for: (a) taking
the initiative immediately with local offensives, emphasizing guerrilla
warfare, (b) initiating an offensive (utilizing the
equivalent of three (3) divisions) in Tonkin by 15 September 1953, (c) recovering a maximum number of units from [Page 744] areas not directly involved in the
war, (d) reorganizing battalions into regiments and
regiments into divisions, with necessary supporting units and (e) developing the Armies of the Associated States and
giving them greater leadership responsibility in the conduct of
operations.
There is attached for your information a memorandum to the Secretary of
Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 28 August 1953, which states
that the present Navarre concept
appears to correct the previously indicated weaknesses and from their
viewpoint presents a marked improvement in French military thinking
concerning operations in Indo-China. Of course, the actual success of the
operations in Indo-China will be dependent upon the aggressiveness and skill
with which the French and Vietnamese forces conduct their future operations.
Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe, as does the Secretary of
Defense, that the necessary support should be provided to permit full and
vigorous implementation of the Navarre concept, conditioned upon continued implementation
of French support, demonstration of French intent by actual performance in
Indo-China, and continued French willingness to receive and act upon U.S.
military advice. Further, the French should be urged at all levels to
support and vigorously prosecute the Navarre concept to the maximum extent of their
capabilities.
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
Secretary of Defense (
Wilson
)2
top secret
Washington
, 28 August 1953.
Subject:
- The Navarre Concept for
Operations in Indochina.
- 1.
- In a memorandum for you, dated 21 April 1953,3 subject: “Proposed
French Strategic Plan for the Successful Conclusion of the War in
Indochina,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out certain weaknesses
in the LeTourneau–Allard plan, but felt that it was workable. During
the visit of the U.S. Joint Military Mission to Indochina,
Lieutenant General Navarre
submitted in writing to Lieutenant General O’Daniel, Chief of the Mission, a
paper entitled “Principles for [Page 745] the Conduct of the War in Indochina” appended
hereto, which appears to correct these weaknesses and which presents
a marked improvement in French military thinking concerning
operations in Indochina.
- 2.
- In his report Lieutenant General O’Daniel stated that, in his opinion, the new French
command in Indochina will accomplish under the Navarre concept the decisive defeat
of the Viet Minh by 1955 and that the addition of two or more French
divisions from outside of Indochina would expedite this defeat.
Additions other than in divisional organization would be in error
since it is the divisional team, with its combat proven
effectiveness, which is sorely needed in Indochina. Lieutenant
General O’Daniel further
reported that French military leaders were most cooperative with the
mission, that several agreements were accomplished to improve the
effectiveness of the proposed military operations, and that repeated
invitations were extended to the U.S. mission to return in a few
months to witness the progress the French will have made.
- 3.
- Based on past performances by the French, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have reservations in predicting actual results which can be
expected pending additional proof by demonstration of continued
French support and by further French performance in Indochina. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that a basic requirement
for military success in Indochina is one of creating a political
climate in that country which will provide the incentive for natives
to support the French and supply them with adequate intelligence
which is vital to the successful conduct of operations in Indochina.
If this is accomplished and if the Navarre concept is vigorously pursued militarily in
Indochina and given wholehearted political support in France, it
does offer a promise of military success sufficient to warrant
appropriate additional U.S. aid required to assist. U.S. support of
the Navarre concept should be
based on needs of the French Union Forces in Indochina for
additional equipment necessary to implement the organization of the
“Battle Corps” envisaged by the Navarre concept and necessary support of the planned
expansion of indigenous forces, such needs to be screened by the
Military Assistance Advisory Group in Indochina. In addition, to
improve the chances of success, this support should include
continued close liaison and coordination with French military
authorities together with friendly but firm encouragement and advice
where indicated.
- 4.
- In furtherance of the O’Daniel Mission the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
receiving Progress Reports from Indochina. Information received from
Indochina indicates the French are not pursuing agreements reached
between General O’Daniel and
General Navarre (including
the Navarre concept) as
vigorously as expected by General O’Daniel
[Page 746] and as contemplated by him
in his report. Progress reports state that (a) the French have “no plans for a general fall offensive
beyond limited objective operations designed to keep the enemy off
balance”, (b) reorganization into regiments
and division-size units “is still in the planning stages”, (c) there is “no sense of urgency in the
training of senior Vietnamese commanders and staff officers”, (d) the organization of a training command is
awaiting the solution of “political problems” and (e) the “organization of the amphibious plan has not gone
beyond the planning stages”.
- 5.
- In light of the apparent slowness of the French in following up
the Navarre concept and other
agreements reached between General Navarre and General O’Daniel, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that
additional U.S. support should be conditioned upon continued
implementation of French support, demonstration of French intent by
actual performance in Indochina, and continued French willingness to
receive and act upon U.S. military advice. Further, the French
should be urged at all levels to support and vigorously prosecute
the Navarre concept to the
maximum extent of their capabilities.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur
Radford
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Appendix
Principles As Stated By General
Navarre For The Conduct
Of The War In Indochina
- I.—
- To retake the initiative immediately through the carrying out,
beginning this summer, of local offensives and by pushing to the
utmost commando and guerrilla actions.
- II.—
- To take the offensive in the north beginning September 15, in
order to forestall the enemy attack. To conduct the battle which
will take place during the fall and winter of 1953–1954 in an
offensive manner by attacking the flanks and the rear of the
enemy.
- III.—
- To recover from areas not directly involved in the battle a
maximum number of units. To pacify these regions
progressively.
- IV.—
- To build up progressively a battle corps by grouping battalions
into regiments and regiments into divisions and by giving to the
units thus created the necessary support (artillery, engineers,
armor, communications) taking into account the very special
character of the war in Indochina (the terrain, the enemy). To bring
about a maximum of cooperation with the Air Force and the
Navy.
- V.—
- To maintain a reserve of special type units (armor, commando,
light battalions, etc.) for attachment to groups and divisions in
accordance with requirements of terrain and mission.
- VI.—
- To continue the effort of instructing and organizing the Army of
the Associated States so as to give them more and more participation
as well as more and more autonomy in the conduct of
operations.
